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Introduction
A substantial body of judicial and academic opinion assumes that
the government's use of the suspect as a source of testimonial evidence

through pre-trial interrogation is fundarfientally wrong.' This view is
1. Mr. Justice Goldberg best summarized this position when he stated, "We have
learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement
which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) (footnotes
omitted).
Yale Kamisar perhaps most forcefully expressed an academic's disdain for police interrogation in his "Mansion v. Gatehouse" analogy:
The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys bellow and strut and
prosecuting attorneys are hemmed in at many turns. But what happens before an
accused reaches the safety and enjoys the comfort of this veritable mansion? Ah,
there's the rub. Typically he must first pass through a much less pretentious edifice, a
police station with bare back rooms and locked doors.
In this 'gatehouse' of American criminal procedure-through which most defendants journey and beyond which many never get-the enemy of the state is a
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often expressed by judges in the context of analysis and application of
constitutional principles. The fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination prohibits the government from compelling testimonial evidence from a suspect and using it against that suspect in a
criminal proceeding. Courts have assumed that attempts to use the suspect as a source of testimonial evidence by means of police interrogation
involve elements of compulsion and are therefore improper if not outright unlawful. 2 Likewise, due process requires that before a court may
admit a confession into evidence, it must find that the suspect made the
confession voluntarily. The United States Supreme Court has expressed
doubts as to the voluntariness of statements made during police interrogation. 3 Indeed, as a general rule, no statement made during custodial
police interrogation may be admitted into evidence in the absence of
demonstrated adherence to "procedural safeguards."'4 While the Court
has stopped short of applying the sixth amendment right to counsel to an
interrogation which occurs prior to formal accusation, 5 some commentators believe that the pressures and coercive aspects of custodial interrogation render protective devices short of the presence of counsel inadequate
depersonalized 'subject' to be 'sized up' and subjected to interrogation tactics and

techniques most appropriate 'for the occasion'; he is 'game' to be stalked and cornered. Here ideals are checked at the door, 'realities' faced, and the prestige of law
enforcement vindicated. Once he leaves the 'gatehouse' and enters the 'mansion'--if
he ever gets there-the enemy of the state is repersonalized, even dignified, the public
invited, and a stirring ceremony of honor of individual freedom from law enforcement celebrated ..
. Tihe legal mind passes by or shuts out [this] de facto inquisitorial
system.
Y. KAMISAR, EqualJustice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American CriminalProcedure,
in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFSSIONs 31-32 (1980).

2. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) ("An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to
the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak."); id. at 457-58 ("The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with
one of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself.").
3. While Miranda rested on the fifth amendment privilege and the Court recognized
that "we might not find the defendant's statement to have been involuntary in traditional
terms," the Court's reasoning came close to traditional due process analysis: "Unless adequate
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,
no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." Id. at
457-58.
4. Id. at 444. This principle is now subject to a recently announced "public safety"
exception. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
5. Indications that the sixth amendment right to counsel applies to custodial interrogation prior to formal accusation in Miranda and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89
(1964), have not been followed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 438 (1974).
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to ensure truly voluntary confessions during that interrogation process.
They argue that all statements by suspects to law enforcement officers

that are not either spontaneous outbursts or statements made in the presence of counsel should be regarded as compelled incrimination and,
6
therefore, involuntary.
Even when statements resulting from custodial interrogation pass

constitutional muster, cases and legal literature frequently reflect an underlying view that it would be preferable to forego their use. The reasons

for this view often parallel fifth amendment rationales. Courts and commentators have asserted that the innocent often confess and that confes-

sions are inherently unreliable. 7 One encounters, as well, the argument
that it is simply unfair to convict a defendant on the basis of a confession
even if that confession is reliable. Under this view, the state should be
forced to "shoulder the entire load" by proving its case through other
evidence of guilt." This rationale is closely akin to the inquisitorial sys6. "[Pre-judicial interrogation is] irreconcilable with the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel." Weisberg, Police Interrogation ofArrested Persons: A Skeptical
View, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 21, 46 (1961); see also Griffiths & Ayers, A
Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 318
(1967); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, CustodialPolice Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital.
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1398 (1968); Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1615 (1967).
7. Among the many "fundamental values" and "noble aspirations" reflected by our fifth
amendment privilege is "our distrust of self-deprecatory statements." Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (Goldberg, J.); see Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79
HARV. L. REV. 21, 37-38 (1965); see also Ellis, Vox Populi v. Suprema Lex: A Comment on
the Testimonial Privilege of the Fifth Amendment, 55 IowA L. REv. 829, 844 (1970) (confessions by innocent suspects may be "self-punishment or self-abnegation" rather than disclosure
of the truth); Foster, Confessions and Station House Syndrome, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 683, 684
(1969) ("[S]cientific as well as humanitarian considerations require all confessions be held
inadmissible as evidence."); but cf Marshall, Evidence, Psychology, and the Trial Some Challenges to Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 197, 212-14 (1963) (declarations against interest may be an
"act of self-punishment or self-abnegation," but may reveal truth).
8. The Supreme Court has expressed the view that "men are not to be exploited for the
information necessary to condemn them before the law.... [T]he State which proposes to
convict and punish an individual [must] produce the evidence against him by the independent
labor of its officers . . . ." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961) (footnote
omitted).
Professor Wigmore, although unwilling to condemn all police interrogation, noted that
such a practice is a morally dangerous course:
The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If there is a right to an
answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected answer-that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into an unjust abuse; ultimately, the
innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. Such seems to have
been the course of experience in those legal systems where the privilege was not
recognized.
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tern argument, according to which interrogation of a suspect, whether by
the police or by the judiciary, smacks of the inquisitorial system of an-

cient English and present continental and communist courts, increasing
the possibility of "Star Chamber" abuses, in fundamental opposition to
our accusatorial system. 9 Finally, some commentators argue that use of
the suspect as a source of testimonial evidence is not necessary because
such evidence plays a minor role in the guilt-determining process and
other, more reliable forms of evidence are available.10 In addition, it is

argued that the minimal impact of the criminal justice system on the
control of crime does not justify the extensive state intrusions into individual liberty and dignity which accompany police interrogation. 1
From these arguments and assumptions, many judges and commentators conclude that the use against an accused of statements obtained
during custodial police interrogation cuts against the very nature of our
adversary system and violates constitutional principles. Since this type of

evidence plays a relatively minor role in our system of justice, it should
be severely restricted or, preferably, eliminated.

Of course, these attitudes and assumptions do not prevail unopposed, if they prevail at all. A significant body of authority recognizes no

impediment to the frequent use of police interrogation, nor does it see
any conflict between interrogation and our accusatorial system. This
8 J. WIGMORE,

A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
at 309 (3d ed. 1940); see also I. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMI-

COMMON LAW § 2251,

OF ENGLAND 441-42 (1883) ("[T]he fact that the prisoner cannot be questioned
stimulates the search for independent evidence.")
9. Under our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the
accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of
the accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation. 'The law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the
deluded instrument of his own conviction.'
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (quoting 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 46,
§ 34 (8th ed. 1824)); accord Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); Rogers v.
Richmond, 361 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966) (aw enforcement officials exaggerated
need for confessional evidence in five cases before the Court); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 488-89 (1964) (use of confessions less reliable and subject to greater abuse than extrinsic
evidence); see also Sobel, Majority of Confessions "Useless'" Evidentiary Rules No Block to
Prosecution,3 TRIAL 15, 16 (1967) (judicial exclusion of confessions does not measurably affect
successful criminal prosecution); Project, supra note 6, at 1519 n.6, 1579 n.157.
11. See Ellis, supra note 7, at 862. The writer's views were confirmed by Zeisel's study
which concluded that "law enforcement by itself is relatively powerless to control crime." H.
ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 4-5 (1982); see also Schwartz, The Mind of a
Liberal Law Professor: Selectionsfrom the Writings of Louis B. Schwartz, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
847, 848-49 (1983) ("Somehow we manage to conduct a fairly orderly, stable society although
arrests are made in a small percentage of offenses committed, and convictions lag very far
behind arrests.").
NAL LAW
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view regards statements of the accused as both reliable and extremely
valuable to the effective administration of justice. 12 Most statements of
the Supreme Court affirming the importance of police interrogation predate the Warren Court's distrust of confession evidence as expressed in
Miranda.1 3 Recently, however, the Court has begun to place considerable
value on such evidence. In 1977, the Court stated, "indeed, far from
being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers,
if not coerced, are inherently desirable."' 14 In a 1986 case, the Court
went further: "Admissions of guilt are more than merely 'desirable,'...
they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting
5
and punishing those who violate the law."'
Nonetheless, the arguments against police interrogation are significant and influential. They have given rise to numerous debates in judicial opinions and legal literature. While not all of these arguments
represent prevailing views, they are often advanced by influential scholars, and some have been accepted by the United States Supreme Court as
essential to our constitutional principles.
Debates on these questions most often rehash old arguments and
positions rather than propose new ideas or solutions, and the arguments
often reflect emotion or personal feeling rather than a reliance upon em12. For American authorities, see Barrett, Police Practicesand the Law-From Arrest to
Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 11, 45 (1962); Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical
Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 16, 16-17 (1961); Traynor, The Devils
of Due Processin CriminalDetection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 664, 675
(1966).
For English authorities, see Shawcross, Police and Public in Great Britain, 51 A.B.A. J.
225 (1965); Williams, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations Under Foreign LawEngland, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 50 (1961) [hereinafter Williams, Police
Interrogation];Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some FurtherPoints (pt. 2), [1960] CRIM.
L. REv. 352 [hereinafter Williams, Questioning by Police].
After an exhaustive study of the English criminal justice system, the 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure concluded that "there can be no adequate substitute for police
questioning in the investigation and, ultimately, in the prosecution of crime." THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT, 1981, CMND. 8092
4.1, at 70 (1981)
[hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981].
Certainly most law enforcement personnel have a high regard for the importance of confessions. One study found that prosecutors value confessions more than do the police. Robinson, Police andProsecutorPracticesandAttitudes Relating to Interrogationas Revealed by Preand Post-MirandaQuestionnaires:A Construct of Police Capacity to Comply, 1968 DUKE L.J.
425, 445 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
14. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
15. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1144 (1986). The Court did not cite statistical or
other authority for these conclusions.
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pirical evidence and logic.1 6 We may therefore find it refreshing to take
leave of our own rules and procedures and look to how a criminal justice
system not too distant from our own deals with similar issues.
Comparing the English system of justice with our own has a number
of advantages. First, English and American systems have the same common core: an accusatorial process in which the parties, rather than the
judge, have the primary responsibility for marshaling and presenting the
evidence, and in which the fact-finder is an all-lay jury. Second, both
England and the United States give the accused a similar, though not
identical, right to remain silent. England also has extensive experience
with rules governing police interrogation which protect this right that
can profitably be compared with our own. Its common-law voluntariness
principles and its Judges' Rules which embodied right to silence cautions
are comparable in many respects to American Miranda requirements.
Furthermore, the English interrogation process has been the subject of
extensive study and debate, much of it recent, factual, and objective. As
a result of some of these studies, principally the Report of the Royal Commission on CriminalProcedure in 1981, Parliament recently undertook a
7
major overhaul of the Judges' Rules governing police interrogation.'
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 modified the traditional voluntariness principle and directed that the Judges' Rules be replaced with
a detailed Code of Practice which has been implemented as of January,
1986.18 The new Act and the Code of Practice provide a unique opportunity to compare our rules to a modernized, comprehensive scheme for
the detention, treatment, and questioning of suspects.
A final important reason for analyzing the English approach is that,
at least in this century, the English are generally regarded as meticulous
in safeguarding the rights of the accused.' 9 In particular, it is often as16. After reviewing arguments of writers, pro and con, on the question of the propriety
and necessity of police interrogation, one commentator concluded, "To all appearances, most
of the above arguments fail to surpass the narrow bounds of emotion. Therefore, it is imperative that such an important issue be subjected to empirical analysis." Witt, Non-CoerciveInterrogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police
Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320, 321 (1973); see also Beaney, Foreword to 0.
STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT at viii (1973) (referring to
discussion of police interrogation as "highly polemical, often reflecting the particular bias of
the writer arising from his role or status in the legal order.").
17. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12. See infra notes 154-65 for a discussion of the Judges' Rules.
18. CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE DETENTION, TREATMENT AND QUESTIONING OF PERSONS BY POLICE OFFICERS (1985) [hereinafter CODE OF PRACTICE].

19.

See Kurland, The Administration of Criminal Justice in England: Some Invidious

Comparisons (Book Review), 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 193, 193-94 (1958); Traynor, Ground Lost

and Found in CriminalDiscovery in England, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 749 (1964) (observing that
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sumed that England, along with a few other countries, has either dispensed with or severely limited police interrogation of suspects. 20 A
recent comparison of the English Judges' Rules with our Miranda rights
concluded that the Judges' Rules provide superior protection for the individual in all areas except the right to counsel. 2 1
While the crime problem facing the English criminal courts is generEnglish law displays "enduring attitudes conducive to a large-souled concept of fair trial"); see
also Kauper, JudicialExaminationof the Accused-A Remedy for the ThirdDegree, 30 MICH.
L. REV. 1224, 1235 (1932) (noting that criminal procedure in England is characterized by
"the tradition of scrupulous fairness to the accused"); Steinberg, A ComparativeExamination
of the Role of the Lawyer in Our Present-DaySociety, 15 CASE W. RES. 479, 483 (1964).
This view of English criminal procedure is not, however, universally shared among American scholars. Some view aspects of the English system as strongly favoring the prosecution.
See M.

GRAHAM, TIGHTENING THE REINS OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA

228 (1983); Hughes, We

Try Harder,N.Y. REV., Mar. 14, 1985, at 17 ("English concerns for fair criminal procedure,
whether in legal analysis or judicial practice, remain trivial. The calm of English courtrooms
may resemble that of a desert."); cf M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 105-12 (1975).

20. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486-88 (1966); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 593, 598 (1961); see also Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV.
935, 1096 (1966) [hereinafter Developments] ("[I]nterrogation of suspects is on the whole probably less frequent and less intensive than in the United States.").
This illusion is apparently still prevalent despite the fact that nearly 20 years ago Illinois
Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer did his best to dispel it:
Most other countries utilize interrogation as a technique of law enforcement to a far
greater extent than does the United States. The experience of a few nations, however,
has suggested to some scholars that police questioning is expendable. These scholars
usually list England, Scotland, and India as nations which have dispensed with interrogation and suffered no serious social consequences. The observation is true, however, only of Scotland: and even in Scotland, only post-arrest or station-house
questioning has been eliminated.
W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 32-33 (1966).

Even Scotland has now altered its procedure to give police broader powers to question
suspects. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 authorized the detention and questioning
of witnesses and suspects. See Lidstone & Early, QuestioningFreedom: Detentionfor Questioning in France,Scotland and England, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 488, 497 (1982).
Countries which have severely restricted police interrogation, such as Italy and India,
have placed authority to question suspects in the hands of magistrates. See Scaparone, Police
Interrogationin Italy, [1974] CRIM. L. REV. 581; see also Balsara, CriminalProcedure,in THE
INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 231 (J. Minatur ed. 1978); Lushing, Comparative CriminalJusticeSearch and Seizure, Interrogation,and Identification of Suspects in India: A Research Note, 10
J. CRIM. JUST. 239, 244 (1982).

21. Kaci, Confessions: A Comparison of Exclusion Under Miranda in the United States
and Under The Judges' Rules in England, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 87, 108 (1982).
However, English scholars who have conducted extensive research concerning the English interrogation process would dispute this view. See M. MCCONVILLE & J. BALDWIN,
COURTS, PROSECUTION, AND CONVICTIONS 5 (198 1) (asserting that the rights of English suspects in police custody are "virtually non-existent" and that police practices are "more
favorable to the accused in the United States where the courts have striven in recent years to
give meaning to his rights.").
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ally not as severe as our own,2 2 evidence shows recent significant increases in the English crime rate.2 3 In fact, since 1980, the United States
crime rate has leveled off, and begun to decline, 24 while at the same time
the British crime rate has continued to rise steadily. 25 Furthermore, the

traditional equanimity with which the British have viewed their system
of justice has been undermined by declining public confidence in the police and worsening police-community relations.2 6 Consequently, English
courts now confront many of the same tensions between "law and order"
27
and personal liberty which we have faced for decades.
Learning how the English approach the complex and delicate
problems encountered in using the suspect as a source of testimonial evidence may give us new perspectives on the propriety of our own assump22. In 1958 Lord Devlin wrote that there is comparatively little organized crime in England and "the homicide rate in England, allowing for the difference in population, is about onetenth of that in the United States." He also noted that the number of persons in prison, again
allowing for the difference in population, is eight or nine times greater in the United States. P.
DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 134 (1958). Even in the 1980s, a substantial difference appears. For example, the rates (number of offenses per population figure)
of robbery and residential burglary in 1981 in England and Wales were about one-half of those
in the United States. M. HOUGH & P. MAYHEW, THE BRITISH CRIME SURVEY: FIRST REPORT (Home Office Research Study No. 76, 1983); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

1973-82 TRENDS

(1983) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT, 1973-82 TRENDS].

23.

Reported crime in England has increased five-fold since 1945. M. HOUGH & P.

MAYHEW, supra note 22, at 1; see also Shawcross, supra note 12, at 225.
24. See SPECIAL REPORT, 1973-82 TRENDS, supra note 22; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOUSEHOLDS TOUCHED BY CRIME, 1984; BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 1984. Twenty-five percent

of U.S. households fell victim to serious crime in 1985, but this represented a consistent decline since 1975, when 32% were victimized. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, HOUSEHOLDS TOUCHED BY CRIME, 1985.

25. M. HOUGH & P. MAYHEW, supra note 22, at 1-3. Recorded crime rose 8% during
1984, compared with a 1% fall in 1983. The annual increase in recorded crime since 1977 has
averaged 4%, with increases of 10% in 1981 and 1982, and 8% in 1984. HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL BULLETIN: NOTIFIABLE OFFENCES RECORDED BY THE POLICE IN ENGLAND AND

WALES [1984] (1985), reported in The Times (London), Mar. 13, 1985, at 2.
In response to the continuing increase in the British crime rate, the government recently
issued a "White Paper" containing a number of proposals to strengthen law enforcement efforts and "ensure crime does not pay." Recommendations included increases in prison
sentences and elimination of the right to jury trial for certain offenses. The Times (London),

Mar. 7, 1986, at 1.
26. See infra notes 687-88.
27. "The general view in the United States is that crime detection and the administration
of criminal justice in Great Britain is much more effective than it is here, but [Shawcross]
shows that the same problems confront both." Introduction to Shawcross, supra note 12, at
225. See also Reichert, Shoot-Out in Kensington High Street ... The British Response to a
London Bank Robbery, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 144 (1973). See generally D. SMITH & J. GRAY, THE
POLICE IN ACTION (Police and People in London No. 4, 1983).
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tions and approaches to these problems. As Justice O'Connor recently
pointed out, "The learning of [England and certain other countries] was
important to development of the initial Mirandarule. It therefore should
be of equal importance in establishing the scope of the Miranda exclu'28
sionary rule today.
I.
A.

General Restrictions on Police Questioning

The Right to Remain Silent

In many ways the right to silence principles of English law parallel
those of our own. However, in one fundamental respect the English right
is more limited than ours, with the result that police may subject the
accused to greater pressures. This important difference has not been
widely recognized by American authorities.
The following basic English principles regarding police questioning
are substantially the same as our own:
(1) Police may question any person, whether or not suspected of
29
criminal activity;
(2) A person questioned by the police is not legally obligated to respond, and the police have no legal power to compel answers. 30 This rule
reflects the common-law right to remain silent, recognized in both countries, which guarantees that no one may be required to incriminate
3
himself.
(3) Absent a proper arrest, police cannot take a person to a police
station for the sole purpose of questioning. A citizen may be arrested
28. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting) (footnote omitted).
29. HOME OFFICE, CIRCULAR No. 31, JUDGES' RULES AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS

TO THE POLICE app. A (1964), reprinted in [1964] 1 All E.R. 237, 237 [hereinafter

JUDGES' RULES]; THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE LAW
AND PROCEDURE 68, at 25 (1981) [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981].

The new Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 does not alter this principle.
30. While there may be a moral or a social duty to assist the police, there is no legal duty;
a suspect may refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority. Rice v. Connolly,
[1966] 2 Q.B. 414; CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance lB.
American law is in accord: citizens have a "deeply rooted social obligation 'to give
whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement,'" New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 665 (1984) ( O'Connor, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
478); see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980). But the police have no legal
power to compel answers. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 n.9 (1983); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969).
31. The English refer to the guarantee as the right to silence whereas we describe it as the
privilege against (or prohibition upon compelled) self-incrimination. Compare Regina v. Sang,
1980 App. Cas. 402, 436 (1979) with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436-37 (1966).
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and taken to the police station only upon reasonable or probable cause to
32
suspect that he is guilty of an offense.
Although statements of the right to silence are similar, there is a
significant difference in the substance of the right under English and
American law which is not readily apparent. If the right to silence is to
have any meaning, it must lie in restrictions on the adverse consequences
flowing from its assertion. In both countries, this limitation protects suspects from criminal prosecution or civil contempt for failure to answer
questions put by the police. But what of the legal consequences, if any,
of such silence once the defendant is brought to trial? Here, one must
distinguish between a suspect's silence before and his silence after he receives warnings as to his rights. Under both English and American rules,
the accused may legally suffer certain adverse consequences from his prewarning silence. According to recent United States Supreme Court decisions, both pre-arrest and post-arrest silence may be used to impeach a
defendant's trial testimony, provided the silence occurred prior to the
administration of Mirandawarnings. 33 It is not clear, however, whether
it could be used as substantive evidence of guilt if the defendant failed to
testify. 34 In England such silence also may be admissible, although its
evidentiary value is less clear. If, prior to the warning a suspect and police officer are speaking on even terms, and the officer makes an accusation against the suspect which an innocent person would be expected to
deny, the suspect's silence may be used as an acknowledgment that the
accusation is true.35 Generally, however, the police and the suspect are
not on an equal footing, particularly when the suspect is in custody, and
32. The introduction to the Judges' Rules recognizes the principle "that police officers,
otherwise than by arrest, cannot compel any person against his will to come to or remain in
any police station." JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237 n.2 (para. (b)); see HOME OFFICE,
CIRCULAR No. 89 (1978), reprinted in ARCHBOLD PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN

CRIMINAL CASES § 15-46 (S. Mitchell & P. Richardson 42d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
ARCHBOLD]; see also Regina v. Lemsatef, 64 Crim. App. 242, 245 (C.A. 1976) ("[P]olice officers have [no] right to detain persons for the purposes of getting them to help with their
inquiries."); Regina v. Houghton, 68 Crim. App. 197 (C.A. 1978) (exception under Prevention
of Terrorism Act).
Under American constitutional law, police may not subject a suspect to custodial interrogation unless they have probable cause to arrest. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08
(1979).
33. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
235-40 (1980).
34. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring, draws
this distinction).
35. Regina v. Chandler, 63 Crim. App. 1, 4 (C.A. 1976); R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 549 (5th
ed. 1979).
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no adverse inferences may be drawn from the suspect's silence.3 6 One
commentator has stated that "although the accused's silence may be
treated as something which has a bearing on the weight of his evidence, it
is not something which can support an inference that the story told by
him in court is untrue; still less can it amount to the corroboration of the
evidence given against him."'3 7 Nevertheless, evidence of such silence is
admissible and forms "part of the circumstances which the court has to
take into account when assessing the evidence." '38
Thus, under both English and American law, pre-warning silence is
admissible evidence. The principal difference seems to be that, in the
United States, pre-warning silence may be used for impeachment if it is
inconsistent with the defendant's trial testimony, while in England, the
law usually disallows impeachment, but it does not exclude evidence of
the silence and, therefore, does not prevent the jury from considering and
using such evidence for whatever purposIe it desires. Thus, in both countries, pre-warning silence often has adverse consequences for a defendant
at trial.
Silence by a defendant after the administration of warnings is
treated differently than pre-warning silence in both England and the
United States. Three principal arguments have been marshalled against
the admissibility of evidence of silence in this context: (1) if evidence of
silence were admitted, the right to silence would be severely diminished
by the negative consequences flowing fiom its assertion; (2) implicit in
warning a suspect of his right is a guarantee that no adverse legal consequences will flow from the exercise of the right; and (3) evidence of silence is inadmissible on the general evidentiary ground that its slight
probative value is outweighed by the posibility of prejudice.
Relying on the first argument, the United States Supreme Court has
prohibited the admission of evidence of a defendant's post-warning silence as substantive evidence of guilt. 39 Relying on the second and third
arguments, the Court has prohibited the use of evidence of such silence
for impeachment purposes as well. In light of the implicit assurance of
the Miranda warning that exercise of ihe silence right will not cause
36.

Regina v. Gilbert, 66 Crim. App. 237, 243-44 (C.A. 1977); see also C. EMMINS, A

PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE1330-32 (1983).

37. R. CROSS, supra note 35, at 548; see ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note
12, %4.39, at 81-82.
38. ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 80, at 29.
39. "[I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment
privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore,
use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) (citations omitted).
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harm, fundamental principles of fairness embodied in due process prohibit the use of such silence for impeachment at trial.'4 In federal courts
such silence is inadmissible on the additional ground that it lacks sufficient probative value. 4 1 The prohibition includes not only evidence of
muteness but also "the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of
a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted." 4 2 Thus,
whether or not the defendant testifies, the jury never learns that the defendant, after he was admonished of his Miranda rights, made such statements as "I won't talk about it" or "I'll take the fifth" or "I want a
43
lawyer" or merely said nothing.

In England, courts have come to similar conclusions about the evi-

dentiary value of post-warning silence. Once a suspect has been cautioned, courts hold that it is "unsafe to use his silence against him for any
purpose whatever." 44 Consequently, despite a great deal of debate, English courts hold that the judge should not, by adverse comment or other-

wise, invite the jury to draw inferences from an accused's exercise of his
right to silence. 45 In fact, the judge should instruct the jury that they

must not draw an inference of guilt from such silence. 46 Unlike American practice, however, English courts restrict only comments about the
evidence of silence; they do not exclude the evidence itself. As a consequence, the jury is fully aware that the defendant refused to answer ques47
tions when cautioned and interrogated by the police.

The 1981 Report of the Royal Commission on CriminalProcedure,
40. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976). Nor can a refusal to make a statement be
used by the prosecution to rebut defendant's claim of insanity. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106
S. Ct. 634, 639 (1986).
41. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975).
42. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634, 641 n.13 (1986).
43. Though statements of counsel are not considered evidence, courts generally hold impermissible any prosecutorial reference to defendant's exercise of his Miranda rights. However, such references are often considered harmless error. Cf State v. Reid, 585 P.2d 411, 413
(Or. Ct. App. 1978). But see Wainright v. Greenfield, 741 F.2d 329 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd,
106 S. Ct. 634 (1986) (comment was not harmless error).
44. ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 1 80, at 29; ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, %4.39, at 82.
45. The trial court judge is entitled to comment on the accused's failure to give evidence.
As the law now stands, he must not comment adversely on the accused's failure to make a
statement. Regina v. Gilbert, 66 Crim. App. 237, 245 (C.A. 1977) (citing CRIMINAL LAW
REVISION COMMITTEE, 11TH REPORT § 30 (1972)).
46. Id. at 243.
47. For example, in Regina v. Sullivan, 51 Crim. App. 102, 105 (C.A. 1966), the court
held that the trial judge erred in telling the jury that, if the defendant were innocent, he would
be anxious to answer questions. Nonetheless, Lord Salmon observed that "[i]t seems pretty
plain that all members of the jury, if they had any common sense, must have been saying to
themselves precisely what the learned judge said to them."
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while recognizing that it is unsafe to use such silence against a defendant
for any purpose, observed that, regardless of legal rules:
if the jury or the magistrates are aware that a person refused to answer
questions under caution or was evasive, that may have some effect
upon the way they interpret the evidence before them. Accordingly,
although the law may give a person the right to say at all stages of the
process "Ask me no questions. I shall answer none," in relying upon
this right, he would be48wise to have regard to how people are likely to
interpret his conduct.

The Commission made the further observation that whatever a judge
may say to a jury concerning a defendant's silence, "it does not, indeed it
cannot, prevent a jury or bench of magistrates from drawing an adverse
'4 9
inference."
It is noteworthy that the Commission seriously considered altering
the right to silence by formally allowing an adverse inference to be drawn
from the lack of response to questioning after caution. The proposal relied, in part, upon the argument that, in view of the tendency of magistrates and juries to draw adverse inferences from such silence, alteration
of the rules would not, in practice, constitute a fundamental change.50 A
majority of the Commission concluded, however, that the present law on
this subject should not be altered.5 1 No change was made by the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.52 Michael Zander, a distinguished
English scholar, commented that, under the Act, "although the prosecution are not allowed to suggest that this accused's silence was suspicious,
they can inform the jury that the accused was silent. Nothing can prevent a jury from drawing adverse inferences from the fact of silence if
48. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, % 4.39, at 82.
49. ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, g 70, at 81, 83; see R.
CROSS, supra note 35, at 551.
50. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 1 4.48, at 84-85.

51. Id. 4.53, at 87.
52. However, the CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notesfor Guidance 10D, makes the
following recommendation:
In case anyone who is given a caution is unclear about its significance, the officer
concerned should explain... that a person need not answer any questions or provide
any information which might tend to incriminate him, and that no adverse inferences
from this silence may be drawn at any trial that takes place. The person should not,
however, be left with a false impression that non-co-operation will have no effect on
his immediate treatment as, for example, his refusal to provide his name and address
when charged with an offense may render him liable to detention.
This elaboration might leave the erroneous impression that in fact no adverse inferences from
silence will be drawn, either by the police or prosecutor during investigation or later at trial.
Whether the distinction between what the law allows and what actually occurs can or should
be explained to the suspect is certainly questionable.
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53
they choose to do so."
In summary, because the English rule against drawing adverse inferences from a defendant's post-warning silence does not affect the admissibility of evidence, but only controls what the judge and prosecutor may
say to the jury, it is considered wise for English suspects to make statements when cautioned and questioned by police. 54 In contrast, in the
United States, the pressures on suspects in this context are considerably
diminished by the knowledge that ordinarily the jury will remain ignorant of a refusal to talk to the police.

B. The Voluntariness Rule
(1) The English Voluntariness Rule
An examination of English rules governing the character of police
questioning and elicitation of statements reveals another principle strikingly similar to one of our own. Under English law, before an admission
or confession can be used, the court must find that it was made volunta56
rily.5 5 As under our rules, the prosecution bears the burden of proof,
and the judge must decide the question of voluntariness outside the pres'57
ence of the jury in a "trial within a trial."
Before the passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,
judges considered two factors in determining whether a statement was
voluntary: (1) whether the statement was obtained through threat or inducement; and (2) whether the statement was made as a result of oppression. The most significant formulation of the voluntariness test was set
forth by Lord Sumner in Ibrahim v. The King.58 According to Lord
Sumner, a judge determining voluntariness must ask: has the prosecution proven that the contested statement was voluntary in that it was not
53.

M. ZANDER, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984,

§§ 53-65, at 89

(1985).
54. See, e.g., C. EMMINS, supra note 36, at 331-32; ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981,
supra note 12, 4.39, at 82.
55. Ibrahim v. The King, 1914 App. Cas. 599, 609 (P.C.) (H.K.); see also ARCHBOLD,
supra note 32, § 15-23.
The introduction to the Judges' Rules defined voluntariness as an absence of "fear of
prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out by a person in authority, or by oppression." JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237 n.2 (para. (e)).
56. Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, 1976 App. Cas. 574, 583 (1975); Ibrahim,
1914 App. Cas. at 609.
57. Ajodha v. State, 1982 App. Cas. 204 (P.C. 1981); Director of Pub. Prosecutions v.
Ping Lin, 1976 App. Cas. 574, 583 (1975). "It is for the Judge to rule having heard the evidence whether or not the prosecution have established to the extent required that the confession or admission was made voluntarily." ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-28, at 1094
(citations omitted).
58. 1914 App. Cas. 599 (P.C.) (H.K.).
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obtained by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage excited or held out by
a person in authority, or by oppression?59 Determination that the statement had been obtained involuntarily led automatically to its exclusion
60
regardless of its reliability.
English courts traditionally construed and applied these principles
rather strictly. 61 Any threat or inducement uttered or held out by a person inauthority rendered a resulting confession involuntary and inadmissible. 62 Courts held that "even the most gentle . . . threat or slight
'63
inducements will taint a confession."
Despite this strict interpretation, application of the rule in specific
factual contexts was not without difficulty. Similar police behavior often
resulted in inconsistent decisions, and the authority of older cases was
sometimes questionable.6 4 For example, while there was nothing improper in saying to a defendant, "tell the truth" or "be a good boy and
tell the truth," statements such as "you had better tell the truth" or "I
think it would be better if you made a statement and told me exactly
what happened" resulted in inadmissible confessions. 65 The decision of
the House of Lords in Directorof Public Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, 66 for
example, raised some doubt as to how strictly the voluntariness principle
was to be applied. Ping Lin was taken into custody for smoking and
possessing heroin. The next day, he was cautioned and questioned by
police officers. He attempted to gain favors by offering to inform police
59. Id. at 609; The House of Lords in Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, 1976
App. Cas. 574, 583 (1975) reaffirmed this well-known test.
60. ARCHBOLD,supra note 32, §§ 15-23, 15-28(3): R. CROSS, supra note 35, at 536.
61. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 73-75, at 110; Cross, England: The Trial Procedure,
in THE ACCUSED 34, 40 (J. Coutts ed. 1966).
62. The issue for the judge to determine is one of fact and causation ....It is not
sufficient for the Crown to show that the person in authority had not intended to
extract a confession or that there had been no impropriety on his part .... The
Crown must prove that the statement in question has not been obtained in consequence of something said or done by a person in authority which amounted to an
express or implicit threat or promise to the accused.
ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-23, at 109.
63. Regina v. Cleary, 48 Crim. App. 116, 119 (C.A. 1963); Regina v. Smith, [1959] 2
Q.B. 35, 38-39 (Courts-Martial App. Ct.).
It is true that many of the so-called inducements have been so vague that no reasonable man would have been influenced by them, but one must remember that not all
accused are reasonable men or women: they may be very ignorant and terrified by
the predicament in which they find themselves. So it may have been right to err on
the safe side.
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz, [1967] 1 App. Cas. 760, 820 (1966).
64. See ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-37; see also ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29,
75, at 27; Cross, supra note 61, at 34.
65. See cases cited in ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-36, at 1098-99.
66. 1976 App. Cas. 574 (1975).
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of his heroin source if they would let him go, but each time the police
stated, "that can't be done." Finally, he admitted selling heroin, but
asked for the third time, "If I help police, can you help me?" The interrogator responded, "I can make no deals with you," but added, "If you
show the Judge that you have helped police to trace bigger drug people, I
am sure he will bear it in mind when he sentences you." Ping Lin then
identified his supplier. The House of Lords upheld the admission into
evidence of Ping Lin's identification of his source of narcotics as well as
his confession that he was a seller. While recognizing that the case was
"near the boundary line," the judges concluded that the foregoing principles had not been violated.
The Ping Lin case limited the voluntariness rule by emphasizing the
causation factor and requiring that the threat or promise actually lead to
the confession. As one commentator noted, "if a police officer holds out
a 'gentle threat' or a 'slight inducement' the judge is entitled to hold that
that was not the true cause of the confession but that the accused confessed because, for example, he appreciated that the prosecution evidence
67
against him was overwhelming."
A second factor embodied in Lord Sumner's voluntariness test required that a confession not be obtained by oppression. This requirement
focused on the overall effect of interrogation on the mind and will of the
suspect and asked whether, in view of all the circumstances, including
particular attributes of the accused, his free will was sapped to such extent that he was, in effect, forced to speak. According to this subjective
analysis, interrogation techniques that are proper when directed at a
hardened criminal can be oppressive when applied to a person of good
character who has no previous experience with the inside of a police
68
station.
In cases decided immediately before the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, courts relied more on the oppression test than on the
traditional threat or inducement standard of voluntariness and were increasingly reluctant to find oppression even in rather extreme circumstances. For example, holding a suspect incommunicado for several days
while refusing to allow him to see his solicitor generally did not entail
oppression. 69 But oppression was found when such conduct was com67. C. EMMINS, supra note 36, at 326.
68. Compare Regina v. Hudson, 72 Crim. App. 163, 169-70 (C.A. 1981) (intensive questioning of an individual held in custody for the first time creates "a strong inference of oppression") with Regina v. Dodd, 74 Crim. App. 50, 56 (C.A. 1981) ("experienced criminals" not
intimidated by extensive interrogation).
69. See, e.g., Regina v. Mackintosh, 76 Crim. App. 177, 178-80 (C.A. 1982); Regina v.
Dodd, 74 Crim. App. 50, 54-57 (C.A. 1981).
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bined with police trickery and the threat that the suspect would be held
"until the truth was out."'70
Lord Lane's opinion in Regina v. Rennie7 1 clearly demonstrates the
movement away from the traditional threat or inducement standard toward the more flexible oppression test emphasizing free will. The appellant was charged with conspiracy to obtain a pecuniary advantage by
deception, a scheme which involved members of his family. He first confessed after his arrest during his journey to the police station. Upon arrival, he was cautioned and then made a second confession. At trial he
challenged the admissibility of both confessions because the police had
led him to believe that, unless he confessed, they would interview and
perhaps arrest and prosecute members of his family. The interviewing
police officer testified that he thought the appellant "made the confession in the hope that I would terminate my inquiries into members of his
family, and perhaps leave the mother out of it, whom I suspected of being involved."' 72 The trial judge denied appellant's motion on the ground
that he had confessed because of the strength of the case against him. In
dismissing the appeal, Lord Lane observed that the officer's opinion as to
the motives of the accused was inadmissible and that it was for the judge
alone to draw inferences from the events.
This case clearly shows the ease of finding that a particular inducement was not a true cause of a confession as well as the difficulty facing
appellants in persuading a court of appeal to overturn a trial judge's decision admitting a confession. More significantly, Lord Lane went on to
propose, albeit in dicta, that even if the appellant had decided to admit
guilt because he hoped that if he did so police would not bring in members of his family, it did not follow that the confession should have been
excluded. Lord Lane noted that motives behind confessions are often
mixed and include hope of some benefit such as earlier release or lighter
sentence. Sometimes this hope is self-generated, but more commonly it
will owe its origin, at least in part, to the statements or behavior of a
person in authority. "If it were the law that the mere presence of such a
motive, even if prompted by something said or done by a person inauthority, led inexorably to the exclusion of a confession, nearly every confession would be rendered inadmissible. ' 73 Referring to Lord Sumner's
traditional voluntariness test, Lord Lane noted that it was unnecessary
and undesirable to complicate the issue by refined analysis of whether the
70. Regina v. Gowan, [1982] CRIM. L. REV. 821 (C.A.).
71. 74 Crim. App. 207 (C.A. 1981).
72. Id. at 210.
73. Id. at 212.
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conduct was improper or constituted an inducement. Rather, the judge
should approach the inquiry much as would a jury, were it for them to
decide. "In other words, he should understand the principle and the
spirit behind it, and apply his common sense; and.., he should remind
himself that voluntary in ordinary parlance means 'of one's own free
will.' -74

Regina v. Rennie may be read narrowly as requiring only that the
pressure amounting to a threat or promise sufficient to exclude a confes-

sion must be explicit rather than that which is implicit in most every case
in which an accused is firmly but fairly questioned while in police custody. However, taken at face value, the language of the opinion goes
much further and signals a new approach to the voluntariness inquiry.
Lord Sumner's test, focusing on inducements and causation, had previously existed side-by-side with the oppression standard, focusing on free
will: the tests were applied in the conjunctive, not in the alternative.
Lord Lane's opinion appears to downgrade the inducement test and
merge what is left of it into a flexible free will standard which forms the
basis of the oppression test.75 Thus, well before the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984, appellate courts had weakened the rather strict and
absolute standards that traditionally governed the voluntariness
76
requirement.
74. Id. at 213.
75. One commentator concluded that the court in Rennie "appears to be hinting at a new
approach" but that traditional voluntariness principles "would be considerably weakened by
such a change." Jackson, Voluntarinessandthe Admissibility of Confessions: A New Approach,
1983 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 101, 104-05.
76. In addition to this judicial weakening of the voluntariness requirement, evidence indicates that English law enforcement practices often come close to violating the voluntariness
rules. For example, English police may grant bail to an arrestee that will entitle him to remain
free for up to weeks prior to his first court appearance. This power creates the expectation on
both sides that, if a suspect confesses, the police will allow his release pending trial. The
Justices' Clerks Society recently expressed serious concern that "bargaining between the police
and the accused during interrogation can result in police granting bail when no court would be
easily persuaded." Justices' Clerks Society Concerned at Police Use of Bail, The Times
(London), May 10, 1985, at 4 [hereinafter Police Use of Bail]. One commentator observed:
Without detailed observational studies, the extent to which this [bargaining] happens
is impossible to estimate, but bargaining theory, when combined with the power differential between the [police and the accused] would certainly help to explain the fact
that only exceptionally are "third degree" tactics resorted to by the police ...
[T]here is simply a built-in assumption which is understood by both parties that certain decisions remain flexible and may be influenced by the outcome of the
interrogation.
P. MORRIS, POLICE INTERROGATION: REvIEw OF LITERATURE 25 (Royal Comm'n on
Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 3, 1980). For a review of bluffs and other current
police interrogation tactics, see P. SOFTLEY, AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY IN FOUR POLICE
STATIONS 78-80 (Royal Comm'n on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 4, 1980).
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The 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure found the voluntariness rule, and the "oppression" standard in particular, imprecise
and ambiguous. 77 The Commission recommended that the rule be replaced by a Code of Practice having the force of law which would
strengthen safeguards for suspects and provide clear and workable
guidelines for police. However, the rule of automatic exclusion would
not apply to breaches of the Code except when evidence was obtained
through torture, violence or threat of violence, or other inhuman or de78
grading treatment.
With the passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,
Parliament significantly modified the voluntariness rule. It rejected,
however, the Commission's recommendation to eliminate the exclusionary rule, reasoning that such action would seriously weaken the safeguards against unreliable confession evidence. 7 9 Under the Act, a
confession must be excluded unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it was not obtained:
(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the
circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession
which might be made by him in consequence thereof. 80
Oppression is defined as including "torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to
81
torture)."
So what has changed? Although the rule of automatic exclusion is
now mandated by Parliament, and the "person in authority" 82 require77. The Commission noted the apparently inconsistent results reached by courts that had
addressed the issue, and also noted the lack of a generally accepted definition of "oppression,"
a term which varied according to the mental capacities and experience of a particular suspect.
The Commission believed that these circumstances impeded effective law enforcement:
What this amounts to is that a police officer is required under the confusion and
pressures of an investigation to make some assessment of the character, susceptibilities and mental state of the suspect whom he is interviewing and then to try to adapt
his questioning of him to that assessment. He may then find that the judge, having
heard witnesses often months after the event and in the entirely different environment of a court, makes his own assessment of the character, susceptibilities and
mental state of the suspect at the time of the interrogation and of the conditions of
that interrogation, and decides, that, he, the police officer, behaved "oppressively,"
that is that he broke the rule. This cannot be satisfactory.
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12,
4.70-.72, at 92-93, %4.131, at 116.
78. Id. 4.132, at 116-17.
79. See HOME OFFICE, POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE BILL BRIEFING GUIDE
§ 11.6, at 62 (1983).
80. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, § 76(2).
81. Id. § 76(8).
82. See ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-23, at 89.
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ment has been abolished, the Act probably does not provide suspects
with more protection. It is more likely that courts will conclude that
Parliament intended to limit the effects of automatic exclusion caused by
liberal, but confusing, applications of the old voluntariness rule, and that
the Act will reduce protections afforded suspects under traditional voluntariness standards.
A number of factors support this conclusion. By and large, the Act
was a consequence of the report of the 1981 Royal Commission which
recommended outright abolition of the voluntariness rule (with the limited exception noted) because vague and unworkable rules led to the exclusion of reliable confessions. A principal objective of the Act was to
clarify interrogation standards and to limit the exclusion of reliable confessions except where the police employ unconscionable measures to extract them. While the oppression principle remains, the Act has
narrowed its scope. The Act states that oppression includes such extreme measures as "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the
use or threat of violence," but no mention is made of threats of nonphysical harm or other psychological pressures. The old voluntariness rule
looked to whether the action of the authorities sapped the free will of the
suspect or excited hopes or fears of the suspect such that "his will crumbles and he speaks when otherwise he would have stayed silent."8' 3 This
subjective approach was rejected by the 1981 Royal Commission. Thus,
while the Act retains oppression as a standard, the narrow inclusive description of extreme police practices and the lack of a comprehensive
definition consistent with prior case law suggest an attempt to restrict the
84
term to clear, objective police misconduct.
Finally, the Act does not mention the aspect of the old voluntariness
standard which asked whether the confession was obtained "by fear of
prejudice or hope of advantage." Instead, the Act provides that a confession must be excluded only if obtained "in consequence of anything said
or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to
render unreliable any confession which might be made . . . in consequence thereof."8' 5 This reliability test was drawn from the recommendations of the 1972 Criminal Law Revision Committee. That Committee
83. Regina v. Prager, 56 Crim. App. 151, 161 (C.A. 1971).
84. On the other hand, one could conclude that Parliament meant to adopt the approach
of the 1972 Criminal Law Revision Committee, which recommended retaining the oppression
standard but substituted "oppressive treatment of the accused" for "oppression," and that
Parliament assumed that this expression would be construed similarly to the definition adopted
in Prager. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, 11TH REPORT EVIDENCE (GENERAL)
§ 60, at 41 (1972).
85. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 76(2)(b).
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regarded the rules relating to admissibility of confessions as excessively
strict and considered two alternative approaches: (1) "to have no restriction on admissibility but allow all confessions to be proved before the
jury or magistrates' court" and (2) "to preserve the general rule that a
threat, inducement or oppression makes a resulting confession inadmissible but to provide that this should not apply to all threats or inducements
but only to those likely to produce an unreliable confession. '8 6 The majority of the Committee approved a modified form of the second approach: "[T]he right course is for the rule as to inadmissibility of a
confession on account of a threat or inducement to be limited to threats
or inducements of a kind likely to produce an unreliable confession, but
for inadmissibility on account of oppression to remain."'8 7 Thus, the history of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 reveals the rejection
of that part of the common-law voluntariness rule that would exclude all
confessions induced by even slight threats or promises.
Following the apparent intent of the Act, the Code of Practice for
the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by the Police indicates that certain inducements, previously prohibited, might now be accepted. The Code provides:
No police officer may try to obtain answers to questions or to elicit a
statement by the use of oppression, or shall indicate, except in answer
to a direct question, what action will be taken on the part of the police
if the person being interviewed answers questions, makes a statement
or refuses to do either. If the person asks the officer directly what
action will be taken in the event of his answering questions, making a
statement or refusing to do either, then the officer may inform the person what action the police propose to take in that event provided that
that action is itself proper and warranted.8 8
While the Code clearly prohibits seeking answers by oppressive
treatment or by indication of future action which would be improper or
unwarranted, if the suspect directly asks the officer what he proposes to
do in response to the suspect's decision whether or not to make a statement, the officer may now tell the suspect of certain consequences that
may follow from refusing to do so. For example, since the action of
granting bail is perfectly proper and police have significant authority and
freedom in bail decisions at early stages in the proceedings, it seems that
offering bail in return for a statement may no longer result in an involuntary and inadmissible confession.8 9
86. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, supra note 84, § 61, at 41-42.
87. Id. § 65, at 43.
88. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 11.1.
89. See M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 76, at 112; Mirfield, The Draft Code on Police
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Even in the absence of a suspect's direct question about future police
action, police may properly encourage a suspect to make a statement in
the course of explaining his right of silence. The Code of Practice provides that if, after receiving the caution, a suspect is "unclear about its
significance," the interviewing officer must "explain it in his own words";
however, in explaining that no adverse inferences from silence may be
drawn at trial, the suspect should not "be left with a false impression that
non-cooperation will have no effect on his immediate treatment as, for
example, his refusal to provide his name and address when charged with
an offense may render him liable to detention." 90 Courts may hold that
non-cooperation encompasses silence in the face of accusation and that
the suspect should not be left with the "false impression" that such lack
of cooperation will not affect the question of his current custody. 9 1
The focus of inquiry under the Act is not merely whether the inducement caused the particular confession at issue, but whether, in light
of all the circumstances, that inducement was sufficiently strong to
render it likely that any confession obtained under such circumstances
would be false.92 Minor threats or inducements are not likely to render a
confession inadmissible in a serious case when the suspect's motivation to
refrain from self-incrimination is substantial. 93 It will probably be the
highly unusual case in which a court will find a confession reliable but
order it excluded on the ground that police conduct was likely to produce
a false confession. Indeed, under this objective reliability test, it is appropriate to ask whether a court may consider the actual reliability of the
particular confession at issue.
Questioning-A Comment, [1982] CRIM. L. REv. 659, 663; see also Police Use of Bail, supra
note 76.
90.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance 10C & 10D.

91. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 53-65, at 89.
92. Mirfield, supra note 89. Parliament appears to have adopted the Committee's view
that the issue should turn not on whether a specific confession is likely unreliable, but whether
any confession given under the circumstances would likely be so:
[T]he Judge should imagine that he was present at the interrogation and heard the
threat or inducement. In the light of all the evidence given he will consider whether
...any confession which the accused might make as a result of it would be likely to
be unreliable. If so, the confession would be inadmissible.
M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 76, at 113.
93. Michael Zander suggests that even powerful inducements might be acceptable if given
in response to a suspect's inquiry:
It would therefore now appear to be proper for instance for the officer to say to the
suspect "If you make a statement I will let you go home, or let you off the more
serious charges or not pursue charges against your wife, etc." (This represents a
major shift in the rules ....
)
M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 53-65, at 90.
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Under this test, the reliability of the resulting confession, while not
determinative, may be regarded as relevant circumstantial evidence on
the question whether it was obtained "in consequence of anything said or
done which was likely . . .to render unreliable any confession which
might be made.., in consequence thereof."9 4a The Act's legislative history, however, suggests that the truth or falsity of the confession is not
relevant to its admissibility. When the bill proposing the Act was first
published, it contained a provision that evidence could be admitted to
prove the truth or falsity of the confession if the court thought that such
evidence would assist in determining the issue of admissibility. 95 The
government's abandonment of this provision and its absence from the
Act may be regarded as an intent to maintain the view of the Judicial
96
Committee of the Privy Council in Wong Kam-ming v. The Queen,
which held that at a suppression hearing, the prosecution could not
cross-examine the accused as to the truth of his statement. The result
may be an absolute bar to introduction of any evidence at the suppression
97
hearing going toward truth of the confession in support of its reliability.
Aside from this uncertainty regarding evidence of truth or falsity,
the new focus on reliability also casts doubt on whether English law any
longer recognizes a true "voluntariness" principle. The word is not mentioned in the Act, and, although the oppression standard and the causation aspect of the reliability rule preserve aspects of the old voluntariness
rule, it is no longer appropriate to ask simply whether a confession was
made voluntarily. However, it will most likely take many years and numerous judicial decisions to define the precise boundaries of the new
"voluntariness" standard.
(2) The American Voluntariness Rule
American voluntariness principles reflect a "totality of the circumstances" approach in which results do not turn on the presence or absence of any single criterion. 98 It is thus extremely difficult to draw
generalizations, and it is not an easy task to compare our voluntariness
standards with those of England. Most United States Supreme Court
cases suppressing confessions as involuntary have involved rather ex94. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch.60, § 76(2)(b); cf.CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, supra note 84, § 65, at 43.
95. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 76, at 113.
96. 1980 App. Cas. 247, 257 (P.C. 1978) (H.K.).
97. See G. POWELL & C. MAGRATH, POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984, at
179 (1985); see also M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 76, at 113.
98. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
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treme factual situations such as police brutality, unconscionable trickery,
or a particularly vulnerable suspect. 99 In such cases, the Supreme Court
has required the prosecution to prove that the confession was the product
of a rational intellect and a free will. 1°°
While the emphasis on freedom of choice in our test corresponds to
the English prohibition of oppression, our rationality requirement has no
direct English equivalent. This difference is significant in the case of
mentally disordered suspects. The confession of an insane person is not
regarded as voluntary under our law.' 0 ' However, under English law, an
irrational or disordered state of mind will not render a confession involuntary. 10 2 In such cases, the judge retains discretion to exclude the confession if its probative value is slight and is outweighed by the danger of
prejudice, but no English authority requires the exclusion of a confession
03
obtained from a mentally abnormal suspect.
Another traditional difference is that the American standard is not
limited to official action. If the accused's free will was overborne, it matters not that the impairment was caused by the accused himself, third
persons, or circumstances beyond anyone's control. 104 In this aspect, our
rules are broader than the traditional English standard which required
conduct by "a person in authority." However, after elimination of this
requirement by the 1984 Act, the English approach more closely parallels our own.
As noted earlier, English law is not altogether clear as to whether
the reliability of a contested confession may be considered in determining its admissibility. 10 5 However, the long-standing American rule is
that courts do not consider the probable truth or falsity of the confession
99. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (interrogation while defendant hospitalized in critical condition); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (falsely indicating an
intent to take defendant's wife into custody); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960)
(interrogation of mentally ill defendant); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (police
officer made false statements to take advantage of his prior friendship with defendant); Lara v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (hypnotic techniques applied to defendant in need of medical
treatment for acutely painful sinus attack); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (torture). See generally 1 W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(c), at 444-49

(1984).
100. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). Earlier cases spoke of the requirement that the confession be a product of defendant's "free and rational choice." Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
101. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
102. Regina v. Miller, The Times (London), May 6, 1986, at 34.
103. See Regina v. Stewart, 56 Crim. App. 272 (Central Crim. Ct. 1972). See generally
ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-25.
104. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
105. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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in assessing voluntariness, but only whether police behavior was such as
to overbear the suspect's will to resist and thus bring about a confession
not freely self-determined. This question must be answered "with com10 6
plete disregard to whether or not [the suspect] in fact spoke the truth."
The Supreme Court emphasized in Lego v. Twomey 107 that the principal
aim of the rule excluding involuntary confessions is to protect suspects
from compelled self-incrimination, rather than to prohibit the admission
of unreliable evidence. Consequently, the sole issue is whether the confession was coerced. An inquiry into whether it was true or false is irrelevant and forbidden: "[T]he judge . . . is . . . duty-bound to ignore
implications of reliability in facts relevant to coercion and to shut from
his mind any internal evidence of authenticity that a confession itself
10 8
may bear."
A suspect's will may be overborne by either threats or inducements.
In Brain v. United States,109 the Court stated that to be free and voluntary, a confession "must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,
nor by the exertion of any improper influence." 11 0 These principles are
strikingly similar to the traditional English voluntariness rule in that
they prohibit "any" threats or inducements, no matter how slight."1
However, while English courts have, until recently, applied these principles strictly,1 12 our Supreme Court has avoided a strict application of the
rules against threats or promises. Instead, the Court has focused on
whether pressures or inducements were sufficient to overbear the free will
of the accused. In emphasizing free will, rather than the prohibition of
all inducements, the Court might be seen as allowing the police to apply
psychological pressures that the English courts have found improper.
For example, in Farev. Michael C.113 police told the suspect that a cooperative attitude would be to his benefit. The Court dismissed the defend106. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).
107. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
108. Id. at 484-85 n.12 (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held that the trial judge
in certain circumstances may properly consider the fact that defendant's confession contained
facts known only to him. Gilreath v. Mitchell, 705 F.2d 109, 110 (4th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
109. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
110. Id. at 542-43. The language was reaffirmed in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964);
see also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (statement excluded because police
had held defendant incommunicado until he confessed).
111. See Regina v. Cleary, 48 Crim. App. 116, 119 (C.A. 1963) (statement by appellant's
father made in the presence of police could amount to an inducement); Regina v. Smith, [1959]
2 Q.B. 35, 38-39 (Courts-Martial App. Ct.) (second statement rendered inadmissible if the
threat or promise under which the first statement was made still persists).
112. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
113. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
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ant's claim that the confession was involuntary, describing the police
remarks as "far from threatening or coercive." 114 This would seem to
indicate that something more than a gentle threat or slight inducement is
required to render a confession involuntary.
Uncertainties persist, in part because, unlike English courts, our
Supreme Court has taken a hands-off approach to traditional inducement
issues. While the Court recently has been particularly protective of an
accused's sixth amendment right to counsel in the interrogation context,' 1 5 it has failed to articulate clear and predictable voluntariness standards and often has avoided supervising lower courts in their review of
claims that threats or promises were used to procure confessions." 6 Accordingly, state courts, left to fend for themselves, have come to strikingly different and often conflicting conclusions, many of which are
difficult to reconcile with the principles established by the Supreme
Court 1 1 7 Even courts in the same jurisdiction may come to conflicting
results. For example, California courts have found police suggestions
that the suspect would benefit from making a statement to be proper in
some cases but improper in others.11 8
Recently, the Supreme Court further confused matters in Miller v.
Fenton." 9 In deciding that the voluntariness question is both an issue of
fact and of law for the purpose of federal habeas corpus review of state
convictions, the Court considered the nature of the voluntariness inquiry.
It recognized that the test traditionally looked to whether the confession
was the product of a free and rational will and had been "framed as an
issue of psychological fact." However, finding the "locus of the right" in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court found the
voluntariness question to have a uniquely legal dimension:
[T]he admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the techId. at 727.
See infra notes 315-19 & 322-28 and accompanying text.
See generally W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 99, § 6.2(c)-(d).
See cases cited in Kaci, supra note 21, at 91-96; see also cases cited in W. LA FAVE &
J. ISRAEL, supra note 99, § 6.2(c).
118. Generally, statements that the accused would somehow benefit from confessing will
render the resulting confession involuntary, see People v. Brommel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 364 P.2d
845, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961), unless the nature of the benefit "flows naturally" from a truthful
and honest course of conduct. People v. Hill, 66 Cal. 2d 536, 426 P.2d 908, 58 Cal. Rptr. 340
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911 (1968). Yet it appears that almost any statement which goes
further than advising a suspect that he would "feel better" if he confessed is improper. People
v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035
(1981); see also People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 647 P.2d 93, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1982);
People v. McClary, 20 Cal. 3d 218, 571 P.2d 620, 142 Cal.Rptr. 163 (1977); In re Roger E.G.,
53 Cal. App. 3d 198, 125 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1975).
119. 106 S. Ct. 445 (1985).
114.
115.
116.
117.
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niques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a
conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the
defendant's will was in fact overborne.120
Thus, the voluntariness inquiry was seen to entail a complex of values.
The Court's language is puzzling. In an attempt to demonstrate
that the voluntariness question is at least as much an issue of law as one
of fact, the Court implied that though a confession may be an entirely
"voluntary" product of a rational intellect and a free will, it must be
suppressed as "involuntary" if it was obtained by a process inconsistent
with the presumption of innocence and our adversary system of justice.
Since the Court did not elaborate upon or apply its explanation of this
distinction, it created doubt as to what official conduct, if any, might
produce a confession from a suspect's free and rational will, yet require
that the confession be suppressed as involuntary.
In many respects, the confusion and inconsistency of the United
States cases mirror problems found to exist in English cases by the 1981
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure and are the inevitable result
of rules which depend on such imprecise and ill-defined phrases as "free
will" and "totality of circumstances." This lack of clarity and consequent uncertainty is likely to persist both in the United States and in
England despite the 1984 Act. Parliament's retention of a form of the
oppression test together with its adoption of a new reliability principle
will not likely clarify matters, though it probably will result in a narrower rule against inducements. Until quite recently, English courts
have been more active than American courts in establishing firm rules
against verbal inducements in the form of threats or promises, but under
the 1984 Act, following the trend of the most recent cases, 121 the English
"voluntariness" principles may now offer less protection to suspects than
their American counterparts.
C. Enforcement of General Restrictions on Police Questioning
Thus far, we have examined English principles which closely parallel our own. Enforcement of these principles is also similar in that both
countries apply an automatic exclusionary rule to involuntary confessions. This prohibition extends to the prosecution's attempt to use such
statements to cross-examine the accused or impeach his testimony. 122
120. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
121. See, e.g., Regina v. Rennie, 74 Crim. App. 207 (C.A. 1981); Regina v. Gowan, [1982]
CRIM. L. REv. 821 (C.A.); see also supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
122. In England, if the inadmissible statement is material to the defense of a co-defendant,
the co-defendant may cross-examine the defendant concerning it, but the judge should dis-

November 1986]

INTERROGATIONS AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

However, the process of enforcement differs in important respects. Both
countries place on the prosecution the burden of proving that a confession was made voluntarily, but England requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 123 while the United States merely requires proof by a
124
preponderance of the evidence.
While English courts require a higher standard of proof, American
courts rely more on the exclusionary rule as an enforcement tool, with
the result that more severe sanctions flow from a finding that a statement
was involuntary or otherwise inadmissible. For example, the exclusionary rule in the United States applies not only to the illegally obtained
evidence itself, but also to other incriminating evidence derived from
it.125 This "fruit of the poisonous tree" rule may lead to suppression of
physical and other highly reliable forms of evidence, including the very
body of a murder victim.126 While the United States Supreme Court has
adopted an "ultimate or inevitable discovery exception,"' 127 the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" rule is currently applied broadly to fourth, fifth, and
sixth amendment violations. Thus, reliable evidence found to be the
product of an involuntary confession or a confession obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel must be suppressed along
with the confession unless the prosecution proves that the evidence inevi28
tably would have been discovered by other means.1
In contrast, English law does not apply the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine when the "fruit" is reliable evidence. For example, when a
coerced confession leads to recovery of stolen property, the confession
129
will be suppressed but the property will be admitted in evidence.
courage the jury from considering it a part of the prosecution's case against defendant. Regina
v. Rowson, [1985] 2 All E.R. 539, 542 (C.A.).
In the United States, use of an involuntary statement to cross-examine a defendant or to
impeach his testimony violates due process of law even though ample evidence aside from the
confession supports the conviction. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). However,
voluntary statements obtained in violation of the procedural requirements of Miranda may be
used to impeach a defendant. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
123. Regina v. Angeli, 68 Crim. App. 32, 35 (C.A. 1978); Regina v. Sartori, [1961] CRIM.
L. REv. 397 (Central Crim. Ct.); R. CROSS, supra note 35, at 541. The 1984 Act retains the
reasonable doubt standard. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 76(2).
124. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
125. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
126. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc).
127. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984).
128. See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968); Killough v. United States,
315 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
129. Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 264-65 (1783); see also Gotlieb, Confirmation by
Subsequent Facts, 72 LAW Q. REv.209, 235-36 (1956); ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, §§ 15-71 to
-72. See generally ABA, ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE WAY A BRITON
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Thus, the English exclusionary rule as applied to the fruits of excluded
confessions is tempered by a reliability principle. The rule of exclusion
does not apply
to the admission or rejection of facts, whether the knowledge of them
be obtained in consequence of an extorted confession, or whether it
arises from any other source; for a fact, if it exists at all, must exist
invariably in the same manner, whether the130confession from which it is
derived be in other respects true or false.
The English rejection of the "fruit" doctrine is preserved by the
1984 Act, which provides that the exclusion of a confession "shall not
affect the admissibility in evidence... of any facts discovered as a result
of the confession." 13 1 In emphasizing the importance of reliable evidence, this rule comports with the Act's adoption of a reliability standard
as part of its voluntariness test.
Another difference between the English and American approaches
to the "fruit" or "product" doctrine arises in a more subtle fashion in the
context of multiple confessions. In the United States, if the first of several confessions was voluntary, but obtained without the warnings required by the Miranda rules, it must be excluded. However, later
voluntary statements obtained after proper warnings may be admitted. 132
If, on the other hand, the first confession was actually coerced, subsequent confessions must be suppressed unless a "break in the stream of
events" separates the two statements. 133 What this means is unclear. Arguably, it requires nothing more than a showing that the connection between the coercion and later confessions is so attenuated that the later
confessions themselves are not regarded as coerced. On the other hand,
it likely requires something more. 134 The Ninth Circuit recently applied
the "fruit" doctrine to coerced confessions, holding that subsequent confessions must be suppressed unless they are "sufficiently attenuated from
[the] initial admission of guilt so as to dissipate its taint."'1 35 Applying
this test, the court must look to the temporal proximity of the statements
and the unconstitutional activity, the presence of intervening circumWOULD
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IT TO AN AMERICAN

49 (1978) [hereinafter

ENGLISH

LAW AND

PROCEDURE].

130. Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 264 (1783).
131. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 76(4).
132. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1298 (1985).
133. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710 (1967); accord Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285,
1292 (1985).
134. See Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S.
35, 38 (1967); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 444 (1961).
135. United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1985).
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stances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 136 Implicit in this approach is the requirement that, under certain
circumstances, subsequent confessions that were not the products of coercion must be suppressed because they are insufficiently attenuated.
The Supreme Court has suggested that this is the proper approach in
137
cases involving constitutional violations.
Under English law, although the circumstances attending the first
confession will often affect later ones, the principal question is whether
the later confessions are voluntary. Rather than relying on a "fruit" or
"product" doctrine, courts look to whether the original pressures on the
accused remained to impel his later confessions. 13 8 If the threat or inducement under which the first statement had been made operated on the
defendant's mind when he made the second statement, the latter would
be involuntary and inadmissible. 139 However, if the effect of the original
threat or inducement had ended at the time of the second statement, it
would be voluntary and admissible. Thus, English rules would not require exclusion of a subsequent voluntary confession on the basis of lack
of attenuation alone. 14°
There is another subtle but marked difference. The American
"fruit" or "product" rule includes the English inquiry into the continuation of original threats or inducements, but it also emphasizes "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."' 14 1 This involves an
136. Id.
137. Referring to a confession obtained voluntarily but in violation of Miranda, the
Supreme Court reasoned, "Since there was no actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights, the case was not controlled by the doctrine ... that fruits of a constitutional
violation must be suppressed." Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (1985) (discussing
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)). By implication, when a constitutional right is violated, as with a coerced confession, admissibility of derivative evidence is controlled by the
fruit doctrine.
138. See Regina v. Rosa Rue, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 209 (1876); The Queen v. Doherty, 13
Cox Crim. Cas. 23 (1874). See generally ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-41.
139. Regina v. Williams, 52 Crim. App. 439, 442 (Central Crim. Ct. 1968).
140. Regina v. Smith, [1959] 2 Q.B. 35, 41 (Courts-Martial App. Ct.).
141. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975). In Brown the poisonous tree was an
illegal arrest. In suppressing confessions which were found to be its "product," the Court
noted that the original illegality "had a quality of purposefulness" and that "the impropriety of
the arrest was obvious." There is no reason to believe that the Court would find that the
deterrent rationale ofBrown applies with less force when the poisonous fruit is a coerced confession. Indeed, the Court applied a form of the fruit doctrine to confessions in Brown itself.
After holding that the first confession was the product of the illegal arrest, the Court went on
to hold that the second confession "was clearly the result and fruit of the first." Id. at 605.
The giving of the first statement, the suspect's cooperation in the arrest of his partner, and "his
anticipation of leniency bolstered the pressures for him to give the second, or at least vitiated
any incentive on his part to avoid self-incrimination." Id. n.12. The Supreme Court has continued to apply the Brown criteria when considering the fruit of a fourth amendment violation
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assessment of the degree of illegality involved in obtaining the first confession, as well as an inquiry into the need to suppress the second in
order to deter police from engaging in such conduct. This deterrent or
enforcement purpose, while not foreign to the English approach, is regarded there as less important.
Another significant difference in the enforcement of police interrogation rules relates to the prohibition of searches of suspects without adequate cause, and the detention or arrest of persons for the purpose of
station house questioning. A violation of search and seizure rules in
England will not, as in the United States, lead to the exclusion of statements obtained as a result. The basic English rule is that if such evidence
is relevant, it is admissible: "It matters not how you get it; if you steal it
even, it would be admissible." 14 2 While a number of English cases have
suggested that evidence improperly obtained may be excluded at the discretion of the judge, 143 Lord Diplock of the House of Lords rejected such
reasoning:
It is no part of a judge's function to exercise disciplinary powers over
the police or prosecution as respects the way in which evidence to be
used at the trial is obtained by them. If it was obtained illegally there
will be a remedy in civil law; if it was obtained legally but in breach of
the rules of conduct for the police, this is a matter for the appropriate
disciplinary authority to deal with. What the judge at the trial is concerned with is not how the evidence sought to be adduced by the prosecution has been obtained but with how it is used by the prosecution at
the trial. 144
The House of Lords recently reaffirmed this view: "The duty of the
court is to decide whether the appellant has committed the offense with
which he is charged, and not to discipline the police for exceeding their
powers." 145
Thus, English courts, unlike our own, would not suppress a confession on the ground that it was the fruit of an unlawful search or on the
ground that it was the product of an improper detention, arrest, or other
seizure. While English courts retain discretion to exclude evidence if the
police have acted oppressively or unfairly toward the accused, this disand has continued to emphasize the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. See
Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107-09
(1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979).
142. Regina v. Leatham, 8 Cox Crim. Cas. 498, 501 (Q.B. 1861).
143. Jeffrey v. Black, 1978 Q.B. 490, 497-98 (1977); Callis v. Gunn, [1964] 1 Q.B. 495, 501
(1963); Kuruma v. The Queen, 1955 App. Cas. 197, 204 (P.C.) (E. Afr.); see also ROYAL
COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 1132, at 47.
144. Regina v. Sang, 1980 App. Cas. 402, 436 (1979); see also ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 1 133, at 47-48.
145. Fox v. Chief Constable, [1985] 3 All E.R. 392, 396-97 (H.L.).
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146
cretion, in fact, is quite narrow and rarely exercised.

This English reluctance to use exclusionary rules to discipline the
police was strongly approved by the 1981 Royal Commission. The Commission specifically rejected exclusion of evidence as a way of enforcing
police compliance with rules of conduct. 14 7 The 1984 Act follows the
Commission's recommendations in this respect. While the Act sets forth
rules governing police authority to stop, detain, arrest, and search, it

does not provide for the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
any principle of the Act or of the ensuing Code of Practice respecting
search and seizure powers of the police. Indeed, the Act provides that
"failure on the part... of a police officer to comply with any provision
of [the new Code] ...shall not of itself render him liable to any criminal
or civil proceedings." 14 8 Instead, the Act relies upon police disciplinary
proceedings for enforcement. 149 Thus, while the Act treats a breach of
the Code's rules on detention and search of suspects as a serious matter,
suppression of evidence is generally not contemplated as an enforcement

method. 150
Finally, it should be recognized that English impeachment rules significantly deter suspects with criminal records from challenging the ad-

missibility of confessions. Allegations of police misconduct which often
accompany a defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of a confession

may lead to unpleasant consequences. Under English law, a defendant
does not open himself up to prior conviction impeachment merely by
146. The House of Lords recently suggested that, based on assuring fairness to the accused, a court might have discretion to exclude evidence obtained by trick or deception or by
other oppressive police behavior. See id. at 397. The limited discretion to exclude evidence on
grounds of oppression or unfairness to the accused is a part of the Act, but appears to be
further narrowed by the requirement that the improper conduct adversely affect the fairness of
the proceedings. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 78(1). It is difficult to see
how, outside the context of confessions, the admission of reliable evidence could detract from
the fairness of the trial.
147. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12,
4.131-.132, at 116. However,
automatic exclusion would apply to breaches of rules prohibiting violence, threats of violence,
torture, or inhumane or degrading treatment in order to mark the seriousness of the breach
and society's abhorrence of such breach. Id. 4.132, at 116.
148. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 67(10).
149. Id. § 67(8).
150. See T.C. WALTERS & M.A. O'CONNELL, A GUIDE TO THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE ACT 1984, at 70 (1985); M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 66-67, at 93-95. Though
breach by the police of a Code of Practice will not lead automatically to the exclusion of
evidence, it may, when relevant, be taken into account by a judge when exercising the general
discretion to exclude evidence on grounds of unfairness, or by a jury in determining the weight
to be given to the evidence. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 67(11).
Judicial discretion to exclude evidence will be discussed further in the context of enforcement
of specific rules governing the manner of police questioning. See infra section II.E.
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testifying in his own defense. However, his prior convictions may be
used on cross-examination if he places his own "character" in question or
impugns the "character" of a prosecution witness.15 1 The latter can occur through allegations of police misconduct which accompany a challenge to the voluntariness of a confession. Glanville Williams gives the
example of a false verbal confession strongly corroborated by the testimony of two policemen. The task of defense counsel becomes almost
impossible when the defendant has suffered criminal convictions:
If the defendant tries to expose the lie, prosecuting counsel may ask
him whether he is calling the officer a liar. If he replies in the affirmative, he will, by a singularly wicked rule, be subject to cross-examination 1on
his criminal record, which otherwise would be kept from the
52
jury.
Consequently, defense counsel in England tend to dissuade defendants who have criminal records from challenging either the admissibility
153
or the accuracy of statements.
II. Specific Rules Governing the Manner of Police Questioning
A. Rules for Cautioning Suspects: The Right to Remain Silent
In formulating more specific rules governing the interrogation process, each country has developed a scheme to ensure that suspects are
aware of their rights. At first glance, the English caution requirements
and our Miranda admonition rules appear similar. Both provide that
police explicitly warn a suspect of his right to remain silent prior to questioning. A closer look, however, reveals more differences than similarities between the English and American admonition rules, not only in the
warnings themselves but in the nature of both the substantive rights and
enforcement mechanisms. While in many ways the English cautions appear broader and more protective of suspects' interests than Miranda, in
151. The prohibition on questioning an accused concerning his past offenses or his bad
character does not apply whenever "the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve
imputations on the character of the prosecution or the witnesses for the prosecution." Criminal
Evidence Act 1898, § l(f)(ii), reprinted in ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 4-338; see Regina v.
Britzman, 76 Crim. App. 134 (C.A. 1982); Monday, Reflections on the CriminalEvidence Act
1898, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62, 74-78 (1985).
152. Williams, Authentication of Statements to the Police, [1979] CRIM. L. REV. 6, 13.
However, Williams states that if the defendant is properly instructed, he will reply: "I am only
giving my evidence. The jury can decide between us." Id. at 26; see also House of Commons,
Dec. 5, 1985, col. 513.
153. See J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, CONFESSIONS IN CROWN COURT TRIALS
(Royal Comm'n on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 5, 1980); M. MCCONVILLE & J.
BALDWIN, supra note 21, at 113, 154; Heydon, Illegally Obtained Evidence (pt. 2), [1973]
CRIM. L. REV. 690; Vennard, Disputes Within Trials over the Admissibility and Accuracy of
IncriminatingStatements: Some Research Evidence, [1984] CRIM. L. REV. 15, 23.
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important respects they are much narrower and much less protective.
But they are also much more complex and, to thoroughly understand the
difference in approaches, it is necessary to review the development and
current character of both sets of rules.
(1)

The English Cautions

The English cautions were originally formulated and approved by
the judges of the King's Bench Division of the High Court in 1912.154
With later additions, there were nine "Judges' Rules" in all. It is important to note that these Rules were not considered rules of law but merely
guidelines or directives to the police. Though they later were pronounced
by the judges of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, they had
never been established by Parliament as rules of law, nor approved by
1 55
England's highest court, the House of Lords.
The Judges' Rules may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) when
a police officer decides to charge a person with a crime, he should caution
him, explaining that he is not obligated to say anything unless he wishes
and that whatever he does say will be taken down in writing and may be
used in evidence; (2) persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual caution being first administered; and (3) a prisoner making
a voluntary statement must not be cross-examined, and no questions may
be put to him about his statement except for the purpose of removing
156
ambiguity in what he has actually said.
These rules proved ambiguous and controversial. In 1930, the
Home Secretary, with the approval of the Judges, issued a police circular
explaining the true intent of the rules: that persons in custody should not
be questioned or cross-examined on the subject of the crime for which
154. Actually, the origin of the Judges' Rules is probably to be found in a letter dated
October 26, 1906. The Lord Chief Justice had written to the Chief Constable of Birmingham
in answer to a request for advice. On the same Circuit, one Judge had censured a member of
his force for having cautioned a prisoner, while another Judge had censured a Constable for
having omitted to do so. Replying to the inquiry, the Lord Chief Justice advised that the
approved practice was that whenever a Constable determined to make a charge against a man
he should caution him before taking a statement in the following manner: "you are not obligated to say anything unless you wish to, but anything you say will be written down and may
be used in evidence against you." But the Lord Chief Justice suggested that the words
"against you" be omitted "on the ground that the man might just as well say something in his
favor as against him." ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, app. 13, at
163.
155. The low status of the Judges' Rules led to their characterization as "a vague outline
for criminal inquiry" as opposed to "operational rules." E.C. FRIESEN & I.R. SCOTT, ENGLISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63 (1979).
156. ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, app. 13, at 162-65.
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they are in custody.1 57 This interpretation followed from the long-established principle that, as a general rule, arrest should take place at the end
of the investigation and that, upon arrest, the suspect should be promptly
charged. 15 8 For some time thereafter, courts tended to follow the circular by excluding written statements resulting from questioning or crossexamination of persons in custody. Gradually, however, enforcement began to loosen as the courts perceived a public need for some police power
to interrogate suspects in custody. After 1950, courts uniformly began to
admit statements obtained during custodial questioning. By 1961
Glanville Williams regarded the Home Secretary's circular of 1930 as a
"dead letter."' 159 He surmised that "the Rules have been abandoned, by
tacit consent, just because they are an unreasonable restriction upon ac160
tivities of the police in bringing criminals to book."
In 1964, the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court amended
the Judges' Rules to give police greater freedom to question suspects in
custody. 16 1 The Rules existed in this less restrictive form for the next
62
twenty years.'
157. HOME OFFICE, CIRCULAR No. 5360 53/23; see ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, app. 13, at 164; Williams, Police Interrogation,supra note 12, at 50.
158.

See V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, A GUIDE TO THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVI-

ACT 1984, § 5.02 (1985).
159. Williams, Police Interrogation, supra note 12, at 50-51 ("[J]udges have given up enforcing their own rules, for it is no longer the practice to exclude evidence obtained by questioning in custody.").
160. Id. at 52; see also V. BEVAN & K LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 5.02 ("[Ihe courts
acquiesced in [the practice of detention for questioning] by failing to enforce the Judges' Rules,
so much so that they had, by 1960, ceased to exist as a legal constraint on custodial
questioning.").
161. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237. The reference by the Miranda Court in 1966
to the "recently strengthened" Judges' Rules, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486-87
(1966), charitably could be described as misleading. While the new Rules did add more precision and detail, their principal effect was to legitimize greater police questioning of suspects in
custody:
[The new Rules] have confirmed quite unambiguously the right of the police to interrogate persons already in custody, a practice which hitherto has been discouraged
and was officially denied under the old Rules except for the purpose of clearing up
ambiguities. It is ... clear that the balance in the past between private right and
public interest has sometimes appeared to be "excessively and unnecessarily tilted in
favor of the individual," .... The new Rules appear partly to redress the balance by
conferring additional powers and extended discretion on the police without depriving
the individual of all safeguards, and in so doing should fulfill a pressing need.
Coutts, The Public Interest and the Interest of the Accused in the Criminal Process, in THE
ACCUSED, supra note 61, at 28; see also V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 5.02; D.
KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 122-23 (1967).
162. Various Home Office circulars have since been issued in connection with the Administrative Directions and other matters, but the Rules themselves have remained unchanged.
162-165.
ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29,
DENCE
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The amended Rules provided for three separate cautions, depending
on the circumstances. The first caution was required prior to any questioning as soon as police had evidence providing reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the person had committed an offense. The second was
required, regardless of police efforts to question, whenever the person
was charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted for an offense.
The third caution was required in the "exceptional" case when police
question a person after he has been charged or informed that he may be
prosecuted. 163
Attached to the Judges' Rules were appendices which affirmed or
163. The portion of the Rules dealing with cautioning suspects is as follows:
1. When a police officer is trying to discover whether, or by whom, an offence has
been committed he is entitled to question any person, whether suspected or not, from
whom he thinks that useful information may be obtained. This is so whether or not
the person in question has been taken into custody so long as he has not been charged
with the offence or informed that he may be prosecuted for it.
2. As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds
for suspecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall caution that person or
cause him to be cautioned before putting to him any questions, or further questions,
relating to that offence.
The caution shall be in the following terms:
"You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say
may be put into writing and given in evidence."
When after being cautioned a person is being questioned, or elects to make a
statement, a record shall be kept of the time and the place at which any such questioning or statement began and ended and of the persons present.
3.(a) Where a person is charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted for an
offence he shall be cautioned in the following terms:
"Do you wish to say anything? You are not obliged to say anything unless you
wish to do so but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in
evidence."
(b) It is only in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence should be put
to the accused person after he has been charged or informed that he may be prosecuted. Such questions may be put where they are necessary for the purpose of
preventing or minimising harm or loss to some other person or to the public or for
clearing up an ambiguity in a previous answer or statement.
Before any such questions are put the accused should be cautioned in these
terms:
"I wish to put some questions to you about the offence with which you have
been charged (or about the offence for which you may be prosecuted). You are not
obliged to answer any of these questions, but if you do the questions and answers will
be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence."
Any questions put and answers given relating to the offence must be contemporaneously recorded in full and the record signed by that person or if he refuses by the
interrogating officer.
(c) When such a person is being questioned, or elects to make a statement, a record
shall be kept of the time and place at which any questioning or statement began and
ended and of the persons present.
JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237-38.
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pronounced other rights and protections. The introduction to Appendix
A listed principles unaffected by the Rules including a statement of the
traditional voluntariness requirement and a reference to the qualified
right of access to a solicitor. 1 4 Appendix B contained "Administrative
Directions on Interrogation and the taking of Statements" which established general rules for the treatment of persons in custody and require165
ments concerning record-keeping and the writing of statements.
The 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure found the
Judges' Rules unclear and imprecise and regarded the law governing police interrogation as "jigsaw pieces of two centuries of police and legal
history." 166 It recommended that all aspects of the treatment and questioning of suspects be regulated by statute and that a detailed Code of
Practice be drafted to replace the Judges' Rules. 167 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 implemented the substance of the Commission's
recommendations and required the Secretary of State to issue Codes of
Practice in connection with four substantive areas, one of which concerned the detention, treatment, and questioning of persons by police officers.168 In December, 1985 Parliament approved the Codes of Practice
issued by the Secretary. As of January 1, 1986, they replaced the Judges'
Rules as well as the associated appendices. The Codes are said to "provide clear and workable guidelines for the police as well as strengthened
safeguards for the individual."1 69 They establish a comprehensive
scheme for the treatment and questioning of suspects and therefore cover
a much broader area than the Judges' Rules. They are also more precise
and more detailed.170 While they were not enacted by statute and thus
lack the status of legislation, they were the subject of extensive study and
debate by the government, and the order bringing them into effect was
164. Id. at 237 n.2 (paras. (c) and (e)).
165. Appendix B also contained a requirement that persons in custody should be informed
"of the rights and facilities available to them." Id. at 240 n.3 (para. 7(b)).
166. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 4.115, at 109-10.
167. Id. 5.18, at 124.
168. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 66. The Act also required the
issuance of Codes of Practice in the following areas: the exercise by police officers of statutory
powers of stop and search, the searching of premises by police officers and the seizure of property found by police officers on persons or premises, and the identification of persons by police
officers.
169. Home Office statement appended to the Code.
170. Following each section of the Code are "Notes for Guidance," which are not technically part of the Code but provide "guidance to police officers and others about its application
and interpretation." CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 1.3. The Code also contains Annexes, which are part of the Code itself, the purpose of which is to collect in one place provisions that recur in the text of the Code and would otherwise require repeating. Id.
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approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. 171 It is likely,
therefore, that they will have a somewhat higher status than the Judges'
172
Rules in the eyes of the police and the courts.
The Code 173 provisions with respect to cautions elaborate upon and
in some respects alter the Judges' Rules. The language of the caution is
simplified but in substance unchanged: "You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence."' 174 The first caution is required prior to questioning when police
have "grounds to suspect" a person of an offense and the questioning is
"for the purpose of obtaining evidence which may be given to a court in a
prosecution."' 17 5 This may occur before a suspect's arrest. If a person
not under arrest is cautioned at a police station or other premises, he
must be told that he is not under arrest and is not obliged to remain with
the officer, but that if he chooses to remain, he may obtain legal advice if
he wishes. 176 In any event, unless previously cautioned, a suspect must
be cautioned upon arrest except when the suspect's condition or behavior
1 77
makes it impractical.
Whenever a police officer believes there is sufficient evidence to prosecute a detained person, he must, without delay, bring him before a "cus171. The Codes can be characterized neither as primary nor as secondary or subordinate
legislation. The 1984 Act did not require that the Codes be in the form of a statutory instrument, but only that the Secretary of State "bring [them] into operation by order made by
statutory instrument," and that such order shall not have effect "until approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament." Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 67(4)(5). For a general discussion of English legislative process, including primary and subordinate
legislation, see P.F. SMITH & S.H.

BAILEY, THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM

184-234

(1984).
172. The status of the Codes apparently lies somewhere between statutory rules of law and
mere guidance or advice to the police of the character of the Judges' Rules. See Munro, The
Accountability of the Police, [1985] CRIM. L. REV. 581, 585.
Zander believes that it is impossible to say whether the Codes would have a higher status
in the eyes of the police if they were statutory instruments, but he regards the difference in
form of enactment as not of major significance: "The crux of the matter is whether the police
treat the rules in the Code of Practice as rules to which they must adhere. The Judges' Rules
were not law and the judges over the years showed themselves somewhat lax in enforcing their
provisions." M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 66-67, at 94.
Furthermore, a breach of a Code of Practice, unlike a deviation from the Judges' Rules, is
a disciplinary offense and renders an officer subject to complaint under the new police complaints procedure established by the 1984 Act. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60,
§ 67(8).
173. Unless otherwise noted, this Article refers to the "Code" or "Code of Practice" pertaining to detention, treatment, and questioning only.
174. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 10.4.
175. Id. § 10.1.
176. Id. §§ 3.9, 10.1-2.
177. Id. § 10.3.
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tody officer" who is located at police stations designated for detaining
arrested persons and who must not be involved in the investigation of the
offense for which the person is detained. 178 The custody officer is responsible for the proper treatment of detained persons, the maintenance
of accurate and complete records as to arrested persons, the giving of
notices and advice of certain rights, and, most important, the determination whether persons should be released, detained for further questioning, or charged with an offense. 179 The custody officer must inform those
arrested of the right to have someone notified of the arrest, the right to
consult a solicitor, the right to consult the Code of Practice, and the right
to a copy of the custody record. 180 In addition, the custody officer must
give the suspect written notice setting forth these rights as well as the
caution.181 The officer must ask the suspect to sign the custody record to
acknowledge receipt of the written notice and to signify whether or not
he wants legal advice at this point.182
When a detained person is charged with or informed that he may be
prosecuted for an offense, he must be given the second caution, and when
he is charged, in addition, he must be given written notice setting forth
the caution as well as the particulars of the charge. 183
After a suspect has been charged with an offense or informed that he
may be prosecuted for it, he may not be questioned with respect to the
offense unless questioning is necessary
for the purpose of preventing or minimising harm or loss to some other
person or to the public or for clearing up an ambiguity in a previous
answer or statement, or where it is in the interests of justice that the

person should have put to him and have an opportunity to comment
on information concerning the offence which has come to84light since he
was charged or informed that he might be prosecuted.'

Before any such questioning, the suspect again must be cautioned. 85
It is evident that the Code maintains the basic structure of the
Judges' Rules. The first caution is required prior to questioning when
178. The position and responsibilities of custody officer are created by Part IV of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, §§ 35-36.
179. See id.
§§ 35-39; CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, §§ 2-4, 9, 12, 17.
180. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 3.1.
181. During debates on the Code in the House of Commons, it was suggested that the
suspect be provided a simplified or shortened leaflet setting out these rights. The Minister of
State for the Home Office gave his assurance that this will be the practice. House of Commons,
Dec. 5, 1985, col. 519; see also House of Lords, Dec. 9, 1985, col. 36 (assurance of Lord
Glenarthur).
182. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 3.2, .4.
183. Id. § 17.2-.3.
184. Id. § 17.5.
185. Id.
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suspicion reaches the required level. The second caution is required regardless of questioning when the suspect is charged or informed that he
may be prosecuted, and the third caution is required when the police
question a suspect after he has been charged or informed that he may be
prosecuted. Although this basic structure remains, the Code is much
more comprehensive and provides enhanced guarantees with respect to
giving of the caution. For example, in some contexts, the caution must be
given earlier and more often. The Judges' Rules did not require that a
suspect be cautioned at the time he is taken into custody unless he was
questioned regarding an offense for which there were reasonable grounds
to suspect him. The Code of Practice requires that the suspect be cau18 6
tioned "upon arrest" even though he is not subjected to questioning.
Also, the Judges' Rules did not require written cautions, but the Code
requires the custody officer to give those under arrest at the police station
written notice of their rights including the caution.18 7 However, in other
respects the Code decreases protection for suspects-for example, by
188
providing additional exceptions to restrictions on police interrogation.
(2) Comparison with the Miranda Rules
Before Miranda v. Arizona, 189 specific national standards for the
questioning of suspects had never existed in the United States. Apart
from the vague voluntariness limits imposed by due process and the
search and seizure rules of the fourth amendment, 190 the interrogation of
suspects was regarded as a matter for state and local authorities, which,
in turn, usually deferred to the policies of individual police departments. 191 It was not until the United States Supreme Court decided Miranda twenty years ago that federal and state law enforcement officials
were required by law to advise suspects of their rights prior to questioning. 192 The Miranda decision, applicable to both federal and state prose186. Id. § 10.3.
187. Id. § 3.2.
188. Id. § 17.5.
189. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
190. The exclusionary rule associated with the fourth amendment did not apply to federal
prosecutions until 1914. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). It did not apply to state
prosecutions until 1961. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
191. Federal law enforcement practices were more closely regulated by federal statute and
decisional law. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451-54 (1957); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345-47 (1943); 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985).
192. Advice of rights may have been required by policy or rules of individual law enforcement agencies. For example, at the time of Miranda, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
required its agents at the outset of an interview to warn the suspect that he has the right to say
nothing and the right to counsel and that any statement he makes may be used against him in

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

cutions,193 set forth, for the first time, specific warnings to be provided

suspects prior to custodial questioning. Miranda also detailed the circumstances under which questioning may proceed once the suspect has
been warned. Miranda requirements are limited in scope and effect,
however, since they concern only narrow aspects of custodial questioning
and rely only on the judicial system and its exclusionary rule for
enforcement.
Compared to the English caution requirements, the Miranda rules
are simple. When an officer has taken a suspect into custody or otherwise deprived him of his freedom of action in any significant way, procedural safeguards must be employed prior to any questioning to protect
the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Unless other fully effective ineans are devised to inform suspects of
their right to silence and to assure them a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the suspect must be warned that: (1) he has a right to remain
silent and anything he says can and will be used against him in court; and
(2) he has the right to consult with an attorney and if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
194
desires.
The suspect may waive these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If, however, the suspect indicates in any manner at any time prior to or during questioning that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. If he states that he
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Unless there is demonstrated compliance with these procedural safeguards, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used
95
as evidence against the accused.'
In many respects, the English and American rules are similar. Both
provide for an investigatory period during which police can question persons without warning them of their rights. Both systems identify a point
at which the assertion of official authority requires warnings. Finally,
there is an attempt to reduce or eliminate all questioning at some later
defined event which marks the commencement of the accusatory stage of
the proceedings.
court. Those actually or imminently under arrest were also advised of the right to appointed
counsel. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483-86 (1966).
193. Miranda is designed to protect fifth amendment rights and both the fifth amendment's and Miranda'sprotections apply to state as well as federal prosecutions. Michigan v.

Tucker,
194.
195.
panying

417 U.S. 433, 441-43 (1974).
Miranda, 384 U. S. at 479.
Id. at 479; see id. at 444-45, 469, 470, 473-74. But see infra notes 251-54 and accomtext.
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Nevertheless, in numerous instances both the Judges' Rules and the
Code of Practice offer suspects greater protection. Miranda's requirements for admonitions do not come into play absent custody and interrogation. Custody occurs upon formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement to the degree associated with formal arrest. 19 6 Interrogation
consists of express questioning or its functional equivalent, that is, any
words or action on the part of the police, other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody, that police should know are reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response.1 97 Under the Judges' Rules and
the Code, custody is often not determinative and interrogation is often
insignificant. Though the suspect may not be in custody, the Judges'
Rules required the first caution prior to any questioning as soon as the
police have "evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for suspecting [he] ...has committed an offence." 19 8 Under the new Code, the
duty to caution arises at an even earlier point: "reasonable grounds"
under the Judges' Rules had been taken to require evidence admissible
over objection in a court of law, but the Code's new relaxed standard of
"grounds to suspect" may be present though based on inadmissible evidence. 199 Thus, as a general rule, persons suspected of an offense will
have to be cautioned before they are questioned even though they may
not be under arrest or otherwise detained.
Under Miranda, warnings are only necessary when the suspect is in
196. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,430 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per
curiam)).
197. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
198. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, rule 2, at 238. This standard was not comparable to
either our own reasonable suspicion standard or our probable cause requirement, since "evidence" in the Judges' Rules meant information of a nature that would be admissible as evidence in court. Regina v. Osbourne, [1973] Q.B. 678, 682 (C.A. 1972). Thus, the caution
could be delayed if the suspicion justifying the arrest was based on information which could
not be put before a court. See Regina v. Dodd, 74 Crim. App. 50, 55-56 (C.A. 1981); C.
EMMINS, supra note 36, at 328-29. Our reasonable suspicion or probable cause standards, on
the other hand, may be satisfied by evidence ordinarily inadmissible in court. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959).
199. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 10.1; see T. C. WALTERS & M. A. O'CONNELL,
supra note 150, at 72. The authors suggest that the new standard should be regarded as "subjective" and will have the effect "that an officer may now have to administer the caution, in its
new form, at an earlier stage than previously." This may occur well before the time of arrest
since the power to arrest can only be exercised when the officer has reasonable grounds for his
suspicion. See also M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 66-67, at 98. Furthermore, the Notes for
Guidance provide that persons voluntarily at police stations to assist with an investigation
should be treated with no less consideration than those who are in custody and that they
"enjoy an absolute right to obtain legal advice or communicate with anyone outside the police
station." CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance IA.
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custody. The question of custody does not depend on the strength or
content of police suspicions, 20° nor is it affected by the fact that questioning takes place in a "coercive environment," such as a police station. 20'
Custody will be found only when the suspect is formally arrested or subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal
arrest.

20 2

Another important difference should be noted with regard to the
suspect who has been arrested but is not questioned. Under the Judges'
Rules an arrest without questioning did not require the caution, but
under the Code, unless the suspect has previously been cautioned, he
must be cautioned "upon arrest" regardless of whether he is subjected to
questioning. 20 3 Miranda requires warnings only if the arrestee is interrogated. Suspects arrested but not questioned need not be warned of their
Miranda rights.
The arrest and questioning of suspects by store security personnel or
other private persons engaged in law enforcement activities offers another context in which English rules provide greater protection. The
fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence discovered from searches by private persons, 20 4 and neither the Miranda rules
nor the sixth amendment right to counsel guarantees circumscribe questioning by private persons such as private detectives or store security officers. 20 5 The Judges' Rules, on the other hand, provided that persons
other than police officers charged with the duty of investigating offenses
or charging offenders "shall, so far as may be practicable, comply with
these rules."' 20 6 The 1984 Act preserves the spirit of this principle by
requiring that such persons "shall... have regard to any relevant provision of [the Code]."' 207 Thus, private detectives and security officers may
be required to caution suspects prior to questioning them. Though the
200. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1976). A test focusing on suspicion
was announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91-(1964), but was rejected by subsequent cases.
201. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977) (per curiam).
202. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984). However, Miranda is not limited
to station house questioning. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1980)
(police car); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (suspect's bedroom).
203. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 10.3.
204. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984); Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 656 (1980).
205. The fifth amendment is not concerned with moral or psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285,
1291 (1985); see In re Deborah C., 30 Cal. 3d 125, 130-31, 635 P.2d 446, 448-49, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 852, 854 (1981).
206. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, rule 6, at 239.
207. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 67(9).
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Act merely exhorts private persons to "have regard" for the Code, their
compliance may be taken into account in court proceedings with respect
to questions of admissibility and weight of evidence.20 8
The Code requires a second caution when a detained person "is

'20 9
charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted for an offense.
Under the Code, whenever there exists sufficient evidence to charge, po-

lice have a duty to bring the suspect before the custody officer who then
must determine whether to charge the suspect.2 10 The charge itself triggers the duty to caution irrespective of whether the person is
21 1
interrogated.

The English rules contain limited prohibitions against questioning
not found in Miranda. First, the Code provides that "[a]s soon as a police officer who is making inquiries of any person about an offense believes that a prosecution should be brought against him and that there is
sufficient evidence for it to succeed, he shall without delay cease to ques-

tion him. 212 Thus, when the police believe that there is enough evidence
for a successful prosecution they are not permitted to question the suspect, and if they come to this belief while questioning, they must terminate the interview.
These rules appear to place greater restrictions on police questioning

than do their American counterparts. Neither Miranda nor any other
American legal principle requires that charges be filed as soon as there is
enough evidence to prosecute or that questioning cease as soon as police

believe they have enough evidence to convict or as soon as the suspect is
informed that he may be prosecuted. General due process principles may

limit excessive delay in bringing a charge, but violations occur only in
208. Id. § 67(11).
209. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 17.2. If the suspect is charged, he must be
given a written notice containing the caution and the particulars of the charge. Id. § 17.3.
The Judges' Rules imposed the same requirement regardless of whether the suspect was
"detained." JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, rule 3(a), at 238.
210. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 17.3; Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
§ 37(7). The Judges' Rules required that the police officer himself prefer the charge as soon as
he had obtained sufficient evidence. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237 n.2 (para. (d)).
211. The second caution under the Judges' Rules had been somewhat interrogatory in
form, commencing with, "Do you wish to say anything?" Thus, the Rules imposed a duty of
inquiry along with a duty to caution. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, rule 3(a), at 238.
212. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 11.2. The Judges' Rules did not specifically
prohibit questioning after obtaining sufficient evidence to convict. However, the Rules were
interpreted as requiring that, as soon as a police officer had enough evidence to charge, he must
cause the suspect to be charged without delay and thereafter may not question him about the
offense. ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, %71, at 26. The Code
merely requires the investigating officer to bring the suspect to the custody officer who will
make the charging decision.
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extreme circumstances. The sixth amendment speedy trial right applies
21 3
only to those who have been charged or otherwise formally accused.
However, the English rules are not as strict or protective of suspects
as first appears. The duty to cease questioning arises not simply with
sufficient evidence to charge and prosecute (meaning a prima facie
case), 2 14 but only when there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.2 1 5 Because the interviewing officer, or on occasion the custody officer, makes this judgment, 2 16 the rule prohibits questioning only when
other evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that a confession is unnecessary for a conviction. In these cases, the suspect might not be questioned
regardless of the rule.
Furthermore, the English rules provide a loophole to the prohibition
on questioning persons who have been charged or informed they may be
prosecuted. Questioning of such persons is permitted when
necessary for the purpose of preventing or minimising harm or loss to
some other person or to the public or for clearing up an ambiguity in a
previous answer or statement or where it is in the interests of justice
that the person should have put to him and have an opportunity to
comment on information concerning the offense which has come 217
to
light since he was charged or informed that he might be prosecuted.
This exception appears to offer a large enough hole for an interrogator to
2 18
drive through at will.
213. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 513 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307, 313 (1971).
214. Under the Judges' Rules, "evidence sufficient to charge" meant enough to establish a
prima facie case. This was regarded as a higher standard than "reasonable suspicion." Hussein v. Chong Fook Kam, 1970 App. Cas. 942, 948 (P.C. 1969) (Malaysia). See generally
ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 71, at 26.
215. See V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 7.88.
216. Id.
217. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 17.5. Even the broad conditions of this exception do not have to be met when the suspect is questioned regarding offenses other than those
with which he is charged or for which he has been informed he may be prosecuted. T.C.
WALTERS & M.A. O'CONNELL, supra note 150, at 76. The language of the exception is identical to the Judges' Rules except that the Code added a last provision allowing questioning on
new information, thereby expanding circumstances under which a charged person may be
questioned with respect to the offense.
218. Interrogation of arrested suspects at the police station is well-accepted practice. P.
SOFrLEY, supra note 76, at 85. If the rules are being followed, police either delay charging the
suspect or informing him that he may be prosecuted for the offense or employ the stated exceptions to justify interrogation. In one case, for example, a suspect was arrested Wednesday and
confessed to ten armed robberies on Thursday. Because police suspected him of other robberies, they did not charge him and continued interrogation through Friday, when he admitted
two more robberies, and Saturday, when he admitted another. The court found a breach of the
Judges' Rules by not charging the suspect and bringing him before a magistrate on Saturday,
but regarded the delay up to that point as reasonable in light of the need to further investigate
the unsolved robberies. See, e.g., Regina v. Mackintosh, 76 Crim. App. 177 (C.A. 1982).
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Once this exception applies, a third caution is required prior to any
questioning. This points up one area in which the protections of the English rules certainly exceed those of Miranda.While Miranda may require
that a new caution be given prior to reinterrogation after a substantial
period of time has elapsed or after the suspect has first asserted his right
to remain silent, 219 Miranda sets forth no requirement for multiple cautions in the normal interrogation context. 220 Not only does the Code
explicitly provide for separate cautioning at each phase of the interrogation process, it requires that, whenever there is a break in questioning,
the interviewing officer must ensure that the suspect is aware that he
remains under caution. If there is any doubt, the caution must be given
again in full when the interview resumes. 22 1 Even under the Judges'
Rules, the normal practice of many police officers was to caution suspects
on a number of occasions whether or not they intended to question them
222
at that time.
Yet a number of shortcomings of the English rules appear when
contrasted with Miranda rules and sixth amendment right to counsel
standards. The English caution and the Miranda warning similarly inform the suspect of his right to silence. The language of the Judges'
Rules seems somewhat clearer when it flatly tells the suspect that "you
do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so," rather than advising in shorthand legal terms of "the right to remain silent." Nevertheless, the basic meaning conveyed is similar, and in both countries minor
deviations from the stated language are not regarded as a breach of the
duty to inform as long as the essence of the rights is conveyed. 223 However, the implications of the silence warning and the use to which silence
can be put in England make the English caution misleading. In holding
evidence of silence inadmissible even to impeach, the United States
Supreme Court has found that the Miranda warning constitutes an im219. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 99-102 (1975); People v. Bennett, 58 Cal. App.
3d 230, 238, 129 Cal. Rptr. 679, 684-85 (1976); cf People v. Mack, 27 Cal. 3d 145, 154, 611
P.2d 454, 459, 165 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1980).
220. Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1982) (per curiam); see also People v. Brockman, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1006, 83 Cal. Rptr. 70, 72-73 (1969); cf People v. Braeseke, 25
Cal.3d 691, 701-02, 602 P.2d 384, 390, 159 Cal. Rptr. 684, 690 (1979), vacated,446 U.S. 932

(1980).
221. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 10.5. The Notes for Guidance admonish that,
"[i]n considering whether or not to caution again after a break, the officer should bear in mind
that he may have to satisfy a court that the person understood that he was still under a caution
when the interview resumed." Id., Notes for Guidance 10A.
222.

P. SOFrLEY, supra note 76, at 71.

223. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1981) (per curiam); CODE OF PRACTICE,
supra note 18, § 10.4.
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plicit assurance that a suspect's silence "will carry no penalty. '224 Surely
no less can be said for the English caution. In fact, the Notes for Guidance in the Code suggest that when a suspect is unclear about the significance of the caution, the officer should explain that it "is given in
pursuance of the general principle of English law that a person need not
answer any questions or provide any information which might tend to
incriminate him, and that no adverse inferences from his silence may be
drawn at any trial that takes place. 2 2z 5 Yet, as noted previously, while

an English court will instruct the jury that an inference of guilt cannot be
drawn from silence, evidence of the silence comes before the trier of
fact-the jury knows that when the defendant was questioned, he failed

to offer an explanation- and nothing can prevent the jury from drawing
adverse inferences.2 26 Therefore, while English law states that silence
cannot be used to convict, in fact, an accused's failure to talk to police
often may be used by the jury to his detriment.

In another important respect the caution rules offer less protection
than Miranda. An American prosecutor must affirmatively prove a
knowledgeable waiver of Miranda rights.2 27 While Miranda does not require an express waiver,2 28 relinquishment of rights cannot be inferred
224. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
225. CODE OF PRACtiCE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance 10D. See supra note 170 for
an explanation of the Notes.
226. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
227. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1979).
228. See id. at 373 (defendant's course of conduct indicated that he had understood rights
and waived them). See generally Comment, Waiver of Rights in Police Interrogations: Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 413, 422-23 (1969).
Adequate waiver of Miranda rights has been found when the police read the Miranda
warnings aloud from a printed card and then recorded the suspect's responses as follows:
Do you understand these rights? Yeh.
Do you have any questions about your rights? No.
Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now? Yeh, I do.
The card was dated and signed by the officer and the suspect. Characterizing the process
as a "careful administration of Miranda warnings," and concluding that the suspect was fully
capable of understanding them, the court found valid the suspect's waiver of his rights. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1296 & n.4 (1985).
The following is a standard admonition and waiver form used by many police departments in California:
Admonition: You have the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used
against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him
present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford a lawyer one
will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you wish one.
WAIVER: DO YOU UNDERSTAND EACH OF THESE RIGHTS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU?
HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK TO US NOW?
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from silence. 229 However, Miranda makes no provision for explaining to
the suspect the meaning and significance of his rights. Factors unknown
to the accused, such as police deception or an attorney's efforts to give
advice, are irrelevant to the question of waiver:
Once it's determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights
was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and

request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the state's intention to use

his statements to receive a conviction,
the analysis is complete and the
230

waiver is valid as a matter of law.
If a suspect asserts his right to remain silent, or simply declines to speak,
Miranda requires that the police honor his assertion by immediately
ceasing interrogation until a lawyer is present. 231
The Judges' Rules had failed to require that police take precautions
to ensure that suspects understood their rights and failed to require
either an express or implied waiver. Thus, in practice, police usually did
not inquire whether suspects understood their rights. 232 The Code offers
much improvement regarding suspects' knowledge and understanding of
their rights. First, if it appears that the suspect does not understand what
the caution means, the officer should "explain it in his own words," and
if the suspect "is unclear about its significance," the officer should go on
to explain the consequences of silence as previously discussed. 233 Special
care must be taken when questioning juveniles and mentally ill or mentally handicapped persons. 234 Furthermore, if because of alcohol or
drugs, a suspect is "unable to appreciate the significance of questions put
to him and his answer," he may not be questioned unless the "urgent
interview" exception applies. 235
Although the Code provides greater assurance that suspects understand their rights, it does not change the traditional principle found in
the Judges' Rules that allows the police to disregard a suspect's assertion
of those rights. Neither the Judges' Rules nor any common-law principle
required that if the suspect indicated that he wished to remain silent no
more questions could be asked. 236 As long as a suspect was properly
229.
230.
231.

Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471 (1980).
Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986).
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975).
232. P. SOFTLEY, supra note 76, at 73-74.
233. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance 10C, 10D; see supra note 225
and accompanying text.
234. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance 13B.
235. Id. § 12.3; Id. Annex C. The Annex provides for "urgent interviews" of intoxicated,
mentally ill, juvenile, or illiterate suspects if a superintendent or other superior officer decides
that delay would involve an immediate risk of harm to persons or a risk of serious property
damage. Questioning must cease after the police obtain sufficient information to avert the risk.

236.

ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION

1981, supra note 29, f 70, at 26.
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cautioned, interrogation could continue in the face of protestations and
objections, subject only to the prohibition against such pressure as would
render the statement involuntary. The Code does not refer to this subject
directly, but the Notes for Guidance appear to reaffirm the traditional
principles by restating the right of police to question suspects and then
noting, "[a] person's declaration that he is unwilling to reply does not
'237
alter this entitlement.
In contrast, Miranda principles afford suspects the power to cut off
interrogation. Questioning can continue only if the suspect clearly understands "that, at anytime, he [can] bring the proceeding to a halt, or,
short of that, call in an attorney to give advice and monitor the conduct
of his interrogators. 2 38 Indeed, the Supreme Court has accepted the
characterization of police interrogation as "a privilege terminable at the
will of the suspect. ' 239 Moreover, police cannot avoid the rule by ceasing
questioning momentarily then shortly thereafter resuming questioning on
the same subject since this "would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will
of the [suspect]." 24 While it is possible in some circumstances for the
police to interrogate after the lapse of a substantial period of time and
to
upon a different subject matter, the suspect's invocation of the24right
1
honored."
"scrupulously
be
to
continue
silence must otherwise
In this respect, the importance of the English caution is severely
limited when compared to Miranda. The English rules guarantee that
suspects are made aware of the right of silence, but by denying suspects
the right to cut off questioning, the rules do not give significance to the
exercise of the right.
In a related context, the language of the Code appears to be more
protective of suspects than is the case. The procedures for taking written
statements require that a suspect writing his own statement "shall be
allowed to do so without any prompting except that a police officer may
indicate to him which matters are material or question any ambiguity in
the statement. '242 When the officer writes the statement, "he must take
down the exact words spoken... and must not edit or paraphrase it."243
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance lB.
Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1144 (1986).
Id. & n.1.
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975).
Id. at 105-06.
CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Annex D(a)(3). The Code is less strict than the

Judges' Rules, which limited the police to pointing out what matters are material. JUDGES'

RULES, supra note 29, rule 4(b), at 238.
243.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Annex D(b)(5). The Code has eliminated the
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These restrictions are very similar to those of the Judges' Rules and may
suggest that English police are prohibited from questioning or interrogating an accused. Indeed, the Miranda Court flatly stated that the Judges'
Rules "require that any statement made be given by the accused without
questioning by the police, '244 and Justice Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut asserted that English courts have long tended severely to dis245
courage police from questioning those arrested or about to be arrested.
However, these restrictions apply only when a suspect makes a written
statement, not during the interrogation process in general. Thus, an
English officer who lacks definite proof of guilt may vigorously crossexamine an uncharged suspect unrestricted by these requirements as long
as he is not taking a written statement. 246 In fact, written statements are
not taken in most cases, and when they are, it is usually after the suspect
247
has orally confessed.
The only restriction imposed by the new law on aggressive questioning in the usual interrogation context is an admonition in the Notes for
Guidance that "the purpose of any interview is to obtain from the person
concerned his explanation of the facts, and not necessarily to obtain an
admission. ' 248 This is not part of the actual Code and a violation is not
automatically a breach of the police disciplinary code. 249 Most important, the admonition does not alter the general principle of English law
that entitles police in the course of crime detection to question any person, whether or not under suspicion or in custody, at least until the person has been charged or informed he may be prosecuted. In fact, the
prohibition on questioning (with exceptions) and prompting, and has added the requirement
that necessary questions and answers be contemporaneously recorded. See JUDGES' RULES,
supra note 29, rule 4(d), at 238-39.
244. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 484 (1966).
245. 367 U.S. 568, 593 (1961).
246.

Police are free to question uncharged suspects freely concerning the written state-

ments of others. Thus, the suggestion that an accomplice has "grassed" on a suspect will not
itself violate the rule or render the subsequent confession inadmissible. See Regina v. Dodd, 74
Crim. App. 50 (C.A. 1981); Regina v. Murphy, [1965] N. Ir. 138, 147-49 (Courts-Martial
App. Ct.). See generally ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-24. Apparently, "accomplice and
informational bluffs" are commonplace. See B. IRVING, A CASE STUDY OF CURRENT PRACTICE 145 (Royal Comm'n on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 2, 1980).
In this respect, the English and American practices are similar. Deception techniques are
generally allowed in the United States as long as they do not result in an involuntary statement
or are not the type that would likely produce a false confession. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731,
739 (1969). See cases cited in Kaci, supra note 21, at 103-04 & nn.80-81. The English rules in
this context certainly cannot be described as "a striking contrast to United States practice."
See id. at 103.
247.

See P.

248.
249.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance
M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 66-67, at 96.

SOFTLEY,

supra note 76, at 81.

lB.
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Notes expressly state, "A person's declaration that he is unwilling to reply does not alter this entitlement. ' 250 Thus, it is clear that, subject to
the minimal restrictions imposed by the Code, English police retain their
traditional power to interrogate suspects in and out of custody and may
do so aggressively, at least so far as not taking "no" for an answer.
Finally, it is important to consider the emergency or exigent circumstance exceptions to the warning requirements. Until recently, no such
limits on Miranda were generally recognized, 25' but in New York v.
252
Quarles, the Supreme Court announced a "public safety" exception.
In this case, the Court held that Miranda warnings need not be given
when police question a suspect in response to a threat posed by the presence of a loaded gun. The suspect in Quarles was interrogated while in
custody concerning the location of a weapon thought to be in a nearby
public area. Because the questioning was "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public's safety," the Court found it was justified despite the
absence of Mirandawarnings. 253 The Court suggested, however, that the
new exception would not be so broad as to sanction the gathering of
evidence for the sole purpose of obtaining a conviction even in serious
cases. 254 Unfortunately, the Court's opinion failed to draw clear boundaries around the exception, and the extent of its effect on the protections
afforded by Miranda will not be known for some time.
Neither the Judges' Rules nor the Code contains an explicit emergency or public safety exception to the caution requirements. Provisions
for emergency questioning certainly abound, but they are exceptions, not
to the caution requirements, but to the restrictions on questioning those
250. CODE OF PRACriCE, supra note 18, Notes for Guidance lB.
251. However, a number of lower courts had recognized public emergency or public safety
exceptions to Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir.
1974); People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 886, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 562 (1974) (en banc).
252. 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
253. Id. at 657. Shortly after midnight, a woman approached police officers seated in their
patrol car and told them that she had just been raped. She specifically described the man and
said he had just entered a nearby supermarket carrying a gun. The officers entered the supermarket, where one officer spotted a man who matched the description. The officer pursued
him but lost sight of him for several seconds. Upon finding him, the officer arrested and
frisked him, discovering an empty shoulder holster. He asked where the gun was, and the
suspect nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over there."
The officer then retrieved a loaded .38 caliber revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed
defendant under arrest, and read the Miranda rights. Id. at 658.
254. The Court was concerned with the possibility that an accomplice, a customer, or an
employee might later use the gun or be harmed by it. Noting that the Mirandawarnings might
well have deterred the defendant from revealing the location of the gun, the Court relied upon
the fact that the cost to society would have been something more than the mere failure to
obtain evidence useful in convicting the defendant. Id. at 657.
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who have been charged or informed they may be prosecuted, 255 those
who have asked for legal advice, 25 6 and juveniles, illiterates, or other persons at a particular disadvantage. 257 No express public safety or emergency exception applies to the caution required to be given an arrested
suspect or one whom there are "grounds to suspect" of an offense. 258
However, the duty to give the first caution is not as broad as initially
appears. Under the Judges' Rules, the first caution was required before
the police asked the person suspected of an offense "any questions...
relating to that offence."' 259 The Code requires this caution to be given to
the person suspected of an offense "for the purpose of obtaining evidence
which may be given to a court in a prosecution," and explicitly permits
police to question a suspect without caution "for other purposes," citing
examples. 260 Though the examples do not mention a public safety purpose, they are not inclusive. The type of questioning in Quarles, which
was characterized by the Court as "devoted to locating the abandoned
weapon," would arguably be permitted under the Code, at least when it
occurs prior to formal arrest. The new requirement that a person be
cautioned upon arrest (unless first cautioned as a suspect) is excused only
when "it is impracticable to do so by reason of [the arrestee's] condition
or behaviour at the time." 261 Certainly, the English rules provide enough
latitude for an emergency or public safety exception similar to our
oWn.

262

B. Rules for Cautioning Suspects: The Right to Counsel
(1) The English Right of Access

The right to counsel as we know it is referred to in England as the
right of access to a solicitor. 263 Compared to the Miranda warning, the
most glaring omission of the English caution is the absence of any advice
on the right to consult with a solicitor. The caution of the Judges' Rules
255.

CODE OF PRACTICE,

supra note 18, § 17.5.

256. Id. § 6.3.
257.

Id. §§ 13.1-14.9, Annex C.

258. See id. §§ 10.1, .3.
259. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, rule 2, at 238.
260. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 10.1 (emphasis added).
261. Id. § 10.3.
262. In fact, exceptions to the first caution requirement appear much broader since questioning for other purposes is not limited to public safety reasons. Similarly, if the Quarles
exception is taken to encompass all questioning except that "designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect," 467 U.S. at 654, it may embrace questioning prompted by multiple police purposes, only one of which involves public safety.
263. An English suspect would seek advice from a solicitor rather than from "counsel," a
barrister.
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made no mention of this right, nor is it a part of the caution under the
new Code.
From this omission one might be tempted to infer that suspects in
England had no right of access to a solicitor during police questioning
before appearance in court. However, although limited and ill-defined, a
right of access to a solicitor has been established in England for some
time. While nothing in the body of the Judges' Rules referred to a suspect's right to contact or consult with a solicitor during the interrogation
process, and no statutory provisions conferred such a right, a number of
other sources indicate recognition of a right of access.
The introduction to the Rules, for example, stated that they did not
affect the principle that
every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if he is
in custody provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the processes
of investigation or the administration
2 64
of justice by his doing so.
In addition, the Administrative Directions in Appendix B provided that
"a person in custody should be allowed to speak on the telephone to his
solicitor or to his friends," and that such persons should be informed
orally and by posted notices of the rights and facilities available to them.
Also, an act of Parliament provided a person in custody the statutory
entitlement to notify one person "reasonably named by him" of his arrest
and location "without delay or, where some delay is necessary in the
interest of the investigation or prevention of crime or the apprehension of
265
offenders, with no more delay than is so necessary."
These principles required considerable clarification, but English
courts were reluctant to undertake the task. The principles appeared to
provide a qualified right of access to a solicitor, but exactly when this
right came into play and how it was to be exercised and enforced remained unclear. The prevailing view was that, despite a general right of
access, a suspect had no right to the presence of a solicitor duringpolice
interrogation.2 66 Moreover, those rights of solicitor access and communication that did exist were subject to various provisos which turned on the
exercise of police discretion. The right to communicate and consult
could be limited when it might cause unreasonable delay or hindrance to
the process of investigation or to the administration of justice. While
264. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237 n.2 (para. (c)).
265.

Criminal Law Act 1977, § 62. See generally ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION

1981, supra note 29, 85, at 31-32.
266. ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 86, at 32; C. EMMINS,
supra note 36, at 332; Williams, Police Interrogation,supra note 12, at 56.
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police could not, as a matter of routine, prevent persons in custody from
obtaining legal advice if they wished to do SO, 2 6 7 and the fact that a suspect under arrest had not yet made an admission was not regarded as a
good reason for refusing to allow the suspect to see a solicitor, 268 access
to a solicitor could still be denied for a number of reasons. For example,
courts recognized that solicitors could not reasonably be expected to turn
up until ordinary business hours and did not require the police to postpone interrogation until then. 2 69 Also, if other suspects in the case were
still at large and the weapons used had not yet been found, police could
refuse a suspect's request to consult with a solicitor and could continue
270
interrogation.
Since a suspect in custody had no legal right to the presence of a
solicitor during police interrogation or while making a statement, he
need not be advised of any such right. The Administrative Directions to
the Judges' Rules did suggest that persons in custody should be informed
orally and by written notices displayed at convenient and conspicuous
places at police stations of the rights available to them. 271 However,
since there was no specific requirement of oral advice, most police relied
2 72
on drawing the suspect's attention to displayed notices of rights.
Often, the first time a suspect knew of his rights would be when he saw
them printed on the back of the charging document after he was bailed
and as he was leaving the police station. 273 Consequently, few suspects
ever asked to consult with a solicitor while in police custody. 274 Furthermore, the occasional request by a suspect for a solicitor was no guarantee
that a solicitor would be provided. In fact, most requests for access to a
solicitor were refused. 275 In any event, there was no requirement that,
once a suspect requested a solicitor or otherwise asserted his limited right
of access and consultation, police had to cease interrogation until a solicitor was present.
Given the uncertainty and the limits of these English rules, one English barrister and scholar pointed out that the right to consult with a
267.
268.
269.
270.

ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29,

1 86, at 32.

Regina v. Lemsatef, 64 Crim. App. 242, 246 (C.A. 1976).
Id. at 839-40.
Regina v. Dodd, 74 Crim. App. 50, 55 (C.A. 1981).

271.
272.

JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 240 n.3 (para. 7(b)).
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, f 4.84, at 98; V. BEVAN & K.
LIDSTONE, supra note 158, §§ 7.49, .51.
273. T.C. WALTERS & M.A. O'CONNELL, supra note 150, at 62.
274. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, %4.84, at 98; M. ZANDER, supra
note 53, § 57, at 72 & n.22 (citing articles and studies).
275. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 1 4.83, at 97; M. ZANDER, supra

note 53, § 57, at 72 & n.22.
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solicitor given by the Judges' Rules "is somewhat illusory. ' 276 The Miranda Court, then, was off the mark when, referring to taking statements
from suspects, it stated that "the right of the individual to consult with
an attorney during this period is expressly recognized" by the Judges'
Rules. 277 In fact, contrary to the Court's implicit assertion, the English
limitations on the right of access to legal advice during the critical interrogation period appeared so substantial as to effectively eliminate any
such right during this period as is recognized under American law.
The 1981 Royal Commission recognized these weaknesses in the
right of access and recommended measures to strengthen the right and
make it effective. 2 78 The 1984 Act adopted the general approach advocated by the Royal Commission. An arrestee now has both a statutory
right to have someone informed (a right not to be held incommunicado)
and a statutory right of access to a solicitor. With certain exceptions a
person "arrested and ... held in custody in a police station or other
premises" is entitled, if he requests, to have a person known to him who
is likely to take an interest in his welfare (which includes a solicitor) told
of his arrest and his place of detention. 279 He is also entitled, if he re'2 80
quests, "to consult a solicitor privately at any time.
The Act endeavors to make the right of access meaningful by providing for the establishment of duty solicitor schemes which are designed
to ensure that legal advice will be promptly available on request to persons in custody. 28 1 This is regarded as a major achievement by the government in collaboration with the solicitor's organization, the Law
Society.2 82 At police stations designated for the care of detained persons,
all suspects, whether under arrest or voluntarily present, will be able to
obtain free legal advice on a twenty-four hour basis regardless of
2 83
means.
276. C. EMMINS, supra note 36, at 332.
277. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 488 (footnote omitted).
278. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12,
4.87, at 99, 5.18, at 124.
279. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 56.
280. Id. § 58. The right of access provisions have been referred to as "arguably the most
important protection conferred by the Act." M.D.A. FREEMAN, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE ACT 1984, at 60-105 (1985).
281. Under § 59 of the Act, solicitors participating in magistrates' court schemes may be
required to take part in duty solicitor schemes at police stations. The purpose of the schemes
is "to ensure that legal advice is available outside normal working hours so that the right to
consult a lawyer is not made meaningless for those who are detained at night or during weekends." Comments by the Minister of State to the House of Commons, Dec. 5, 1985, col. 491.
282. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 58-59, at 74-75.
283. See generally id.; see also G. POWELL & C. MAGRATH, supra note 97, 1 14.18,
23.04.
However, a number of smaller nondesignated stations will not have duty solicitor
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The Code adds precision and provides supplemental guarantees to
the rights accorded by the Act. When a suspect is brought to a police
station under arrest, or is arrested there, the custody officer must inform
him orally of his rights and must also give him a written caution including the right to silence. 28 4 He must ask for signed acknowledgement of
receipt of the written notice. 285 If the custody officer authorizes the suspect's detention, he must inform him of the grounds for detention as soon
as practicable and, in any event, before he is questioned about any offense. 2 86 The detained person must then be asked to sign the custody
287
record to signify whether or not he wants legal advice at this point.
The right to legal advice includes the opportunity to consult a specific
solicitor or one from the duty solicitor scheme if one has been established. If advice cannot be obtained through these means, or if the suspect does not desire the duty solicitor, he may choose a solicitor from a
list of those willing to provide legal advice. 288 The written notice of rights
given the suspect by the custody officer should be accompanied by a notice explaining the arrangements for obtaining legal advice.2 89
In two other important respects, the Code significantly expands
upon the protections stated in the Act. First, the Act provides a right of
access only to persons "arrested and held in custody in a police station or
other premises," 290 but the Code provides that "any person may at any
time consult and communicate privately... with a solicitor."'29 ' Thus,
under the Code, all persons have a right of access whether or not they are
questioned by police and whether or not they are in custody or under
arrest at a police station. However, only the custody officer must give
notice of this right, and then only to those under arrest at a police staschemes, and in some cases suspects may be held at these stations for up to six hours. Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 30(5)-(6); V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note
158, §§ 5.52, 7.50. Furthermore, though annual sums have been allocated to the project, much
controversy surrounds the question whether compensation to solicitors is adequate to ensure
their participation in a program requiring night and weekend duty. See Comments to the
House of Commons, Dec. 5, 1985, col. 498-500, 514-15.
284. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, §§ 3.1-.2. The right to consult with a solicitor
includes consultation in person, in writing and by telephone. Id. § 6.1.
285. Id. § 3.2.
286. Id. § 3.3.
287. Id. § 3.4.
288. Id., Notesfor Guidance 6B. If the first solicitor from the list is unavailable, the suspect may choose up to two alternatives. If these attempts prove unsuccessful, the custody
officer has discretion to allow further attempts.
289. Id., Notes for Guidance 3E, 3G.
290. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, § 58(1).
291. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 6.1.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

The right of access is not part of the caution. Neither officers in
the field nor officers interviewing suspects at a police station are required
293
to advise of the right of access to a solicitor.
Second, the Act does not prohibit further questioning once a suspect
has requested a solicitor. The Code, however, states that, with certain
exceptions, "[a] person who asks for legal advice may not be interviewed
or continue to be interviewed until he has received it. ' ' 294 Furthermore,
after consultation with his solicitor, he must be allowed to have the solic295
itor present whenever he is interviewed if the solicitor is available.
The solicitor may be excluded from an interview only if his conduct is
such that the investigating officer is unable properly to put questions to
the suspect. 296 Exclusion is regarded as a serious matter, and procedural
protections are established to ensure that it occurs only in those rare
297
cases when it is clearly justified.
Despite these protections, English law does not force a lawyer on a
suspect. 29 8 Both the Act and the Code provide for the right of access
only upon request, and waiver may occur in a number of ways. Since
there is no provision for notice of the right of access which exists prior to
arrest and incarceration, a suspect may waive the right merely by failing
to assert it. The statutory right of access possessed by those under arrest
at a police station may be waived by indicating on the custody record
that legal advice is not desired at this point. 299 Furthermore, even when
a suspect has asked for legal advice, questioning may commence at once
in the absence of a solicitor if the suspect agrees "in writing or on
3
tape." oo
Neither the right of access nor the right not to be questioned after
tion.292

292. Id. §§ 3.1-.2; see supra note 180 and accompanying text.
293. However, when continued detention is authorized under § 42 of the Act and the suspect has not exercised his right of access, he must be informed of the right once more. Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, § 42(9).
294.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 6.3.

295. Id. § 6.5.
296. Id. § 6.6.
297. See generally id. § 6.6-.10; id., Notes for Guidance 6E. Solicitor misconduct does not
occur merely from challenging an improper question or the manner in which it is put, or from
seeking to give further legal advice. A solicitor "should not be required to leave an interview
unless his interference with its conduct clearly goes beyond this." Id., Notesfor Guidance 6D.
298.

ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12,

4.87, at 99.

299. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 3.4. Under an earlier draft of the Code, refusal
to sign on the custody record was deemed a desire for legal advice. Waiver could be accomplished only by signing to that effect. See M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 58-59, at 72. Since
the final version states only that the suspect "shall be asked to sign ... to signify whether or
not he wants legal advice at this point," the consequences of a failure to sign remain unclear.
300.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 6.3(d).
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requesting legal advice is absolute. The access principle recognized by the
Judges' Rules was subject to the limitation that "no unreasonable delay
or hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation or the administration of justice. ' 30 1 This broad ground of denial Was frequently invoked since it applied to persons detained for any offense and could be
relied upon by any officer to deny access. 30 2 The Royal Commission concluded that these prior rules had been excessively broad and recommended narrowing the power to deny access. The Act and the Code
carry out this recommendation. Access to a solicitor for a suspect at a
police station who is under arrest but has not yet been charged may be
delayed only if he has been detained in connection with a serious arrestable offense, and then only if authorized by an officer of the rank of superintendent or above. The delay must be based on reasonable grounds
for believing that exercise of the right will lead to interference with or
harm to evidence or other persons, alerting other suspects, or hindering
recovery of property. 30 3 Furthermore, access cannot be refused merely
because the solicitor initially was asked by another person to see the suspect. 3° 4 These provisions significantly limit police power to delay access.
Even when the right of access is delayed, it cannot be denied. Delay is
permitted only as long as the grounds justifying it continue to exist, but
in no case beyond thirty-six hours from the suspect's arrival at the
305
station.
In summary, as a general matter, persons under arrest at police sta301. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237 n.2 (para. (c)).
302. V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 7.49; M. ZANDER, supra note 53,
§§ 58-59, at 72.
303. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, § 58(6)-(9); CODE OF PRACTICE,
supra note 18, § 6.2, Annex B; see ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 1 4.90.91, at 100-01.
The Home Office Minister pointed out that "the only reason under the [Act] for delaying
access to a legal advisor relates to the risk that he would either intentionally or inadvertently
convey information to confederates still at large that would undercut the investigation in progress." Home Office Minister Mr. Douglas Hurd, Standing Committee E, Feb. 28, 1984, col.
1417, cited in V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 7.55. The issue concerns the
conduct of the solicitor after the interview, and it is no ground for denial that the solicitor
might advise the suspect not to answer any questions.
Further proposals were made to prevent solicitor misconduct by allowing the police to
issue a form of "stop" notice requiring the solicitor to refrain from specified acts for 36 hours.
Though the proposal was reluctantly supported by the Law Society, it was opposed by the
government and defeated. See V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 7.55; M.
ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 58-59, at 73.
304.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Annex B(A)(a)(2).

305. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, § 58(5), (11); CODE OF PRACTICE,
supra note 18, Annex B(A)(a)(3). In terrorism cases the period is 48 hours from the time of
arrest. Id., Annex B(B)(a)(6), (7).
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tions for serious offenses enjoy a qualified right of access to a solicitor as
soon as practicable after request. That right becomes absolute after
thirty-six hours. The right of access of persons arrested for other offenses
is without qualification. By narrowing and making explicit the previously
ill-defined exceptions and by placing outer limits on permitted delay, the
Act and the Code have greatly strengthened the English right of access to
a solicitor.
Broader and more significant are the exceptions to the right not to
be questioned after requesting legal advice, which, it should be recognized, is not a statutory right but found only in the Code. One exception
to this right parallels the foregoing cases involving serious arrestable offenses when a delay in exercising the access right is permitted. In these
situations, the suspect may be interviewed immediately. 30 6 The remaining exceptions are not limited to serious offenses, but apply to all cases in
which a suspect asks for legal advice. They authorize immediate questioning despite the fact that the suspect has requested a solicitor and the
police cannot postpone calling him. First, a suspect may, after requesting legal advice, waive the right not to be questioned until obtaining such
advice by giving his agreement "in writing or on tape" that the interview
start at once. 30 7 Commentators recognize the grave danger that strong
pressures will be brought to bear at this point to persuade the suspect to
begin talking at once. 30 8 It is significant that no written waiver is required if the conversation is taped, and that nothing in the Act or the
Code precludes the police from seeking to persuade a suspect to speak
without waiting for his solicitor as long as the tactics do not become
oppressive.
Second, questioning of a suspect who has requested legal advice may
commence immediately if the solicitor selected by the suspect cannot be
contacted or refuses his services and a duty solicitor is unavailable or the
suspect declines his services. 30 9 Finally, immediate questioning may be
authorized by a supervisor or other superior officer if he has reasonable
grounds to believe that a delay in questioning will involve an immediate
risk of harm to persons, serious damage to property, or unreasonable
delay in the process of investigation. 310 The open-ended nature of this
last exception is readily apparent. It has been suggested, for example,
306. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 6.3(a).
307. Id. § 6.3(d).
308. See V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 7.54; M. ZANDER, supra note 53,
§§ 58-59, at 74.
309. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 6.3(c).
310. Id. § 6.3(b)
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that if, before the solicitor's arrival, the end of the permissible period of
detention without judicial warrant is near, police may order questioning
31
to begin at once. '
Together, the foregoing exceptions pose a clear danger to the goal of
providing legal advice to suspects prior to or during questioning and may
reduce the access rule to a narrow exception in this context. 31 2 Nevertheless, the Act and the Code have greatly strengthened general access
principles, and suspects are much better protected now than they were
under the Judges' Rules.
(2) The American Right to Counsel
The American right to counsel has two sources. The first is the
right to counsel aspect of the Miranda warning scheme, which is
designed to protect against encroachment on the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 3 13 Since the Miranda rules
guard against the coercive aspects of custodial questioning, Miranda's
counsel guarantee applies to all police questioning regardless of whether
the suspect has been charged with an offense. However, the guarantee is a
"procedural safeguard" rather than a right protected by the Constitution. 3 14 The second source of the right to counsel is based on the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution and is enjoyed by those
actually subjected to criminal prosecutions. 31 5 This right is not limited
to trial proceedings, but attaches earlier at all critical confrontations with
authorities "where the results might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. 3 1 6 It is clear that the process
of police questioning constitutes such a confrontation. 31 7 However, since
the sixth amendment counsel right is given only to an "accused" to assist
in coping with his adversaries in the criminal prosecution, it comes into
play only when the suspect has been formally charged with an offense. 318
On the other hand, unlike the Miranda counsel right, it is a constitu311.

LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 7.54; but some protection is afforded by
supra note 18, Notes for Guidance 6A.

V. BEVAN & K.

CODE OF PRACTICE,

312. The danger is apparent to commentators who have studied the rules. See V. BEVAN
& K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 7.54; Gibbons, The Conditionsof Detention and Questioning
by the Police, [1985] CRIM. L. REV. 558, 563; M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 58-59, at 75.
313. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974).
314. Id. at 444.
315. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 339, 343-44 (1963); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932).
316. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
317. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).
318. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
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tional guarantee offering protection throughout the criminal proceedings
3 19
beyond the context of police interrogation.
The Miranda warning sets out the first counsel right, notifying the
suspect that he has the right to consult an attorney and that if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning
if he so desires. 320 A suspect's invocation of this right-as, for example,
his expression of a desire to speak with a lawyer or have one present
during questioning-brings into play a per se rule which prevents further
questioning unless the accused himself initiates further communication
32 1
with the police.
The sixth amendment right to counsel applies upon formal accusation such as arraignment, preliminary hearing, information, or indictment. 322 Police officers generally are not obligated to warn or notify
suspects of this right. However, when an accused first appears in court
for arraignment, the judge will inform him of his right to retained or
appointed counsel and he must be afforded counsel throughout the proceedings unless the record demonstrates that he knowingly and intelligently waives the right 323 with an awareness of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation. 324 Furthermore, once a suspect is
charged with an offense, he is an "accused." Police are then prohibited
from "eliciting" any statement from him without a waiver of the right to
counsel. 325 This protection goes beyond affirmative interrogation in the
normal context of police questioning and controls the use of secret agents
or informants. It prevents police from either intentionally creating or
knowingly taking advantage of a situation in which the accused is induced to make incriminating statements without the presence of
326
counsel.
An accused may generally waive his sixth amendment counsel right,
319. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 224-28 (1977); Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1, 7, 10 (1970); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 9, 60 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961).
320.

See supra note 189 and accompanying text.

321. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981).
322. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
205 (1964).
323. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 46465 (1938).
324. Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (citing Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948)).

325. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400, 404-05 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
326. Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 487 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,
270-71 (1980).
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but the requirements for such a waiver in the context of police questioning are anything but clear. 327 However, many courts hold that the standard for waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel is more
328
demanding than that required for a waiver of Miranda rights.
(3) Comparison
Compared to the right to counsel under American law, the English
right of access to a solicitor was a feeble thing prior to the 1984 Act and
Code of Practice. Not considered to apply during police questioning and
not enforced by effective advice to suspects, the right was rarely asserted.
Being subject to broad exceptions, when it was asserted it was usually
denied.
The new Act gives the right of access possessed by one in custody at
a police station or other premises a statutory foundation, which the Code
seeks to effectuate by requiring oral and written notice to suspects, written waiver or assertion, and the availability of legal advice through duty
solicitor schemes. These protections go far beyond the Miranda and sixth
amendment rights which fail to require that notification and waiver take
any particular form. Warnings can be oral and usually need not be repeated. Waiver of Miranda rights often amounts to a verbal expression
of understanding of the rights and a desire to talk. No express waiver is
needed. Requirements for waiver of the sixth amendment counsel right
in the interrogation context remain unsettled.
Furthermore, the scope of the English access right is somewhat
broader than Miranda since it applies "at any time, '3 29 irrespective of
whether the suspect is in custody or subjected to questioning. However,
outside the station house, the right is diluted because of its absence from
the caution and the lack of any requirement that police other than the
custody officer give notice of the right. A suspect cautioned and interviewed prior to arrival at the police station may be unaware that he has
the right of access and thus the power to prevent further questioning
327. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-04 (1977). The Supreme Court has left
undecided the question whether waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel necessarily
serves to waive the "parallel rights" under the sixth amendment. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.
Ct. 1135, 1145 n.2 (1986).
328. Fields v. Wyrick, 464 U.S. 1020 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 50-55 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v.
Mohabie, 624 F.2d 1140, 1146-48, 1153 (2d Cir. 1980) (waiver must be preceded by judicial
officer's explanation of the right to counsel); State v. Wyler, 320 S.E.2d 92, 105 (W.Va. 1984)
(waiver must be in writing and signed by the accused); see also W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 99, § 6.4(f), at 279.
329. The Act applies only to those in police detention (§ 8(l)), but the Code contains no
such qualification. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 6.1.
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until he has received it. In contrast, the Mirandawarning not only notifies the suspect that he has the right to an attorney, but also states that
he has the right to consult with an attorney prior to any questioning.
There is a still more fundamental difference between English and
American rules regarding the right to counsel. Under English law, the
demand for legal advice requires that it be provided as soon as practicable unless an exception applies. Since Miranda rights apply only to police interrogation and the sixth amendment right comes into play only
after formal charging, American principles do not give uncharged suspects under arrest and in custody at police stations a general right to
consult a lawyer absent police questioning. Police cannot interrogate,
but they are under no obligation to provide access to legal assistance
before an arrestee is charged or brought to court. Indeed, given the general absence of anything equivalent to duty solicitor schemes and the fact
that public defender systems are not established in every jurisdiction, police are often unable to provide legal assistance to suspects. Even if a
public defender system is in place or the suspect is fortunate enough to
have the funds to hire private counsel, prior to charging or questioning,
police are under no constitutional obligation either to notify a lawyer on
330 Most
the suspect's behalf or to allow a lawyer access to a suspect.
often, counsel is provided only after the suspect has been charged when
he appears in court for arraignment. Earlier requests for a lawyer usually operate only to shut down the interrogation process.
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that police may even inhibit an attorney from contacting an uncharged suspect while continuing
to interrogate. In Moran v. Burbine,331 the defendant had been arrested
for burglary and his sister contacted a lawyer on his behalf. The lawyer
informed the police that she would act as the defendant's attorney if the
police intended to question him, but the police responded that they
would not be questioning him that night. Less than one hour later, police began interrogating the defendant on a separate murder case. The
defendant waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the murder. He
was never told of the attorney's efforts to contact him. Rejecting the
defendant's contention that he should have been informed of the attor330.

Some jurisdictions by statute or decisional law give detained persons the right to

contact a lawyer or other person. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.5 (West 1985) (immediately upon being booked and no later than three hours after arrest, arrestee has the right to
make three completed telephone calls, one of which can be to an attorney of his choice or a
public defender).
331. 106 S.Ct. 1135 (1986).
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ney's attempt, the Supreme Court found the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights valid and the confession admissible:
Events occurring outside the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right ....No doubt
the additional information would have been useful to [the defendant]
....But we have never read the Constitution to require that the police
supply the suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate
332his
self interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.
Furthermore, the Court found no violation of the sixth amendment
right to counsel since the defendant had not yet been charged. Implicit
in the Court's holding is the conclusion that during this period, there is
no constitutional protection against police interference with, and even
outright denial of, attorney access to the client. 333 Nevertheless, it
should be recognized that most states generally prevent police interference with an attorney's efforts to provide legal advice. 334 Also, the
Supreme Court strongly implied that a right of access of some type does
arise after the suspect has been formally charged when the sixth amendment right to counsel comes into play. "[O]nce [the right to counsel
under the sixth amendment] has attached, it follows that the police may
not interfere with the efforts of a defendant's attorney to act as a 'me'335
dium' between [the suspect] and the State during the interrogation.
At present, the nature of this right is unclear.
English law would most likely prevent the police from denying access in a situation like Moran. Though the right of access in the 1984
Act depends upon a request by the suspect, the Code provides that access
may not be delayed on the ground "that the solicitor was initially asked
to attend the police station by someone else," provided that the suspect
himself then wishes to see the solicitor. 336 This suggests that the police
must inform the suspect of the availability of the solicitor and allow access if the suspect so desires.
Despite the questions raised by Moran, the police obligation to
honor the right to counsel by ceasing interrogation offers suspects greater
protection under American law in a number of respects. As noted above,
a suspect's assertion of the right to silence requires termination of ques332. Id. at 1141-42. The Court noted that the result would not be affected even if the
police had intentionally misled the attorney, though the Court characterized such deliberate
deception as "highly inappropriate." Id. at 1142.
333. See id. at 1150, 1163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
334. See id. at 1151 n.10 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases from such states).
335. Id. at 1145 ("The state cannot prevent the accused from obtaining the assistance of
counsel." (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 106 S.Ct. 477, 487 (1985)).
336. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Annex B (A)(a)(2).
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tioning under Miranda, whereas English police have always been able to
meet a suspect's claim to silence by asking further questions and attempting to persuade him to talk. While the Code now seeks to prevent the
interrogation of a suspect who has asked for legal advice until he has
received it, the new restriction is riddled with exceptions which could
overwhelm the rule. Pressure can be brought to bear on a suspect to talk
about the offense while waiting for his solicitor. Police may justify immediate questioning by claiming that waiting for the solicitor would "involve an immediate risk" of harm to persons or property or would "cause
'337
unreasonable delay to the process of investigation.
The Miranda requirement that all questioning must cease when a
suspect asks for counsel is subject to no similar limitations. The Quarles
public safety principle involves an exception to the requirement that
warnings must be given, not to the rule that questioning must end once a
suspect asks for a lawyer. The Supreme Court has been particularly protective of the right to counsel aspect of the Miranda rules and has treated
the assertion of that right differently from the expression of a desire to
remain silent. 338 In light of the greater protection the Court has provided for suspects who have asserted this right, it is unlikely that the
Court will extend the Quarles public safety exception to this context.
Even if it does, the result is not likely to come close to the expansive
exceptions to the corresponding English rule.
Miranda also prohibits police from badgering or pressuring a suspect who has asked for a lawyer in the hope he will agree to talk before
he has spoken with counsel. In Edwards v. Arizona,339 the Court established what it later described as a " 'rigid' prophylactic rule": 34 Once a
suspect has invoked his right to counsel, he may not be questioned further unless (1) he himself initiates further discussions with the police and
(2) he knowingly and intelligently waives the right he had invoked. 34 1
The Court has recognized that this is a new per se rule beyond the original Miranda principles, 34 2 yet has applied it strictly. In Edwards the sus337.

Id. § 6.3(b).

338. The Court has suggested that continued interrogation in the face of a suspect's assertion of the right to silence or counsel is more serious and will carry greater sanctions than a
mere failure to administer the Miranda warning. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1295 n.3
(1985). But see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 n.7 (1984) ("[A]bsent actual coercion
by the officer, there is no constitutional imperative requiring the exclusion of the evidence that
results from police inquiry of this kind.").
339. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
340. Smith v. Illinois, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492 (1984) (per curiam).
341. Id. at 493; see also Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986); Solem v. Stumes,
104 S.Ct. 1338, 1343 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043-46 (1983).
342. Edwards was somewhat foreshadowed by earlier cases, but it did establish a new rule
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pect was under arrest at the police station when he waived his rights and
agreed to make a statement. At one point during questioning, he said "I
want an attorney before making a deal."' 343 Police terminated questioning. The next morning detectives visited him in jail, said they would like
to talk to him, and again informed him of his Miranda rights. He said he
was willing to talk on certain conditions and eventually confessed. The
Court held that once the suspect had asked for counsel, he should not
have been subjected to further interrogation until counsel was made
available to him unless he himself had initiated further communication
with the police. 344 Similarly, in Smith v. Illinois,345 during the course of

receiving Miranda advice, the suspect was asked if he understood his
'346
right to counsel and he responded, "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that.
After some further discussion, he agreed to talk immediately without a
lawyer and gave a confession. The Court held that the confession should
have been suppressed. The Court regarded "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do
that" as a clear expression of a desire for counsel and held that when
such an expression is unambiguous, all questioning must immediately
cease. Furthermore, an accused's later responses to questioning cannot
be used to cast doubt on the clarity or adequacy of his initial request.
The Court feared that in the absence of such a "bright line prohibition"
the police, through badgering or overreaching, might "wear down the
accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his
'347
earlier request for counsel's assistance.
As noted, under the English Code police may not interview or continue to interview a suspect who has asked for legal advice unless "the
person has given his agreement in writing or on tape that the interview
may be started at once."' 348 This exception suggests that after a suspect
asks for legal advice, police may properly inquire whether they may interview him at once before counsel arrives, a course of action prohibited
by the "rigid" Edwards rule. Moreover, since the new English "voluntariness" standard allows pressure to be brought to bear as long as it does
not constitute oppression or conduct likely to render a confession unreliable, many suspects who request a solicitor may be asked for and acquiand was not a necessary consequence of Miranda. Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1343-45

(1984).
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 484-85.
105 S. Ct. 490 (1984) (per curiam).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 494-95.
CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 6.3(d).
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esce in an immediate interview. 349
Both English and American rules restrict the questioning of suspects
who have been charged with an offense, but the nature and scope of the
restrictions are quite different. The right to counsel guarantee of the
sixth amendment forbids elicitation of statements from all charged persons absent a knowing waiver. 350 Although just exactly what may constitute such a waiver remains unclear, the fact that, with a waiver, police
may question a charged person contrasts with the English prohibition.
The Code follows the Judges' Rules in prohibiting, with stated exceptions, the questioning of charged persons with respect to the charged
offense. 3 51 Absent an exception, the restriction applies regardless of the
person's willingness to talk. However, the English restriction is subject
to exceptions which were made even broader by the Code and which
have the potential to outweigh the rule itself.352 Thus, if the charged
person requests legal advice, access cannot be delayed, but questioning
can proceed before counsel arrives if any of the exceptions apply. Such
questioning would be prohibited by the sixth amendment absent a knowing waiver of the right to counsel, and, under Edwards, if the accused
had requested counsel, he would have to initiate further discussion with
police before his waiver could be accepted.
In still another context the sixth amendment counsel right provides
greater protection. The ban against elicitation of statements from a
charged person absent a waiver goes beyond typical police interrogation
and covers the process of obtaining statements through use of agents or
informants. Once a suspect is charged with an offense, police violate his
right to counsel if they deliberately elicit from him statements respecting
the offense in the absence of counsel. 3 53 Traditional interrogation is not
required. Even when police do not affirmatively create such a situation,
they violate the sixth amendment if they exploit an opportunity to confront the accused through an informant without counsel being present.
Thus, police cannot record and use at trial statements which the defendant makes to a co-defendant acting as a secret government agent con349. See supra notes 87-92 & 302 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 322-28 and accompanying text.
351. The restriction includes those who have been informed they may be prosecuted.
CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 17.5. The Miranda rules contain no similar limitations
as a consequence of such advice.
352. Id.; see supra notes 301-12 and accompanying text.
353. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (incriminating conversation monitored on concealed transmitter); see also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980)
(paid informant in defendant's cell).
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cerning charges pending against them. 354 This restriction applies even if
the police have reason to believe that the defendant is planning to kill a
prosecution witness and the recording is made for the purpose of thwarting such criminal activity." 5 In these contexts the Court has extended
the protections of the sixth amendment beyond the right of access to a
356
lawyer as ordinarily understood.
The English right of access principles spelled out in the 1984 Act
contain nothing comparable to these sixth amendment protections. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the general prohibition on questioning of
charged persons applies outside the usual context of official interrogation.
The Code requires that a caution precede such questioning and that questions and answers be contemporaneously recorded in full. These provisions indicate that the rules regarding questioning charged persons refer
to overt police interviews rather than to a suspect's communication with
secret agents or informants. Of course, even if the prohibition is found to
apply in this context, the numerous exceptions would still be available.
Evidence gathered by informants or secret agents might still be excluded on grounds of unfairness. The general discretion to exclude evidence on such grounds is founded on a long line of cases and is preserved
by the 1984 Act. 357 It is said that unfairness may consist of "trick or
deception" or false "representation. ' 35 8 In practice, however, discretion
35 9
to exclude evidence on grounds of unfairness is exercised very rarely.
Generally, trickery or deception by itself will not lead to exclusion of
evidence or to other sanctions. 360 For example, the use of informers or
eavesdroppers, or even conduct amounting to police entrapment, will not
354. Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 488 (1985).
355. Id. at 488-89. In such a case, however, defendant's statements pertaining to other
crimes with which he has not been charged would be admissible at the trial of those offenses.
Id. at 490 & n.16.
356. "The right means more than simply that the State cannot prevent the accused from
obtaining the assistance of counsel .... [I]t
guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation
of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" between him and the State ...
Id. at 484-85.
357. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
358. See Fox v. Chief Constable, [1985] 3 All E.R. 392, 397-98 (H.L.); Callis v. Gunn
[1964] 1 Q.B. 495, 502 (1963).
359. See Regina v. Sang, 1980 App. Cas. 402, 435 (1979); Ashworth, Excluding Evidence
as ProtectingRights, [1977] CRIM. L. REv. 723, 733; Heydon, Illegally ObtainedEvidence, (pt.
1), [1973] CRIM. L. REV. 603, 605.
360. In Regina v. Murphy, [1965] N. Ir. 138 (Courts-Martial App. Ct.), Lord Chief Judge
MacDermott commented that prior cases recognizing discretion to exclude evidence obtained
by tricks, threats, bribes, or similar devices merely set forth "a variety of classes of oppressive
conduct which would justify exclusion. It certainly gives no ground for saying that any evidence obtained by any false representation or trick is to be regarded as oppressive and left out
of consideration." Id. at 147 (emphasis in original).
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provide grounds for exercising discretion to exclude evidence or otherwise frustrate a prosecution.3 6 1 The practice of secretly overhearing or
recording an accused's jail conversations with fellow inmates or with relatives has also been permitted. 362 In Regina v. Stewart,363 the court allowed evidence of the defendant's statements noted by a police officer
dressed as a fellow prisoner. While agreeing that the judge had discretion
to refuse to admit the evidence on the ground that it was "obtained by a
trap, and the Court does not in general approve of a trap being laid for a
man who is in custody," the court nevertheless recognized that the evidence was not only inconsistent with defendant's asserted innocence but
also disclosed a plan to concoct alibis to deceive the court. The court
stated, "[i]t is difficult to see how in such circumstances a court could
have ruled out this evidence and not allow it to be put before the jury.''364
Thus, evidence obtained by private persons acting in complicity with
the police is not likely to be excluded because the defendant was denied
access to a solicitor or because the evidence was obtained by deceptive
and unfair techniques. English courts considering the admissibility of
such evidence are instead likely to rely on the test of voluntariness. For
example, in Deokinanan v. The Queen, 365 the defendant was convicted of
murdering his co-workers during their trip together up river to purchase
lumber. Defendant had returned alone and falsely claimed that the other
workers and the money had been lost in an accident. He was arrested
and taken to prison. The defendant's friend Balchard visited him in jail,
and the defendant asked him to help retrieve the money. Balchard
agreed, but immediately went to the police, who arranged to place him in
the same cell as the defendant in the hope that he would obtain information. Balchard questioned the defendant concerning "how the money got
missing" and "how the bodies got chopped," and received incriminating
answers which he communicated to the police. At trial, the defendant
objected to the evidence of his statements to Balchard.
The Privy Council regarded the question for discussion as "whether
the prosecution established at the trial that the appellant's confession was
free and voluntary and that he was not induced to confess by any promise or hope of advantage held out to him by a person in authority." The
361. Regina v. Sang, 1980 App. Cas. 402, 433 (1979); ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 11 57-58, at 20-21.
362. Regina v. Keeton, 54 Crim. App. 267, 272-73 (C.A. 1970); Regina v. Ali, [1966] 1
Q.B. 688, 703 (C.A. 1965); Regina v. Mills, 46 Crim. App. 336 (C.A. 1962).
363. 54 Crim. App. 210 (C.A. 1970).
364. Id. at 216. The court's opinion does not indicate whether the deception occurred
before or after the accused was charged.
365. [1969] 1 App. Cas. 20 (P.C. 1968) (Guyana).
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court easily concluded that the prosecution had satisfied this burden and
further noted that, even if the confession had been induced by a promise
or hope of advantage held out by Balchard, the defendant's friend could
366
not be regarded as a person in authority.
The approach in Deokinanan is enlightening. Though the police informant clearly questioned defendant with the intent to elicit incriminating statements from him, the opinion did not mention the Judges' Rules.
Furthermore, although the facts indicate that the questioning took place
at least a week after defendant had been arrested and most likely after he
had been charged, this issue apparently was not regarded as significant
by defense counsel, the trial judge, or the Privy Council. Also not raised
on appeal or mentioned by the court was the discretion to exclude evidence on grounds of unfairness resulting from trickery or deceptions.
The court simply applied the traditional voluntariness test, with both its
3 67
inducement and its person in authority requirements.
Similarly, in Regina v. Longstaff,368 police sought the assistance of
the defendant's brother, who was also under suspicion, telling him that
he had "everything to gain from helping the police." The brother indicated that if he could see the defendant (who was in custody) "it would
be to your advantage." He was then placed in the same cell as the defendant and both made incriminating statements that, unknown to
either, were overheard by an officer listening outside. The Court of Appeal reasoned that, even assuming there had been a holding out of some
hope of advantage, the statements were not obtained by reason of that
hope. Since the defendants were unaware that they were being overheard,
"[t]hey were accordingly hoping for no advantage from speaking and
fearing no prejudice from not speaking." As in Deokinanan, the court
failed to mention either the Judges' Rules or whether the suspects had
been charged.
Although the cases involving secret government agents eliciting confessions do not explicitly reject any resort to the Judges' Rules or the
discretionary exclusion of unfairly obtained evidence, the cases suggest
366. Id. at 33.
367. In cases involving secret agents, English courts show no concern for interference with
the attorney-client relationship. However, the question has arisen in another context. In Regina v. Heston-Francois, 78 Crim. App. 209 (C.A. 1984), the defendant alleged that police had
searched his home and had seen his correspondence with his solicitor including the names of
his witnesses. The defense claimed that the prosecution had been guilty of oppressive conduct
before trial and requested that the criminal proceedings be stayed. The Court of Appeal, however, refused to impose a duty on the trial court either to hear evidence on such allegations or
to stay the proceedings on this ground. Id. at 218.
368. The Times (London), June 12, 1984.
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rather strongly that English courts will find the voluntariness test controlling in such situations. This approach is even more likely after the
1984 Act, which ties the discretion to exclude on grounds of unfairness
369
to unfairness in the proceedings before the Court.
With the Act's abolition of the person in authority requirement and
the relaxation of the inducement standard, the result of the voluntariness
test will turn on whether the defendant was subjected to sufficient pressure to undermine his free will or to likely render unreliable any confession made as a consequence. 370 In other words, though a witness such as
Balchard in Deokinanan would be subject to the rule, it will be easier for
the prosecution to prove that his acts did not render a confession "involuntary." This is a far cry from the American right to counsel rule, which
demands complete absence of pressure and focuses on interference with
the counsel right, prohibiting in all cases the admission in evidence of
any statement elicited from a charged person in the absence of a waiver
of the right to counsel. Assuming Balchard's meeting took place after
the defendant was charged, the defendant's statements would most certainly be inadmissible in this country and the money discovered as a direct result of the statements most likely would also be suppressed.
C. Conditions of Detention, Record-Keeping, and Recording of Interviews
The English Code is not limited to ensuring that suspects are aware
of their rights and are allowed access to legal advice. It also establishes
detailed rules governing a broad range of subjects connected with the
treatment and interrogation of persons in custody. Specifically, the Code
prescribes conditions of suspect detention, police record-keeping, and recording of interviews.
If an officer wishes to interview a detained person, he must obtain
assent from the independent custody officer, who is responsible for deciding whether to deliver the person for interview. Prior to the interview,
the interrogating officer must identify himself and others present by
name and rank. Generally, interviews must take place in a room which
is adequately heated, lit, and ventilated, and persons questioned must not
be required to stand. With few exceptions, in any twenty-four hour period, a detained person under interrogation must be allowed at least eight
continuous hours for rest, free from questioning, travel, or other interruptions. If the person interviewed makes a complaint concerning his
treatment, the interviewing officer must record the complaint and inform
369.

See supra note 146.

370. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
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the custody officer, who is then responsible for dealing with the
37 1
matter.
The Code provides special protection for young and disabled persons. 372 For example, a juvenile or a mentally handicapped person must
not be interviewed in the absence of an "appropriate adult, ' 373 unless
delay will involve an immediate risk of harm to persons or serious dam374
age to property.
The Code also contains comprehensive provisions for accurate record-keeping and recording of interviews which go much further than the
Judges' Rules. An accurate record must be made of all interviews with
persons suspected of an offense. If the interview takes place in a police
station, more detailed records are required. For example, the record
must state the place of interview, the time it begins and ends, any breaks
in the interview, and the names of those present. It must be timed and
signed by the maker. The record of the interview must be made "during
the course of the interview" unless doing so would be impracticable or
would "interfere with the conduct of the interview," in which case it
must be made as soon as practicable after its completion with the reason
for the delay recorded. The suspect must be given the opportunity to
read the record and to sign it as corrected or to indicate respects in which
375
he considers it inaccurate.
Special provisions are made for written statements. When an interview has been contemporaneously recorded and the record signed by the
suspect, or when it has been tape recorded, "it is normally unnecessary to
ask for a written statement. ' 376 In other cases, when written statements
are taken the suspect should always be invited to write down himself
what he wants to say. Whether the suspect wishes to write out the statement himself or requests that the officer write it out for him, he must sign
a statement that he understands his right to silence. If the officer writes
the statement, he must ask the suspect to read it and to make any correc371.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, §§ 12.1-.8.

372. Id. §§ 3.5-.8.
373. "Appropriate Adult" is specifically defined. Id. Annex E(2) Such adult is not expected to act simply as an observer. "The purposes of his presence are, first, to advise the
person being questioned and to observe whether or not the interview is being conducted properly and fairly; and, secondly, to facilitate communication with the person being interviewed."
Id., Notesfor Guidance 13C.
374. Id. §§ 13.1-.3, Annex C.
375. Id. §§ 11.3-.6, 12.9-.11. The Judges' Rules had also required some record-keeping for
interviews conducted in police stations. See JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, rules 2 & 3(c), at
238.
376.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, Notesfor Guidance 12B.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

377
tions, alterations, or additions he wishes.
In some circumstances the Code explicitly prohibits interviewing officers from prompting or making suggestions to suspects, and from editing or altering their statements. When a suspect writes his own
statement, he must be allowed to do so "without any prompting except
that a police officer may indicate to him which matters are material or
question any ambiguity in the statement. ' 378 If the officer writes the
statement, "he must take down the exact words spoken by the person
''379
making it and he must not edit or paraphrase it. Questioning of
charged or informed persons with respect to statements by others is also
30
subject to special restraints.
Some of the foregoing provisions were taken from the Judges' Rules
and Administrative Directions, but most are new and are intended for
the first time to provide a detailed, comprehensive regulatory scheme
governing the treatment and questioning of detained persons by the police. In particular, the record-keeping requirements and the concern
with written statements admirably enhance the reliability of confession
evidence and will likely minimize courtroom disputes over admissibility
issues.
These English requirements have no counterpart in the United
States except for scattered and fragmented rules based on local law or
police department regulation. Miranda does not require that police
make any written record of the questioning process or of suspect statements, nor does Miranda place specific limits on the circumstances or the
manner of interrogation. 3 1 Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned
that "[n]othing in the Constitution vests in us the authority to mandate a
code of behavior for state officials wholly unconnected to any federal
'38 2
right or privilege.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the English rules are
not so rigid that they provide police no room to maneuver, nor do they
establish a perfect protection system for the suspect. For example, the

377. Id. Annex D.
378. Id. Annex D(a)3.
379. Id. Annex D(b)5.
380. If a police officer wishes to bring another's statement to the attention of a suspect who
has been charged or informed he may be prosecuted, "he shall hand to [the suspect] a true
copy of any such written statement or bring to his attention the content of the interview record, but shall say or do nothing to invite any reply or comment save to caution him." Id.
§ 17.4.
381. Note, Waiver of Rights in Police Interrogations:Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U.
CH. L. REV. 413, 422-30 (1969).
382. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986).
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Code requires contemporaneous recording only when charged persons
are questioned. 38 3 In other cases, the Code requires that a record be
made during the interview unless the investigating officer believes it
would not be practicable or would interfere with the conduct of the interview. 384 This preference for a contemporaneous record is new and its
effect questionable. Police seem to believe that note-taking inhibits an
interview and traditionally have taken brief or no notes, preferring to
summarize the salient features afterward. Since the matter is left largely
to police discretion, it is not at all certain that present practices will
385
change significantly.
Furthermore, while the Code follows the Judges' Rules in outlining
a detailed procedure for taking written statements, neither requires that
written statements be taken in all cases. While it has been said that the
Judges' Rules "anticipate[d] that all statements will be reduced to writing," 386 written statements were not required by the Rules outside the
"exceptional cases" involving questioning charged or informed persons.
"Verbals" were generally permitted and studies revealed that verbal
387
statements were much more common than written ones.
By and large, the Code allows these practices to continue. While an
"accurate record" must be made of all interviews with suspects, the rules
preferring contemporaneous and verbatim recording only apply to those
that "take place in the police station or other premises. ' 388 With respect
to the latter category, the Code provides broad discretion to the investigating officer to make a contemporaneous record of the interview or to

take a "verbal" confession and later summarize

it.389

These require-

ments offer more protection than the Judges' Rules, but stop far short of
383.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 17.8.

384. Id. § 1l.3(b)(ii).
385. "A contemporaneous note of an interview in a criminal case is a rare sight and not
likely to become more fashionable as a result of [the Code]." T.C. WALTERS & M.A.
O'CONNELL, supra note 150, at 71; see also M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 66-67, at 99;
Minfield, The Future of the Law of Confessions, [1984] CRIM. L. REV. 63, 64. See generally
Williams, supra note 152, at 6, 9-15.
386. See Kaci, supra note 21, at 102.
387. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 34; P. SOFTLEY, supra note 76,
at 81; J. VENNARD, CONTESTED TRIALS IN MAGISTRATES' COURTS 9-10 (Royal Comm'n on

Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 6, 1980); Vennard, supra note 153, at 21-24.
The prevalence of oral statements was a consequence of the general practice of asking a
suspect whether he is prepared to make a written statement only after he had admitted the

offense. P. SoFTLEY, supra note 76, at 81. A member of the House of Commons with experience as both a barrister and a solicitor recalled that "He verballed me up, guy" was a "classic
defence that every lawyer has heard." House of Commons, Dec. 5, 1985, col. 510.
388.

CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 18, § 11.3.

389.

Id. § 11.3(b)(ii).
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disallowing "verbals" or requiring written statements from a suspect in
all cases.
However, major changes are now taking place which soon are likely
to revolutionize the entire process of memorializing suspect statements in
England. Over twenty years of heated debates on the question of
whether police interviews of suspects should be tape recorded has come
to an end, and a national system of tape recording in police stations likely
will be introduced well before the end of this decade. 390 The history of
this dramatic change is quite enlightening. For years, public committees
considered the tape recording question, but police reaction was strongly
negative and the subject was always left for further study. 391 Then, the
1981 Royal Commission conducted a limited experiment on the use of
tape recorders, the results of which were cautiously positive and reassuring.392 Considering this, together with all past studies and debates on the
question, the Commission concluded that "[t]he time for further experiments ... is past,"' 393 and recommended that tape recording of suspect
interviews at police stations be introduced on a gradual basis and in a
limited manner. Recording would be done openly, but would be limited
to the officers' oral summary of the interview together with the suspect's
comments on its accuracy.3 94 Some criticized the limited nature of the
Commission's recommendation as "feeble" and "timorous," yet the
Commission's recommendation was widely viewed as an "unqualified endorsement of the principle of tape recording" and as effectively terminating the tape recording debate. 395 In 1982 the Home Secretary scheduled
396
further field trials in which the entire interview would be recorded.
With governmental backing, Parliament included in the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 a requirement that the Secretary of State
issue a Code of Practice in connection with tape recording of police interviews of suspects at police stations and devise a statutory instrument requiring such interviews to be tape recorded. 397 No date has been set for
implementation of the scheme, and field trials are still in progress. How390.
391.

Baldwin, The Police and Tape Recorders, [1985] CRIM. L. REv. 695, 695.
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, 11TH REPORT, EVIDENCE,

50-2; HYDE

COMMITTEE, THE FEASIBILITY OF AN EXPERIMENT IN THE TAPE-RECORDING OF POLICE
INTERROGATIONS, CMND. 6630 (1976); see Williams, supra note 152, at 6, 15.
392. J. BARNES & N. WEBSTER, POLICE INTERROGATION: TAPE RECORDING (Royal

Comm'n on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 8, 1980).
393. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 4.29, at 79.
394. Id. %4.27, at 78.
395. As a result, the police and other opponents began to accept tape recording as inevitable. Baldwin, supra note 390, at 698, 703.
396. Id. at 698.
397. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, § 60.
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ever, preliminary results of the trials are promising and it appears likely
that a national scheme of tape recording will be introduced in England in
the near future. The success of tape recording has been attributed to the
stand of the Royal Commission as well as to a positive attitude on the
part of the government, but, undoubtedly, a most important factor has
been a dramatic about-face in the attitude of law enforcement. Evidence
from the field trials as well as interviews with police officers suggests that
police have come to take a positive view of tape recording, often believing
398
that they will be the major beneficiaries of the new system.
The system of tape recording ultimately will be contained in a fifth
Code of Practice, and very likely will correspond generally to the guidelines governing the field trials established by the Home Office. 39 9 According to these guidelines, the entire interview with a suspect in a police
station must be recorded, including the taking and reading back of statements. 4°° Recording will be done openly and will include the officer's
initial statement that the interview is being tape recorded, a statement of
the caution, and other matters such as names of persons present, date,
time, and place of the interview. 4° 1 Upon completion of the interview,
both the officer and the suspect will sign an exhibit label on the tape, and
the suspect will be notified of the use to be made of the tape and arrangements for access to it. The officer will then prepare a statement containing a summary of the relevant portions of the interview, though not
necessarily in verbatim form. 402 It is contemplated that this statement
will be the primary evidence used in court and that transcriptions of the
tape will only be made in those rare cases in which a dispute arises over
4 °3
the accuracy of the summary.
An obvious limitation of the tape recording requirements is that
they apply only to interviews of suspects at police stations. 4°4 Interviews
outside police stations are not covered by the Act and the guidelines pro398. "[A]ttitudes are changing and many realized that [tape recoiding] has even more
potential as a tool for the prosecution than for the defence." Roberts, Tape Recordingand the
Questioningof Suspects-The Field Trials Guidelines,[1984] CRIM. L. REv. 537, 543; see Baldwin, supra note 390, at 699.
399. See HOME OFFICE, THE TAPE-RECORDING OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH SUSPECTS: PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE (1983) [hereinafter PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE].
400. Id. f1 2.1, 3.5. Only limited exceptions to tape recording are permitted. Id. 1 3.3.
401. Id. 11 4.3-.4.
402. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 60, at 78; see also PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE, supra note
399, %5.2.
403. PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE, supra note 399, I 6.1-.5. Transcription of tapes is strongly
discouraged on the ground of cost. However, the defense will have the right of access to tape
recordings which will be "exhibited in evidence." Id. I 7.1.
404. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, § 60(1).
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vide that "[i]t is not intended that they should lead to any changes of
practice as to where suspects are interviewed.'14 0 5 Experience under the
Scottish system of tape recording suggests that police can easily thwart
any system forced upon them simply by conducting interviews elsewhere. 40 6 However, while in some cases officers may be tempted to circumvent the rules by avoiding a station house interview, preliminary
evidence indicates that police have become convinced of the value of tape
4 7
This
recording and are not engaged in any systematic avoidance of it.
change is not altogether surprising. In 1979, Glanville Williams, a
strong advocate of tape recording, noted advantages to both the prosecution and the defense. 4° 8 In particular, Williams pointed out that juries
had become "acutely suspicious of verbals," and that disputed verbals
often undermined good prosecution cases, resulting in acquittals of guilty
defendants. 4° 9 Furthermore, police and prosecutors may discover additional collateral benefits. Since evidence of silence of the accused in the
face of accusation may be heard by the trier of fact, a tape recording of a
suspect's prolonged refusal to answer forceful questioning or dramatic
accusations by the police may be powerful evidence in the hands of the
4 10
prosecution.
Benefits to the defense are more obvious. Preliminary evidence indicates that tape recorded interviews tend to be shorter and more formal, 411 which further reduces the risk of lengthy and overbearing
interrogation. The judge can listen to the tape of the entire interview
when deciding whether it was conducted oppressively or under circumstances likely to render the confession unreliable. However, since the
procedure is unlikely to reveal police use of improper inducements prior
to the recorded interview, it may prove more beneficial to the prosecution than to the defense in the ultimate contest over whether the confes405. PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE, supra note 399, 3.1.
406. M.D.A. FREEMAN, supra note 280, at 60-107; McConville & Morrell, Recording the
Interrogation: Have the Police Got it Taped?, [1983] CRIM. L. REV. 158, 161-62.
407. An interim report on the field trials noted an absence of evidence of systematic avoidance of tape recording by police. HOME OFFICE, RESEARCH STUDY No. 82, THE TAPE RECORDING OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH SUSPECTS 32 (1984).

408. Williams, supra note 152, at 13.
409. Id. at 14. A similar point was made during hearings held by the 1981 Royal Commission. It was noted that generally the only witnesses to what transpires at interviews are the
suspect and the police themselves, and circuit judges complained that "the present methods of
recording interviews give rise to the acquittal of a substantial number of 'apparently guilty
offenders.'" Vennard, supra note 153, at 15.
410. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text; see also Roberts, supra note 398, at 543

("[Judicial guidelines may well need to take a more robust view than in the past of the inadmissibility of such questions.").
411. McConville & Morrell, supra note 406, at 160-6 1.
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sion was the product of oppressive practices. 41 2 Will recording reduce
the willingness of suspects to speak? Thus far, the field trials have not
demonstrated any significant loss of suspect statements or informationgathering opportunities, even in the few interviews at which solicitors
4 13
have been present.
Significant resources may also be saved by tape recording interviews.

Courtroom contests over admissibility and reliability of confessions often
consume considerable trial time,4 14 and many anticipate a reduction in
such contests and an increase in guilty pleas. 41 5 This could result in considerable savings in lawyer and court costs.
In the United States, the Constitution does not require the preservation of suspect statements by any means. The duty to preserve evidence
imposed by due process is limited to "that [which] might be expected to
play a significant role in the suspect's defense. '4 16 It must "possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed,
and also be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. ' 4 17 The likelihood that the Supreme Court would regard recording interviews as
within this rule is highly remote.4 18 This is not to say that tape or other
recordings of interviews are not favored or are not made in the United
States. The ALI Model Code of Pre-ArraignmentProcedure requires the
4 19
making of both written records and sound recordings of interviews,
412. See Williams, supra note 152, at 10-11.
413. Roberts, supra note 398, at 543.
414. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 152, at 14.
415. Id.; Roberts, supra note 398, at 543; Vennard, supra note 153, at 24. In Vennard's
study of "trials within trials" she found that "disputes over the accuracy or completeness of
the police record of what was said were far more frequent than those concerned with involuntariness or other breaches of the Judges' Rules." She regarded as speculative the question
whether tape recording would reduce court time lost over disputes concerning accuracy or
completeness, but concluded that since most disputed statements were oral rather than written, some form of independent verification would reduce the frequency of disputes and, when
they do arise, recourse to an independent record could lessen the time spent in examining
officers regarding accuracy of their notes. Id. Anticipation of significant savings in court costs
from elimination of lengthy trials concerning the accuracy of police interview evidence also
was voiced during the House of Commons debates on the Codes of Practice. House of Commons, Dec. 5, 1985, col. 516.
416. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984).
417. Id.
418. While the Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limits on the government's ability to engage in conduct that would hamper a defendant's ability to gather evidence for trial,
the limits concern narrow contexts. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858.
872-73 (1982) (deporting potential defense witnesses); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,
795 (1977) (significantly delaying an indictment).
419.

(1975).

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4 commentary at 341-44
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and the Eighth Circuit has suggested that, to the extent possible, all
statements of defendants should be videotaped. 42 0 Indeed, a few jurisdictions require the tape recording of police questioning of suspects under
threat of suppression of the evidence of the statements. 42' As a general
rule, however, whether suspect interviews are recorded is left to the discretion of law enforcement officers, and the existence of a recording affects the weight rather than the admissibility of the statements.
D. Length and Purpose of Detention
Prior to the new Act and the Code, rules limiting the time suspects
could be held in custody without charge were imprecise. While persons
arrested for offenses not regarded as "serious" had to be brought before a
magistrate within twenty-four hours or released on bail, those arrested
for "serious" offenses were required to be taken before a magistrates'
court "as soon as practicable. '422 According to Zander, "police tended
to interpret the phrase 'as soon as practicable' to mean 'as soon as we
have decided whether to charge him,' rather than 'as soon as a court can
be found that is sitting.' ",423 As a result of convenient interpretations of
this and other provisions of the detention law, police had virtually unfettered discretion to detain a suspect in custody. 424 Lengthy detention
without charge, though relatively uncommon, was not unknown, 425 and
the only safeguard against excessive detention was the rare intervention
4 26
of habeas corpus.
To remedy this situation the 1981 Royal Commission recommended
that a system of time limits be imposed and that there be a continuous
and accountable review of the need to detain a suspect and, in the case of
longer periods of detention, some form of outside independent scrutiny. 4 27 The 1984 Act follows the spirit, though not all the specifics, of
the Royal Commission's recommendations.
420. Hendricks v. Swendson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972).
421. See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985) (interpreting state constitution); Ragen v. State, 642 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
422. Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, § 43.
423. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 41, at 53.
424. V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 6.04.
425. Royal Commission studies found that about 75% of suspects were dealt with within
six hours and about 95% within 24 hours. A police study found that in one period 0.4% were
held for 72 hours or longer. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, %3.96. A
number of reported cases revealed much lengthier detentions without charge. See, e.g., Regina
v. Mackintosh, 76 Crim. App. 177 (C.A. 1982) (five day detention); Regina v. Dodd, 72 Crim.
App. 50 (C.A. 1981) (detention in excess of 72 hours).
426. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 41, at 53-54.
427. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981 supra note 12,
3.98-.107, at 53-58.
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The Act provides for a custody officer at police stations to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to charge a suspect with an offense, a
decision that must be made "as soon as practicable after the person arrested arrives at the police station.1 42 8 When the suspect is charged and
kept in detention, he must be brought before a magistrates' court "as
soon as practicable and in any event not later than the first sitting after
he is charged with the offence." 429 If the custody officer finds insufficient
evidence to charge, the suspect must be released "unless the custody officer has reasonable grounds for believing that his detention without being charged is necessary to secure or preserve evidence relating to an
offence for which he is under arrest or to obtain such evidence by questioning him."'430 With such reasonable grounds, the suspect may be detained without charge up to twenty-four hours. 431 However, a person
under arrest for a "serious arrestable offence" may be detained up to
thirty-six hours if a superintendent or other superior officer also has reasonable grounds for believing that the investigation is being conducted
diligently and expeditiously and detention is necessary as determined by
the custody officer. 432 Upon the same grounds and after a hearing at
which the suspect has the right to legal representation, a magistrate can
authorize detention for another thirty-six hours. 433 In addition, police
can apply to the magistrate for one or more further extensions up to an
absolute limit of ninety-six hours. 434 Thus, police may detain a suspect
without charge for up to thirty-six hours on their own authority, and,
with a magistrate's orders, up to a maximum of ninety-six hours.
But does English law actually allow detention to continue without
charge for the primary purpose of questioning to extract a confession?
An understanding of developments before the Act becomes helpful at
this point. Long and clear tradition established that, absent a proper
arrest, police may not detain a suspect at a police station solely for the
purpose of questioning him.4 35 Yet the law did not provide clear guidance as to whether, given a proper arrest based on reasonable suspicion,
a suspect could be detained for the sole purpose of enabling the police to
interrogate. 4 36 Nevertheless, it became accepted police practice to arrest
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 37.
Id. § 46(1)-(2). The time begins upon suspect's arrival at the police station.
Id. § 37(2).
Id. §§ 37(3), 41(1)-(2).
Id. § 42(1).
Id. § 43.
Id. § 44(l)-(3).
See supra note 32 and cases cited therein.
Dockray, Notes of Cases, 47 MOD. L. REV. 727, 730-31 (1984) (citing cases).
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on reasonable suspicion for the purpose of taking the suspect to the police station for questioning. 4 37 The 1981 Royal Commission recognized
this practice:
[T]he period of detention may be used to dispel or confirm... reasonable suspicion by questioning the suspect or seeking further material
evidence with his assistance. This has not always been the law or
practice but now seems to be well4 38
established as one of the primary
purposes of detention upon arrest.

When the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill 1984 was pending
before Parliament, the House of Lords clearly affirmed the validity of
detention for questioning following a lawful arrest. In Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke,4 39 a woman who had been arrested on suspicion of theft
was detained for questioning for about six hours and then released without bail. She was never charged and later brought an action for false
imprisonment. The trial judge found that the constable had detained the
woman "to subject her to the greater stress and pressure involved in
arrest and deprivation of liberty in the belief that if she was going to
confess she was more likely to do so in a state of arrest." 440 The trial
judge found these motives improper, but the House of Lords unanimously disagreed. Since the arrest was based on reasonable cause and
questioning at the station was conducted properly, the court found that
the arresting officer, pursuant to his statutory power of arrest, could
properly consider the
greater likelihood that [the suspect] would respond truthfully to questions about her connection with knowledge of the burglary, if she were
questioned under arrest at the police station, than if, without arresting
her, questions were put to her by [the officer] at her own home from
which she could peremptorily order him to depart at any moment
441

Relying on the Royal Commission Report, Lord Diplock stated that
questioning a suspect is "well established as one of the primary purposes
of detention on arrest." Though the decision has been severely criticized,
it is recognized as far-reaching and one which flatly acknowledges that
442
detention is a potent but proper weapon in extracting confessions.
The decision in Holgate-Mohammed, however, did not condone police conduct previously forbidden, but, as noted by English commentaV. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 5.02.
438. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981 supra note 12, 3.66, at 41.
439. [1984] 1 All E.R. 1054 (H.L.).
440. Id. at 1058-59.
441. Id. at 1059.
442. See Dockray, supra note 436, at 732; Notice, Interrogationas a Groundfor Arrest, 128
SoLIc. J.455 (1984).
437.
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tors, merely "set the seal on some eighty years of police practice by
formally declaring that arrest for questioning was proper." 443 Thus,
prior to the 1984 Act, the legality of arrest for the purpose of questioning
was clearly established by both common practice and legal principle.
During the Committee stage of the Bill in the House of Lords, Lord
Elton was correct when he described the provisions dealing with detention for questioning as nothing more than a formal and statutory basis
for an established legal principle. 444
Although it is now clearly recognized that the primary purpose of
detention without charge as authorized by the Act is to question the suspect, 44 5 the scope of authority to order detentions for this purpose remains unclear. The statutory language is rather open ended:
"reasonable grounds for believing that... detention ... is necessary...
to obtain . . . evidence [relating to the offense for which he is under
arrest] by questioning him." This could be interpreted narrowly. The
Home Office Minister testified at the hearings on the bill proposing the
Act that the language means "necessary," not just that such questioning
would be "desirable, convenient or a good idea." 446 Furthermore, if the
suspect has refused to answer all questions and the real purpose of prolonging detention is to break him down, a magistrate may refuse to grant
an application for further detention. 447 However, neither the Act nor the
Code requiresthat detention applications be denied for this purpose, and
other than the general prohibitions against oppression and unfair treatment, no rule prevents police-authorized detention for the initial thirtysix hour period for the purpose of convincing suspects to speak. As with
other provisions of the new Act, it is simply too soon to gauge the effect
of the new detention law.
In the United States as in England, without cause to arrest, police
may not detain a suspect at a police station solely for the purpose of
subjecting him to interrogation. Recent cases clearly disapprove, on
fourth amendment grounds, of arrests for "investigatory" purposes on
less than probable cause.44 8 Unlike in England, this prohibition is enforced by a strict exclusionary rule applicable to confessions obtained by
exploiting the unlawful detention. However, the fourth amendment does
443.

V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 5.03.

444. See Dockray, supra note 436, at 732.
445. V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 5.03; M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 37,
at 50.

446. House of Commons, Hansard,Standing Committee E, Feb. 16, 1984, cols. 1228-29.
447. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 43, at 57.
448. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
605 (1975).
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not bar questioning during a period of lawful detention following a valid
arrest. A confession obtained after a lawful arrest and during a period of
reasonable delay prior to appearance before a magistrate is admissible if
obtained voluntarily and in compliance with Miranda.
Yet we do not allow, as does England, detention without charge following a lawful arrest for the express purpose of subjecting the person to
interrogation. Federal authorities must take an arrested person before a
magistrate "without unnecessary delay" at which point he will be arraigned on the charges. 449 Federal courts interpret this standard rather
strictly. In McNabb v. United States,450 the Supreme Court found excessive a two day delay, and in Mallory v. United States,45 1 a five and onehalf hour delay was condemned. Nearly every state has restricted prearraignment detention, most using the federal "without unnecessary delay" standard and many imposing definite time limits such as twentyfour, thirty-six, or forty-eight hours. 452 Generally, delay for such functional purposes as booking, transportation, or awaiting the sitting of a
magistrate is regarded as necessary. Delay for the sole purpose of interrogation was clearly disapproved by the Supreme Court in Mallory:
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on "probable cause." The next step in the proceeding is to arraign the arrested
person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may be
advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may be
promptly determined. The arrested person may, of course, be
"booked" by the police. But he is not to be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry that lends itself, even if
not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to support the arrest
and ultimately his guilt.
The duty enjoined upon arresting officers to arraign "without unnecessary delay" indicates that the command does not call for mechanical or automatic obedience. Circumstances may justify a brief delay
between arrest and arraignment, as for instance, where the story volunteered by the accused is susceptible of quick verification through
third parties. But the delay must not be of a nature to give opportunity
for the extraction of a confession . ... 453
While lower federal courts have often stretched the rules, they have
usually not countenanced delay solely for the purpose of extracting a
449.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
450. 318 U.S. 332, reh'g denied, 319 U.S. 784 (1943).
451. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
452. See Comment, The Ill-Advised State Court Revival of the McNabb-Mallory Rule, 72
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 204, 210 (1981). Some states impose a combination of the federal standard and a specific time limit. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 825 (West 1985) (without
unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within two days).
453. 354 U.S. 449, 454-55 (1957).
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statement. 454 The federal rule restricting delay and prohibiting it for the
purpose of police questioning is said to give force to the notion that
arrest, even on probable cause, is not properly a vehicle for the investigation of crime.4 55 However, many courts regard the period of necessary
delay between arrest and arraignment as a perfectly proper time to question the suspect.4 56 Nevertheless, our courts generally regard police questioning as incidental to, rather than a primary purpose of, detention
pending arraignment on the charges. Express authorization to detain
without charge for the purpose of interrogation likely would be regarded
as an unacceptable adoption of an inquisitorial technique foreign to our
adversary system of justice.
Enforcement of the restrictions on pre-arraignment delay has not
been uniform. The Supreme Court in McNabb and Mallory required the
exclusion at trial of confessions obtained by federal officers after a period
of "unnecessary" delay in taking an arrested person before a committing
magistrate, irrespective of whether the confession was voluntary. 45 7 This
McNabb-Mallory rule was not based on the Constitution and did not apply directly to the states. In 1968 Congress limited the rule by providing
that a confession shall not be inadmissible in a federal prosecution solely
because of delay in bringing an arrested person before a magistrate if the
confession was voluntarily given within six hours after the arrest or other
detention or if delay beyond the six hour period was reasonable "considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the
nearest available ... magistrate. ' 45 8 Another provision of the same Act
further provides that any confession voluntarily given shall be admissible
in federal court and that delay in appearance before a magistrate is only
one of several factors, none of which need be conclusive, in determining
voluntariness. 45 9 Most federal courts interpreting this Act have held that
this latter provision entirely eliminates the per se McNabb-Mallory
rule, 460 while a minority believe the automatic exclusionary rule survives
454. See, e.g., United States v. Sotoj-Lopez, 603 F.2d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 729, 734 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 343
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Davis, 459 F.2d 167, 170 (6th Cir. 1972); Williams v. State,
264 Ind. 664, 348 N.E.2d 623 (1976).
455. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 99, § 6.3, at 455.
456. See, e.g., United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, 529-31 (2d Cir. 1961); Goldsmith v.
United States, 277 F.2d 335, 340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Metoyer v. United States, 250 F.2d 30,
32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
457. Mallory, 354 U.S. 449; McNabb, 318 U.S. 332.
458. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1985).

459. Id. § 3501(a)-(b).
460. See, e.g., United States v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 729, 734 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Shoemaker, 542 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Davis, 532 F.2d 22, 25 (7th
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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

4 61
as to unreasonable post-six hour delays.
At the state level, all but a few jurisdictions have rejected the absolute McNabb-Mallory rule as an enforcement mechanism for their own
restrictions on pre-arraignment delay. 462 Consequently, most federal and
state courts regard unreasonable delay as simply another factor to consider in determining whether a statement was obtained voluntarily.
Comparing our detention rules with those of the English, it appears
that, by and large, time limits in the United States are less precise and
less subject to periodic review by an independent monitor during the detention process. In England, the 1984 Act eliminated the old flexible
standards and imposed, a twenty-four hour limit as to most offenses and
specific time limits subject to review as to serious arrestable offenses.
Continued detention is subject to review by the quasi-independent custody officer and more lengthy detentions (over thirty-six hours) by a
magistrate. No similar review procedures exist in most United States
jurisdictions, where the propriety of detention is usually considered for
the first time in the rare instance of a habeas corpus petition or at a
hearing on a motion to suppress a confession obtained after unnecessary
delay in bringing the suspect before a magistrate.
Although the English rules are more protective in this respect, when
it comes to the propriety and availability of detention at a police station
for purposes of interrogation, English rules, at least formally, allow police greater powers. In the past, English police arrested after having investigated and obtained sufficient evidence to charge. Arrests now
frequently occur at a very early stage in the investigation when police
lack evidence to charge the suspect and seek to substantiate guilt by custodial questioning. 4 63 The 1984 Act officially sanctions the practice of
detention without charge for the purpose of interrogating to obtain necessary evidence to charge.
McNabb and Mallory moved the United States in the opposite direction-toward a collapse of the arrest and charging decisions and toward

Cir. 1976); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Hathorn, 451 F.2d 1337, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971).
461. See United States v. Sotoj-Lopez, 603 F.2d 789, 790 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United
States v. Gains, 555 F.2d 618, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1977) (discretion to exclude for excessive
delay).
462.

F. INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 210 n.157 (3d

ed. 1953); 1 W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 99, § 6.3, at 257; Comment, supra note 452,
at 210; see, e.g., People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 611 P.2d 883, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1980);
Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955); Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314,

384 A.2d 709 (1978).
463. V. BEVAN & K.

LIDSTONE,

supra note 158, § 5.01-.03.
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prohibition of questioning intended to determine whether a person lawfully arrested should be charged. 4 64 While Congress and most states
have either limited or rejected the McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule, its
underlying principle-that arrest should occur near the end of the investigation process and that detention without charge should not be used for
the primary purpose of interrogation-is still accepted by most courts.
The question remains whether this difference between English and
American detention rules exists more in legal theory than in reality. Our
rules may not technically allow detention without charge for the primary
purpose of extracting a confession, but they often permit it. Only probable cause, not evidence sufficient in degree or kind to sustain a prosecution, is required for a valid arrest, and as long as delay in bringing the
suspect before a magistrate is justified on other grounds, nothing prevents the police from using the period of "necessary" delay to
interrogate.
E. Enforcement of the Rules
We now come to a most important difference between the English

and American rules surrounding police interrogation.

While the

Supreme Court has characterized Miranda requirements as "procedural
safeguards" rather than rights protected by the Constitution, 4 65 a violation of these protective devices automatically leads to exclusion of statements obtained as a result of the violation 466 without regard to the extent
of the violation or the seriousness of the crime. Judges have no discretion to admit statements taken in violation of Miranda when the violation is insubstantial or, in serious cases, when the confession is the only
evidence of guilt. 467 Nor will the good faith of the police in failing to
properly advise of Miranda rights save a confession. 46 8 An even firmer
automatic exclusionary rule applies to statements elicited from an ac464. See 1 W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 99, § 6.3(b).
465. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974).
466. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 479 (1966).
467. Numerous proposals have sought to temper Miranda's exclusionary rules. In fact,
shortly after the decision, Congress sought to modify the harshness of its automatic exclusionary mandate by enacting Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985), providing that voluntary confessions shall be admissible and that
Miranda-type warnings should not be conclusive on the question of voluntariness. Thus far,
courts have abided by the strict rules ofMiranda rather than the flexible approach of the Act.
See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1298 (1985) ("The Court today in no way retreats from
the bright line rule of Miranda.").
468. See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1298 (1985) ("We do not imply that good faith
excuses a failure to administer Miranda warnings.").
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cused in violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel. 4 69
In contrast, English law applies an automatic exclusionary rule only
to statements which are found to be involuntary. During the era of the
Judges' Rules neither a violation of those rules nor a denial of the right of
access to a solicitor carried the remedy of automatic exclusion. In part
this approach followed from the low status of the Judges' Rules and reflected the traditional reluctance of British courts to use rules of evidence
to discipline the police. The introduction to the Judges' Rules stated that
the Rules were "put forward as a guide to police officers conducting investigations," and explained that "judges control the conduct of trials
and the admission of evidence against persons on trial before them, but
do not control or in any way initiate or supervise police activities or conduct." The introduction further explained that, while a fundamental
condition of the admissibility of all statements is that they be voluntary,
nonconformity with the Judges' Rules "may render answers and state'470
ments liable to be excluded from evidence.
The relationship between the automatic exclusionary rule associated
with involuntary statements and the discretionary rule associated with
violations of the Judges' Rules was not at all clear. One view was that
the automatic and discretionary rules operated independently, i.e., that
involuntary statements were automatically excluded while voluntary
statements may be excluded in the court's discretion if they were obtained in violation of the Judges' Rules. 47 1 However, by the time the
1984 Act was passed, the prevailing view appeared to reject any judicial
discretion to exclude a statement after its voluntariness had been established, although compliance with the Judges' Rules could be considered
in determining whether the statement was in fact voluntary. 472 For example, in Regina v. Dodd,47 3 after suggesting that some Rules might have
469. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1976), reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).
470.

JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237 n.2 (emphasis added).

471. Regina v. May, 36 Crim. App. 91, 93 (C.A. 1952); Regina v. Allen, [1977] CRIM. L.
REV. 163; see ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-25; R. CROSS, EVIDENCE, supra note 35, at 536;
C. EMMINS, supra note 36, at 328.
472. Regina v. Prager, 56 Crim. App. 151, 160 (C.A. 1971) (Nonobservance of Rules
"may, and at times does, lead to the exclusion of an alleged confession; but ultimately all turns
on the judge's decision whether, breach or no breach, it has been shown to have been made
voluntarily."); ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, §§ 15-25, -77; Lidstone, Voluntariness, Discretion
and the Judges' Rules, 1982 NEW L.J. 1065; Prevezer, England: Pretrial-Procedure,in THE
ACCUSED, supra note 61, at 27; see also ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra

note 29, 73, at 27. Even assuming judges retain residual discretion to exclude a voluntary
confession obtained in violation of the Judges' Rules, it is clear that in practice they very rarely
do so. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
473. 74 Crim. App. 50 (C.A. 1981).
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been violated, the court upheld admission of all the confessions, saying:
"In the present case we are not concerned with disciplining the police.
We are concerned to make sure that the evidence admitted was not obtained by oppression or by trick and to make sure that the judge was
474 Simiright in concluding that the admissions were made voluntarily. '
4
75
larly, in Regina v. Mackintosh, the court found a violation of the Rules
in the detention of an arrested defendant for nearly a week before charging him and bringing him before a magistrate, but found that his confession to a robbery during the period of unlawful detention was properly
admitted since "there [was] nothing to suggest that ... [it] was other
than voluntary. '476 Thus, before the 1984 Act strong support could be
found for the position that both the Judges' Rules and the rules regarding
access to a solicitor were not regarded as independent grounds for excluding evidence, but rather, were treated principally as factors relevant
to the application of the voluntariness principle. While on occasion
courts would assert the authority to exclude evidence which would operate unfairly against the accused, they generally avoided any role in disciplining the police through excluding evidence obtained in violation of the
477
Rules.
The 1981 Royal Commission considered but rejected an expansion
of the disciplinary role of the courts through exclusion of evidence. It
recognized that criminal and civil actions could be brought for violation
of common-law and statutory rights by the police, and that disciplinary
proceedings were available for breaches of police rules of conduct. 4 78 Relying primarily on the latter as a means of enforcement, the Commission
recommended that "in general breaches of the [new] Code should not
render any subsequent statement inadmissible as evidence." 47 9 However,
breaches of the Code would remain relevant to a court's assessment of
48 0
the reliability of a confession.
The 1984 Act generally followed the recommendations of the Commission. Confessions obtained in violation of the new "voluntariness"
rule are automatically excluded and failure to comply with the Code of
Practice may be taken into account by a court when relevant to any ques474. Id. at 56.
475. 76 Crim. App. 177 (C.A. 1982).
476. Id. at 181.
See V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 2.39; C. EMMINS, supra note 36, 1
4.124, at 113.
478. See ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 1 119-127, at 42-44;
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 4.120, at 111.
479. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 5.18, at 124.
477.

21.4.2; ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12,

480. Id.
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tion arising in the proceedings. 4 81 Thus, evidence of a breach of the Code
is admissible and may be considered as it bears on the issue of whether a
confession has been obtained voluntarily. However, the Act does not
explicitly rule out court discretion to exclude a confession for general
breaches of the Code. In fact the general discretion to exclude "unfair
evidence" is preserved. A court may refuse to admit evidence "if it appears... that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the
evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the pro-

ceedings that the court ought not to admit

''

it. 482

While the apparent

breadth of this authorization suggests that it could be a vehicle for excluding "voluntary" confessions which nevertheless were obtained in
breach of the Code, a number of factors suggest that this will not occur.
First, the history of the provision shows it was adopted in lieu of a
broader authority to reject evidence unlawfully obtained which had been
opposed by the government because it would lead to acquittal of the
guilty on grounds unrelated to the fairness of the case. 483 Second, the
traditional antipathy of the courts toward deterring police misconduct
through exclusion of evidence is not likely to be diminished by the
Act.4 84 Nothing in the Act suggests that it expands the power of the
court to exclude evidence to deter police. In fact, rejection of the traditional strict voluntariness test constituted a step in the opposite direction.
As the House Secretary stated in the House of Commons debate on the
Act, "[t]he purpose of excluding evidence should not be disciplinary
[but] should be to avoid . . .an unfair trial. ' 485 Finally, the language
conferring discretion supports a narrow interpretation since it covers
only cases in which admission of the evidence would have "an adverse
effect on the fairness of the proceedings." Thus, the provision looks to
the fairness of the trial itself wholly apart from the fairness or legality of
police conduct during the investigation process. Finally, the Act further
provides that "nothing [therein] shall prejudice any rule of law requiring
a court to exclude evidence. ' 486 This is a reference to the rule specifically
481. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, §§ 67(11), 76(2).
482. Id. § 78(1).
483. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, § 78, at 116.
484. See supra notes 472-77 and accompanying text. Lord Fraser recently reaffirmed this
traditional view in a statement with which the other Lords generally agreed: "The duty of the
court is to decide whether the appellant has committed the offense with which he is charged,
and not to discipline the police for exceeding their powers." Fox v. Chief Constable, [1985] 3
All E.R. 392, 397 (H.L.).
485. House of Commons Debate, Oct. 29, 1984, col. 1012, quoted in V. BEVAN & K.
LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 2.41.

486. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Ch. 60, § 78.
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excluding involuntary confessions and may indicate that the discretionary power to exclude evidence solely on the basis of unfairness does not
extend to confession evidence. In short, the language authorizing "unfairness" exclusions is "extremely puzzling" and most scholars are not at
all sanguine that it will be used as an independent ground to suppress
48 7
confessions which have passed the new "voluntariness" test.
With these narrow limits on the power to exclude evidence, enforcement of the English rules with respect to the questioning of suspects is
left largely to ordinary criminal and civil actions against offending police
officers and to police disciplinary procedures. Criminal actions for assault are rare but they do occur. 488 Civil courts may enforce statutory
rules such as improper refusal to allow access to a solicitor under the
1984 Act. 489 However, breach of the Code is another matter. Failure to
comply with any provision of the Code does not render a police officer
liable to any criminal or civil proceedings. 490 The Act reflects the Royal
Commission's view that police compliance with the Code should be left
to the internal police disciplinary system. In the United- States, this approach might be viewed as eliminating any hope that the rules would be
of significance. Neither the Supreme Court nor any other federal authority exercises direct control over discipline of state or local police.
While violations of a suspect's constitutional rights may lead to suppression of evidence as well as civil liability, whether it will also lead to discipline of the offending officer is generally left to local law enforcement
authority.
Arguably at least, England presents a different situation in light of
the potential for greater government control over a far less fragmented
police system, as well as the long tradition of efforts by the English government to police the police. 49 1 Numerous studies have been undertaken
concerning the disciplinary process, and changes have been implemented
487. M.D.A. FREEMAN, supra note 280, at 60-127; see V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra
note 158, § 2.41 ("[Ilt is inconceivable that a court would exclude a confession [as 'unfair'], if
the confession already satisfies the hurdles of [the voluntariness rule.]"); see also Minfield, The
Evidence Provisions, [1985] CRIM. L. REV. 569, 572.
488. See generally ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 1 120124, at 42-44; V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, § 2.31 ("Private prosecutions... are
very much... a weapon of last resort.").
In 1983 the author witnessed a Birmingham Crown Court case, Regina v. Morton, in
which three police officers were convicted of assault for attempting to beat an admission from a
suspect in a police station interview room.
489. See generally ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 1 25-27,
at 9-10; ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 1 4.22, at 76.
490. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 67(10).
491. See ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, I1 110-118, at 39-42;
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 1 4.126-.127, at 113-14.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

to make it more effective. The 1984 Act itself establishes a new Police
Complaints Authority with revised complaint procedures and a greater
degree of independence. 492 Furthermore, the language of the Act is

rather strong: "A police officer shall be liable to disciplinary proceedings
for a failure to comply with any provision of [the Code].

' 4 93

While not

requiring that disciplinary proceedings must follow from a breach, the
Act "at the least seems to suggest that such proceedings could be regarded as a normal consequence for a breach of the Code."' 494 However,
the effectiveness of the Code will turn largely on the perceptions and
reactions of the police and the strength of the disciplinary mechanisms.495 As yet, it is too soon to tell.

III. Application of Legal Principles: Police Compliance and
Judicial Enforcement
Knowing the rules of the game is only the starting point to an understanding of how the game is really played. To gain a realistic picture
of how the English and American approaches differ, one must know how

each set of rules is applied in practice, as well as the effect of the rules on
the prevalence and significance of suspect statements in criminal

prosecutions.
Judging the effect of the rules in practice requires an inquiry into
both the extent of police compliance and the willingness of courts to enforce the rules. However, this task is not without difficulty. Most views
on the subject are based on personal impressions, and conclusions are
492. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, §§ 83-105.
493. Id. § 67(8). However, the Notes for Guidance are not part of the Code and, most
likely, failure to comply with the Notes will not itself automatically be viewed as a breach of
the police disciplinary code. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 66-67, at 96.
494. M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 66-67, at 95. It could be maintained that disciplinary
action is mandatory on the ground that the word "shall" precludes the exercise of discretion
on the part of the supervising police officer. See T.C. WALTERS & M.A. O'CONNELL, supra
note 150, at 70.
495. The old Judges' Rules did not appear to be held in great respect by the police
and were not very strictly observed. However, the linkage to the disciplinary code is
new and is at least worth trying as a means of ensuring compliance with the rules.
Much is likely to depend on the attitudes of supervising officers, and of the senior
officers who decide whether to bring charges.
Munro, The Accountability of the Police, [1985] CRIM. L. REv. 581, 585.
The reputation of the police is not what it was even a decade ago. A lot will depend
on how responsibly the new law is put into practice by the police .... [Miuch must
depend on senior officers, on police training, on the inspectorate, the courts and the
Police Complaints Authority.
M.D.A. FREEMAN, supra note 280, at viii; see also M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 66-67, at 94
("[T]he crux of the matter is whether the police treat the rules in the Codes of Practice as rules
to which they must adhere.").
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open to varying interpretations according to the perspectives and experiences of the writers. Even objective studies may be misleading since resuits often differ from area to area and even from judge to judge.
Furthermore, although English studies are more numerous and more recent than American ones, they were all conducted prior to the 1984 Act,
which, with the Code of Practice, altered the rules governing police questioning, most significantly in relation to the right to legal advice. Moreover, studies of the American rules are of limited significance in view of
the fragmented and often diverse law enforcement systems in the United
States. With these reservations, the application and effect of the rules
governing police interrogation in England and America will now be
considered.
A.

Police Compliance and Judicial Enforcement: English Rules

(1) Police Compliance
English commentators suggest that violations of the 1930 Judges'

Rules prohibiting the questioning of suspects in custody were widespread
prior to the 1964 amendment, which provided greater flexibility to police
questioning of suspects in custody. 496 Writing in 1961, English scholar
Glanville Williams stated that while a strict interpretation of the Rules
was followed for a time, police interrogation of persons in custody had
since become commonplace and the strict interpretation was, by then, "a
dead letter. '49 7 Williams attributed police noncompliance to the unrealis-

tic strictness of the virtually absolute prohibition on the questioning of
498
persons in custody.

After the Rules were amended in 1964, eliminating custody as a cri496. See authorities cited in Weisberg, supra note 6, at 40 nn.87-88.
497. Williams, Police Interrogation,supra note 12, at 50. On the other hand, writing in
1958, Devlin assumed significant compliance with the rules. P. DEVLIN, supra note 22, at 15.
498. "Perhaps the truth is that the Rules have been abandoned, by tacit consent, just because they are an unreasonable restriction upon activities of the police in bringing criminals to
book." Williams, PoliceInterrogation,supra note 12, at 52. Another commentator emphasized
that the severe restriction on police work was not enforced by an effective sanction:
Where no statement is tendered in evidence, the only possible sanction behind the
Rules is disciplinary action by the police themselves and it is thought that the possibility of this may be discounted unless the mere breach of the Rules is accompanied
by some more flagrant misconduct. Strict compliance with the Judges' Rules must be
highly inconvenient for the police-and an undoubted handicap to them in their
present difficult task-and it is too much to expect them to enforce these very strict
standards upon themselves. Even if the true meaning of the Rules is that they prohibit all questioning of prisoners, they are hardly likely to be strictly followed where
there is no sanction whatever behind them.
Smith, Questioning by the Police: Some FurtherPoints (pt. 1), [1960] CRIM. L. REV. 347, 34849.
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terion and allowing greater freedom to interrogate at the station house, it
became easier to comply with the Rules and, at the same time, to interrogate and gain admissions from suspects in custody. Yet the question of
police compliance with the latest version of the Judges' Rules remained
controversial. A 1980 study of interrogation practices concluded that,
despite a few apparent breaches, "on balance, the police kept close to the
spirit if not always to the letter of the Judges' Rules in the way they
treated suspects." 49 9 However, the author of this study based his conclusions on direct reports of interrogation sessions by observers whose presence was known to the interrogating officers. In contrast, two previous
Royal Commissions on police powers found that a number of statements
tendered in court were not voluntary in the strict sense of the word, and
a number of independent studies found that the basic tenets of the
Judges' Rules were disregarded with considerable frequency. 5°°
During the Parliamentary debates on the new Code, numerous
members of both Houses voiced dissatisfaction with the Judges' Rules
and regarded police compliance as sorely lacking.5 0 Reasons for noncompliance are not difficult to understand. English observers recognized
that the Judges' Rules were imprecise and ambiguous. 50 2 Moreover, they
were characterized as "unrealistic" in the sense that they described what
police ought to be doing without regard to the realities of the interrogation process:
For example, during the course of questioning, a witness may become
a suspect and his status vis-a-vis the police may change. The officer's
thoughts must necessarily be on what questions he is going to ask (or
refrain from asking), without revealing that he knows less than he implies; his concern is to obtain information that will be of evidential
value in Court. At the same time, under the Judges' Rules, he must
consider what stage he ought to be cautioning the suspect-a situation
which he must see as almost extraneous to the real object of interroga499. P. SOFrLEY, supra note 76, at 94.
500. See studies cited in J.BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 36; E.C.
FREISEN & T.R. ScoTr, supra note 155, at 63. This lack of compliance is sometimes not only
recognized but supported. Lord Shawcross, writing in 1965, stated, "Of course, the police
often ignore the rules-and they are quite right to do so." Shaweross, supra note 12, at 228.
501. See House of Lords, Dec. 9, 1985, col. 11-17; House of Commons, Dec. 5, 1985, col.
504-13. The following are some examples of the views of members of the House of Commons:
"The Judges' Rules have been honored in their breach rather than in their observance, they
have been discredited, and the judges themselves have generally recognized that they are almost valueless." Id., col. 504 (Mr. Carlile). "The Judges' Rules were outdated. They were
also ignored in many instances. If a suspect knew that they existed and asked a police officer
for a copy of them, the police officer would regard that as something of a joke." Id., col. 513
(Mr. Knight).
502. ENGLISH LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 129, at 30; P. MORRIS, supra note 76, at
22-23.

November 1986]

INTERROGATIONS AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

tion. Identifying this point in time demands a lot of an officer. 50 3
As one researcher observed, "it seems absurd to ask a police officer
to charge a suspect as soon as he has enough evidence to do so, bringing
to an end his freedom to interrogate and having to warn a suspect that he
need volunteer no further information." 50 4 A barrister writing in the
CriminalLaw Review in 1967 commented that police disobey the Rules
when they believe it to be in the interest of obtaining a conviction. He
quoted a policeman who stated, "any police officer who doesn't know the
Judges' Rules is a fool, but he would be even more of a fool if he adhered
'50 5
to them.
While evidence indicates that police frequently continued to disregard the Judges' Rules, the extent of violations is unknown. Certainly, by
tying the obligation to warn and the limitation on questioning to the degree of suspicion and to formal charging (or informing the suspect that
he may be prosecuted), the Rules invited tactical delay by the police and
made enforcement difficult.
To the extent that the new Code uses substantially the same criteria,
these problems remain. However, in some respects, the Code is more
precise. A suspect now must be cautioned upon arrest and the custody
officer must give detailed advice orally and in writing to persons under
arrest at police stations. It will be more difficult for police to avoid these
specific obligations.
Analyzing police compliance with the principles governing access to
a solicitor must take into account the previous lack of clarity attending
both the nature of access rights and the duty to notify suspects of such
rights. The introduction to the Judges' Rules stated that they did not
affect the principle that "every person at any stage of an investigation
should be able to communicate and consult privately with a solicitor. ' 50 6
The accompanying Administrative Directions required that a person in
custody be allowed to speak on the telephone to his solicitor and be informed orally of his rights.5 0 7 The Administrative Directions also provided that notices describing such rights should be displayed at
convenient and conspicuous places at police stations and the attention of
persons in custody should be drawn to them.
However, as discussed previously, these requirements were actually
503. P. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 23.
504. Thompson, Questioning: A Comment, [1967] CRIM. L. REV. 94, cited in P. MORRIS,
supra note 76, at 22.

505. Id.
506. JUDGES' RULES, supra note 29, at 237 n.2 (para. (c)). Access to a solicitor could still
be denied ifit would cause "unreasonable delay or hindrance" to the investigation. Id.
507. Id. at 240 n.3 (para. 7).
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quite limited. Not only were they subject to the proviso that no unreasonable delay to the investigation occur, but they gave no actual right to
the presence of a solicitor during police questioning, much less required
the police to inform the suspect of such a right. It is not surprising,
therefore, that in practice the English took a dim view of the right to
legal advice during police questioning. For example, the Lord Chief Justice-the head of the very body of judges that promulgated the Rules, the
Queen's Bench Division of the High Court-is reported to have stated in
1971 that any rule requiring a solicitor's presence during police interrogation would be "quite unacceptable. ' 50 8 As to whether police even notified suspects of their rights of access, studies disclose that practices were
uneven but when such notices were given, they were generally in the
form of notices posted at various locations in the police station rather
than written or oral advice given to individual suspects.50 9
Another question of compliance with access principles concerns police response to a suspect's request for a solicitor. One Home Office
study used in the 1981 Royal Commission Report which was based upon
observations of interviews found that police refused one-third of the requests by suspects to see a solicitor.51 0 Two studies based upon interviews with prisoners found that their requests to see a solicitor were
denied about three-fourths of the time.5 11 Furthermore, evidence indicates that even when a suspect was allowed to see a solicitor, it was only
after lengthy interrogation or in cases in which the suspect had already
made damaging statements.5 12 The practice of delaying access had long
been recognized as commonplace: "the police in this country ... need
not tell the suspect of his right to have a lawyer present at his interview,
and in practice the police often take advantage of the loop-hole provided
by the Judges' Rules... to prevent a solicitor from communicating with
his client until after a statement has been made." 513 Thus, it appears that
Baldwin & McConville, Police Interrogationand the Right to See a Solicitor, [1979]
L. REV. 145, 152 (citing The Times (London), July 17, 1971).
509. P. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 26-28; P. SOFTLEY, supra note 76, at 64-65; Baldwin &
McConville, supra note 508, at 147.
510. ROYAL COMMISSION: INVESTIGATION 1981, supra note 29, 187, at 32.
511. Baldwin & McConville, supra note 508, at 150; Zander, Access to a Solicitor in the
Police Station, [1972] CRIM. L. REV. 342, 343.
512. P. SOFTLEY, supra note 76, at 69-70; Baldwin & McConville, supra note 508, at 151.
513. SOCIETY OF CONSERVATIVE LAWYERS, THE CONVICTION OF THE GUILTY 11
(1972); see also authorities cited in Baldwin & McConville, supra note 508, at 147-49. A study
of 400 Worchester Crown Court cases in 1978 found that while 27 defendants were interrogated in the presence of a solicitor, approximately 34 others unsuccessfully requested the services of a solicitor. Mitchell, Confessions and Police Interrogationof Suspects, [1983] CRIM. L.
REV. 596, 599-600.
508.

CRIM.
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suspects generally were not specifically informed of their rights of access,
and when they nevertheless chose to exercise such rights, the police denied access in a substantial number, if not the large majority, of cases.
On those occasions when access was granted, it usually came after the
interrogation process had been completed.
The 1984 Act has given the right of access a statutory basis and,
together with the new Code, likely will alter past practices considerably.
The right now has a firm foundation and is more clearly defined. In
addition, the establishment of the position of custody officer and of duty
solicitor schemes likely will put flesh on the bones of the access principle.
However, it remains to be seen whether the numerous exceptions to the
restrictions on questioning those who request a solicitor will significantly
alter former practices when it comes to obtaining statements from suspects before they have had the benefit of legal advice.
(2) JudicialEnforcement
A number of reports and studies, made both before and after the 1964
amendment to the Judges' Rules, concluded that the Rules were not being enforced by judges through exclusion of statements obtained in violation of the Rules. 5 14 However, the infrequency of exclusion may have
been due more to a failure of adequate proof by the defense than to a
disregard of judicial duties. A study of contested cases in Crown Courts
and magistrates' courts found that, without exception, defendants relied
wholly on their own unsupported assertions of police misconduct and
were unable to substantiate their allegations with independent evidence.
The researcher concluded it was not surprising that, "having heard the
officer['s] denial of any misconduct, judges pronounced themselves satisfied that the police had acted properly... and allowed the statements in
5 15
evidence."
Of course, even if a defendant proved that the police had violated
the Rules, exclusion was not required unless the statement was involuntary. Under the traditional view, exclusion of voluntary statements was
left to the discretion of the court; only rarely did the judge exercise discretion in favor of exclusion. 516 Indeed, this result would be required
under the recent and possibly prevailing view that "ultimately all turns
514. In 1960, Glanville Williams noted that "judges at the present time tend to wink at
breaches of the Rules, at any rate if the charge is a serious one." Williams, Questioning by the
Police, supra note 12, at 328; see studies cited in P. MORRIS, supra note 76, at 32, 37.
515. Vennard, supra note 153, at 20.
516. ARCHBOLD, supra note 32, § 15-25; C. EMMINS, supra note 36, at 328; see supra notes
470-77 and accompanying text.
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on the judge's decision as to whether, breach or no breach, [the confes'5 17
sion] has been shown to have been made voluntarily.
Courts generally have taken the same approach with respect to violations of the principles regarding solicitor access. While at least one
court has exercised discretion to exclude evidence of statements made by
an accused after police refused to allow him to contact a solicitor, 5 18
most have not followed this course. 519
The standard approach is demonstrated by the leading case of Regina v. Lemsatef 52 0 The appellant's van was stopped and searched at
about 12:40 a.m. Police discovered contraband and took the appellant to
the customs house to "help with enquiries." He was not told why he was
being detained. His interrogation commenced at 3:30 a.m. At 4:20 a.m.,
the appellant said that he would not answer any further questions until
he had seen his solicitor. The officers told him that he could not see his
solicitor at that hour in the morning and that, although he was entitled to
refuse to answer any questions, the officers were going to continue the
interrogation. Appellant was allowed refreshments and a rest, but from
time to time questioning was resumed. Later that morning, the appellant's solicitor, who had been contacted by the appellant's wife, went to
the customs house, but was refused permission on the ground that allowing him to consult with the appellant at that stage would be prejudicial to the inquiries taking place. Shortly after 3:00 p.m., the
interrogation began again. It ended with the appellant making oral admissions. At 6:15 p.m., he completed a written confession. The trial
judge admitted both the oral and the written statements on the ground
they had been made voluntarily, despite the objection that they were
obtained in violation of the right of access principles set forth in the introduction to the Judges' Rules. The Criminal Division of the Court of
Appeal made the following points: (1) Neither customs nor police officers have any right to detain a person for the purpose of helping with
their investigation; police and customs officials must arrest or detain for
the commission of an offense, or not at all, and there is no offense relating
to "helping police with enquiries"; (2) a proper arrest or detention requires that the accused be told the offense for which he is being arrested;
and (3) the fact that a suspect under detention has not yet made any oral
or written admissions is not a good reason for refusing to allow him to
consult with his solicitor. However, the Court found that, in this case, a
517.
518.
519.
520.

Regina v. Prager, 56 Crim. App. 151, 160 (C.A. 1971) (emphasis added).
Regina v. Allen, [1977] CRIM. L. REv. 163.
See Baldwin & McConville, supra note 508, at 146-47.
64 Crim. App. 242 (C.A. 1976).
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solicitor could not reasonably be expected to turn up until ordinary business hours and that postponing interrogation until that time might have
caused unreasonable delay in light of the fact that there were others
under suspicion who might flee or destroy evidence. Finding that the
trial judge "clearly took into consideration the fact that he had to be
sure that the admission had been made voluntarily," the Court concluded that "there is nothing to indicate that he exercised his discretion
52 1

wrongly.9

The court in Regina v. Dodd 522 took a similar approach. Defendants
were taken into custody and held incommunicado for several days, during which time they denied the charges and demanded to see a solicitor.
Access was denied on the ground that it would hinder police investigations since other suspects were still at large and the weapons used had
not yet been found. The court determined that the police acted reasonably and held the resulting confessions voluntary.5 23 In similar cases,
courts have generally upheld the admission of a confession even when a
defendant's right of access was denied unjustifiably, unless the violation
of the access right was accompanied by improper inducements, trickery,
524
or other unfairness that rendered the confession involuntary.
Clearly, the 1984 Act would prohibit the incommunicado treatment
as well as the denial of access to legal advice that occurred in these cases.
Furthermore, the Code would now prohibit questioning once the suspect
requests a solicitor unless one of the noted exceptions applies. Although
cases such as Lemsatef and Dodd do not amount to a direction that
judges must admit all voluntary statements despite violations of right of
access principles, they do indicate that these principles are sufficiently
flexible to allow trial judges broad discretion to do so. They suggest that,
even when the refusal of a request to see a solicitor amounts to a breach
of a suspect's right of access, the ultimate test is one of voluntariness. As
long as a statement is voluntary, the trial judge's exercise of discretion to
admit it will not be disturbed on appeal.
B. Police Compliance and Judicial Enforcement: American Rules
Analyzing police compliance with American interrogation rules involves difficulties similar to those encountered in studying the English
521. Id. at 246.
522. 74 Crim. App. 50 (C.A. 1981).
523. Id. at 56.
524. See, e.g., Regina v. Gowan, [1982] CRIM. L. REv. 821 (C.A.) (defendant was denied
access to a solicitor and was falsely informed that his friend had implicated him in a statement
to the police).

100
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approach. Many assumptions regarding police compliance are based on
hunches or general feelings rather than on objective, reliable data. Moreover, one encounters additional obstacles: first, most American studies
on the subject are less recent than their English counterparts; second, the
objectives of American interrogation rules are less certain and the subject
of significant controversy.
With respect to compliance with voluntariness requirements, American police in the early part of this century were regarded as lawbreakers.
In 1931, the Wickersham Commission, after extensive study of police
interrogation techniques, concluded that incommunicado detention and
police use of "the third degree-that is, the use of physical brutality, or
other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or admissionsis widespread. ' 52 5 However, the Wickersham report as well as later decisions of the Supreme Court led to reform efforts which, by 1967, allowed
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement to conclude that "today the third degree is almost nonexistent" and that "few Americans
regret its virtual abandonment by the police. ' 526 Certainly, violations of
the voluntariness rules do occur still, but police use of third-degree techniques to extract confessions has largely disappeared in the United
States.
With respect to Miranda requirements, a meaningful analysis of
compliance and enforcement must start with some consensus as to the
nature of the rules. In attempting such a definition, we are in one way
more fortunate than the English. Mirandarules are shorter, simpler, and
clearer. Before police engage in custodial interrogation, they must give
the specified warnings. While the meanings of "custody" and "interrogation" are often debatable, they are regarded as embodying an objective
standard. If the suspect states that he does not wish to talk, interrogation must cease. If he requests a lawyer, interrogation must cease until a
lawyer is present. Although a suspect who has requested counsel nevertheless may initiate a conversation and volunteer a statement without the
presence of his lawyer, the consequences of a suspect's assertion of his
rights have been spelled out in greater detail than in England, at least
before the new Code.
Moving beyond these narrow rules to the goals of Miranda,analysis
525. NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931); cf. Chaffee, Pollack & Stem, The Third
Degree, in id. at 13, 53 ("In England, by contrast, there has not been one reported case showing evidence of third-degree methods in the past 20 years.") (footnote omitted).
526. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967).
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becomes more difficult. The Miranda Court, by the introduction of
warnings and of defense counsel into the interrogation environment,
sought to remove or at least substantially lessen the pressures inherent in
custodial interrogation and, arguably, to reduce the frequency of the admission of confessions, which the Court found overvalued. These goals
are much broader and less definite than the rules themselves. Warnings
may be given and waivers obtained by "mechanical," rather than "meaningful," compliance, and even strict adherence to the rules may not significantly lessen the pressures that produce confessions.5 27 Thus,
analysis of police compliance and judicial enforcement must distinguish
between adherence to Miranda's rules and compliance with its "spirit,"
including the ultimate purpose of diminishing the pressures of custodial
interrogation and, possibly, reliance on confessions as a source of proof.
The question of compliance with the rules themselves is considered first.
(1) Police Compliance
Police compliance with interrogation rules involves: (1) the giving
of warnings; (2) proper response to a suspect's assertion of rights; and (3)
the general character of the interrogation as an indication of whether the
statement is voluntary. Older studies found that police were gravely remiss in complying with Miranda's warning requirements. The wellknown New Haven study on the impact of Miranda, undertaken directly
after the case was decided, found that, despite the presence of observers
in the police station, detectives gave full Miranda warnings to only
twenty-five of the 118 suspects questioned. Most were informed of their
right to remain silent, but less than half were advised that anything they
527. Others have recognized that the far-reaching goals of Miranda contrast with its limited mechanical rules:
Obviously, mere perfunctory recitation of the Miranda warnings, however elaborate
or technically correct, falls far short of the broad policy objectives emphasized in
Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion. Broadly speaking, he sought to remove
what the Court regarded as "inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." It
was assumed that this goal could be attained by making certain that the suspect was
fully aware of his right to remain silent and that his option to exercise that right at
any time was kept open to him. Thus the Court emphasized not only the applicability of the Self-incrimination Clause to custodial interrogation, but also "the right to
have counsel present at the interrogation" as an "indispensable" means of protecting
this immunity. Conceding that confessions might "play an important role in some
convictions," Warren perceived a tendency in police circles to overstate the "need"
for this form of evidence. Presumably, the Miranda requirements were announced
with a view toward reducing the incidence of private interrogation and thereby encouraging greater reliance on investigative techniques used to obtain extrinsic
evidence.
0. STEPHENS, supra note 16, at 167-68.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

might say could be used against them, and even fewer were advised of
their right to appointed counsel.5 28 Other studies of the same vintage
came to similar conclusions.5 29 However, these deficiencies in giving the
warnings appear to have been due in large part to the failure of police to
assimilate the warning requirements promptly. The New Haven study
noted:
During the two weeks of June after Miranda less than half of the suspects received a warning which included more than half the elements
of the Miranda advice, but by August more than two-thirds of the
suspects received such a warning. More important, the number of full
Miranda statements increased even more dramatically. No suspects
received the full Miranda statement in June, while more than one-third
the complete warning. 5 30

of those questioned in August received
The study thus found that much of the initial police noncompliance
may have been transitional. This view is supported by the later Postscript
to the Miranda Project which analyzed FBI interrogations of Yale students, faculty, and staff in late 1967 and found that "[u]nlike the New
Haven detectives, the FBI agents advised virtually every suspect of his
rights. '5 3 1 Later studies confirm that Miranda warnings are now given
quite regularly.5 32 A Denver study during the summer of 1969, based on
interviews with fifty suspects who had been interrogated, found that all
suspects read or were read their Miranda rights.5 33 Moreover, police
often have been found to overcomply with Miranda in a number of respects, such as embellishing the warnings with additional admonitions
and even warning suspects when not required. 534 By the end of the
528. Project, supra note 6, at 1550.
529. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1362-64; Reiss & Black, Interrogation and the CriminalProcess, ANNALS, Nov. 1967, at 55 n.6; Sobel, supra note 10, at 15.
530. Project, supra note 6, at 1550-51 (footnote omitted).
531. Griffiths & Ayers, supra note 6, at 307 (footnote omitted). The researchers made the
following observations about the earlier New Haven study:
Miranda was new to the New Haven detectives when the Journal study was begun,
and their record of giving the warnings increased dramatically over the period of
observation. With the introduction of the waiver form in New Haven, the detectives
may well have given the full warning to most of the suspects they interrogated.
Id. at 307 n.15 (citation omitted).
532. See 0. STEPHENS, supra note 16, at 178, 185; Leiken, Police Interrogationin Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. U.L. REV.1, 10, 14 (1970); Milner, Comparative Analysis of Patternsof Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: Miranda and the Police
in Four Communities, 5 LAW & Soc. REv. 119, 129 (1970); Robinson, supra note 12, at 443,
458, 493; Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A StatisticalStudy, 29 U. PITT. L.
REv. 1, 8-9 (1967).
533. Leiken, supra note 532, at 10, 14.
534. Studies have found that overcompliance often results from a desire to ensure adherence to the rules, see Robinson, supra note 12, at 452, and often from a misconception as to the
nature and extent of the rules. See 0. STEPHENS, supra note 16, at 194-95; Schaefer, Patrol-

November 1986]

INTERROGATIONS AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

1960s, Miranda advice had become an accepted part of police work, and
5 35
by the 1980s, it has become part of the American culture.
Whether police properly follow constitutional rules when suspects
assert their rights presents a more difficult question. The New Haven
study found that of forty-three suspects expressing some wish to terminate their interrogations, seventeen were questioned further by detectives. Police compliance, in this context, was found to be strongly related
to the seriousness of the crime and the amount of evidence available prior
to questioning. The more serious the crime and the less evidence available, the less likely the police were to allow a suspect to terminate the
interrogation.5 36 The Postscriptto the Miranda Project came to similar
537
conclusions with respect to FBI interrogations.
Turning to police compliance with a suspect's request for counsel, it
is clear that the Miranda Court contemplated that its ruling would lead
to the presence of more lawyers during police interrogation. While the
Court noted that once a suspect requests counsel, the police could merely
cease interrogation, 538 the Court nevertheless assumed that lawyers
would more frequently represent suspects in the interrogation process,
5 39
offering them legal advice in the course of questioning by police.
However, since police well know that attorneys will almost uniformly
man Perspectives on Miranda, 1971 LAW & Soc. ORD. 81, 88, 99; see also Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1976), reh'g denied, 431 U.S.
925 (1977). See generally Inbau, Over-Reaction-The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797, 798-800 (1982).

535. By 1983, a social and political commentator on Miranda wrote:
Miranda had come to the stationhouse. Reading a suspect his constitutional rights
was as familiar a procedure to a police officer as strapping on his gun. Settled policy.
Particularly among younger officers, who, like the state court judges who had come
to the bench with Gideon, Escobedo, and Miranda already in place, had grown up
with them professionally, they were accepted, if not always with enthusiasm, at least
with compliance.... The word Miranda had become a staple of the law enforcement
community's vocabulary, and prosecutors and judges alike referred to the stationhouse ritual of giving Miranda warnings as "mirandizing." The Hill Street blues
read them over national television, and in a nationally syndicated comic strip, Peppermint Patty, on her first assignment as a school safety patrol, read them to a kindergartner who had crossed the street improperly. Miranda had become part of the
popular culture.
L. BAKER, Miranda: CRIME, LAW AND POLITIcS 403-04 (1983).
536. Project, supra note 6, at 1555, 1556 table 6.
537. Griffiths & Ayers, supra note 6, at 308.
538. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
539. Id. at 466, 482. Referring to the Miranda decision, Professor Bernard Schwartz recently pointed out that, "[i]n effect, the Warren Court decided that an accused who requests
the assistance of counsel should have it at any time after he is taken into custody." Schwartz,
ChiefJustice Warren and 1984, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 975, 983 (1984); see Medalie, Zeitz & Alex-

ander, supra note 6, at 1379-80.
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advise a suspect to say nothing, they rarely attempt to obtain an attorney
for a suspect who requests one.5 40 It is much easier merely to terminate
questioning. When an attorney is contacted, police seldom seek to continue interrogation in the attorney's presence since they realize it will be
futile. One study in the District of Columbia found that "in the vast
majority (over 95%) of these cases, the police have not continued the
interrogation of the accused after counsel has been contacted. ' 54
Police compliance with interrogation rules might be inferred from
studies revealing that defendants make very few motions to suppress
statements and that very few such motions are granted. A study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice of robbery and burglary cases
in Jacksonville, Florida and San Diego, California between 1978 and
1979 found exclusion problems involving a confession or admission in
less than four percent of the cases and a change in outcome in less than
one-third of one percent of the cases:
In the 619 arrests covered.., there were only six suppression motions
and only three which were granted. None of these caused a case to be
lost, but there were two cases which were rejected at charging because
of legality issues. One involved a failure to give Miranda warnings and
the confession in542the other case arguably was the fruit of an illegal
street detention.
But these statistics are ambiguous. While one might conclude that
police are complying with the interrogation rules, one might likewise
conclude that defense attorneys are not raising valid issues either because
of incompetence or because they have found, by experience, that courts
tend to believe the police even when the police are lying. Another explanation is that lawyers have become aware that courts are not serious
about enforcing the interrogation rules. Further, these studies may also
indicate that suspects are inclined to confess when they are already
540. Most police officers believe that the presence of an attorney makes interrogation impossible. 0. STEPHENS, supra note 16, at 192, 197. This assumption is not unrealistic. Milner
observed that " [m]ost suspects waived their rights to an attorney. If an attorney was called
into the case, he usually told his client to say nothing. Consequently there occurred either
interrogations using pre-Miranda techniques or no interrogations at all." Milner, supra note
532, at 129 (footnotes omitted). But individual police practices may vary. See, e.g., Leiken,
supra note 532, at 10.
541. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1390 (quoting J. Hennessey & L. Bernard, Comments Addressed to Those Participating in the Miranda Project, in Junior Bar
Supp. No. 2 to the Miranda Kit (Sept. 30, 1966)). The authors noted that other bar organization attempts to play a role in police interrogation encountered the same experience. Id. at
1390-91.
542. F. FEENEY, F. DILL & A. WEIR, ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTION: How OFTEN
THEY OCCUR AND WHY 146 (1983). Similar results were obtained in a study of felony cases in

Los Angeles shortly after Miranda was decided. Younger, Interrogationof CriminalDefendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 255, 260 (1966).
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hooked on other evidence and, in these cases, defense lawyers seek to
plea bargain rather than to contest cumulative evidence.5 43 Thus, while
the statistics may suggest that police are complying with the interrogation rules, the strength of this inference is considerably weakened by
other possible explanations.
While the evidence on police compliance with the specific directives
of Miranda is ambiguous, more can be said with respect to the manner
of police compliance-whether the way that police give warnings and
obtain waivers is consistent with Miranda'sgoals and ideals. Most studies have found that police comply less with the "spirit" than with the
"letter" of Miranda. Warnings are often given in a pro forma manner
with the underlying assumption that a statement will be made.544
Though evidence points to some police "overreaction" to Mirandain going beyond its literal warning requirements, 545 generally police do no
more to ensure that suspects are aware of their rights and can exercise
543. See infra notes 647-51 and accompanying text.
544. As noted in the New Haven project:
Despite increasing adherence to the letter of Miranda, however, both groups of
detectives complied less readily with its spirit. By and large the detectives regarded
giving the suspect this advice an artificial imposition on the natural flow of the interrogation.... Often, the detectives advised the suspect with some inconsistent qualifying remark, such as "You don't have to say a word, but you ought to get
everything cleared up," or "You don't have to say anything, of course, but can you
explain how..
"
Even when the detective advised the suspect of his rights without these undercutting devices, he commonly de-fused the advice by implying that the suspect had
better not exercise his rights, or by delivering his statement in a formalized, bureaucratic tone to indicate that his remarks were simply a routine, meaningless legalism.
Instinctively, perhaps, the detectives heightened the unreality of the Miranda advice
by emphasizing the formality of their statement. Often they would bring the flow of
conversation to a halt and preface their remarks with, "Now I am going to warn you
of your rights." After they had finished the advice they would solemnly intone,
"Now you have been warned of your rights," then immediately shift to a conversational tone to ask, "Now, would you like to tell me what happened?"
Project, supra note 6, at 1551-52 (footnotes omitted); see also, 0. STEPHENS, supra note 16, at
177-79, 199; Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1394; Robinson, supra note 12, at
493.
In referring to the willingness of law enforcement to cope with Miranda and similar interrogation rule changes, the Los Angeles District Attorney stated:
If the Supreme Court wants police officers to sing "Yankee Doodle Dandy" to a
suspect before taking a confession, we will do our best to see that every police officer
in Los Angeles County learns the words and tune and sings at the appropriate time;
but we can't anticipate the requirement.
Younger, Results of a Survey Conducted in the DistrictAttorney's Office of Los Angeles County
Regarding the Effect of the Miranda Decision upon the Prosecution of Felony Cases, 5 AM.
CRIM. L.Q. 32, 34 (1966).
545. See supra note 524 and accompanying text.
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them than a strict reading of Miranda requires. 546 In fact, police tend to
encourage waiver of rights in ways not directly inconsistent with Miranda and waivers are usually obtained promptly and expeditiously.5 47
This is not surprising since it is the duty of police to gather evidence,
and, as put by one commentator, "[t]o ask a detective... to act both as
interrogator and as counsel for the defense is to require a capacity for
' 548
schizophrenia as a qualification for the job.
Turning to Miranda's apparent goals of limiting the pressures of
custodial interrogation and reducing reliance on confessions as a source
of proof, evidence suggests that these goals by-and-large have not been
achieved.5 49 Yet, blaming this failure on police noncompliance assumes
the existence of definitive rules which are disobeyed. This is not necessarily the case. First, a strong argument can be made that the Miranda
warnings themselves are inadequate to impart meaningful and effective
knowledge of constitutional rights.55 0 Second, the Supreme Court generally has given Miranda a narrow interpretation and has required only
literal or mechanical compliance. 551 Recently the Supreme Court rejected the argument that police are responsible for advising the suspect of
information known to them which may be generally useful to the suspect
in deciding whether to exercise his rights:
[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self
interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights ....Once
it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was
uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a
lawyer, and that he was aware of the state's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is
546. The 1967 Pittsburgh study described the warning process as follows:
If a suspect who has been advised of these rights indicates a willingness to talk, this is
deemed to be sufficient evidence of an intelligent and understandable waiver of his
constitutional rights in most situations. No further attempt is made to determine
whether the waiver is intelligent and understanding.
Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532, at 9; see Robinson, supra note 12, at 480.
547. See Leiken, supra note 532, at 39-40 (discussing anecdotally the results of interrogation room observations); Milner, supra note 532, at 129; Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532.
at 7.
548. Griffiths & Ayers, supra note 6, at 309-10.
549. See infra section IV.B.
550. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1394-1400; Project, supra note 6, at
1613-16; see Griffiths & Ayers, supra note 6, at 318-19 (confirming the Project's finding of the
warnings as "almost wholly ineffective").
551. Referring to the Burger Court's pre-1980 decisions interpreting Miranda, one commentator concluded that the Court "had shown its disdain for the assumptions which underlie
Miranda and had limited, misread, or ignored its holding at every apparent opportunity."
Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and CounterTrends, 13 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
405, 461 (1982). But see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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552
valid as a matter of law.

Thus, Miranda has been interpreted to allow police to comply with its

directives while, at the same time, subtly encouraging the suspect to
waive his rights and make a statement.5 53 While the goals of Miranda
may have included reducing the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation, the rules themselves certainly do not require the police to discourage suspects from making statements nor do they deter prosecutors from
relying on such statements when they are obtained.
(2) JudicialEnforcement

Few American studies have concentrated on judicial enforcement of
interrogation rules. Those commentators who have observed confession
admissibility hearings have generally concluded that courts are not adequately enforcing Miranda and other interrogation rules. 554 When allegations at a hearing are contradictory or ambiguous, judges are likely to

decide in favor of officials, particularly when the defendant has a prior
criminal record.555 The lenient interpretation of the Miranda waiver
rules and the lack of any record-keeping requirement for interrogation
proceedings have led some to conclude that "the Miranda hearing is gen-

erally, for the suspect, a kind of ritualistic formalism with a vacuous result.

' 556

This conclusion is somewhat supported by the foregoing

Jacksonville and San Diego study finding extremely few successful motions to suppress statements. However, without more detailed studies, it
is not possible to accurately determine whether courts are failing to uphold interrogation rules, or merely applying loose waiver standards in
557
favor of admitting trustworthy evidence in a perfectly proper manner.

552. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986) (citations omitted).
553. See Choper, Consequencesof Supreme CourtDecisions Upholding IndividualConstitutional Rights, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984) (suggesting that judicial attempts to prohibit
coercion and intimidation "simply produced a shift in police tactics to more subtle techniques"). But see People v. Honeycutt, 20 Cal. 3d 150, 570 P.2d 1050, 141 Cal. Rptr. 698
(1977) (in which police "softening-up" tactics were found so inconsistent with Miranda warnings as to render waiver involuntary).
554. Elsen & Rosett, Protectionsfor the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 645, 649 n.58 (1967).
555. Id.
556. Leiken, supra note 532, at 44. In view of the approach of state trial courts in Colorado, the Denver Study concluded:
[T]he impact of Miranda on the ultimate interrogation contest seems to have been
effectively neutralized. Indeed, one of the latent functions of Miranda, as implemented in Colorado, appears to be to aid the police in overcoming their evidentiary
burden with respect to proving the suspect's knowledge and waiver of his constitutional rights.
Id. at 48 (footnotes omitted).
557. Many jurisdictions are regarded as interpreting Miranda so as to require "little more

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

On the other hand, many examples can be given of courts taking
Miranda seriously and suppressing highly important and trustworthy evidence for violation of Miranda rules when "a bit of stretching" would
have enabled the court to admit the evidence. For example, in United
States v. Hinkley,55 8 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
suppressed statements made by John Hinkley after his arrest for the attempted assassination of President Reagan on the ground that, prior to
being questioned by the FBI, Hinkley had asked to speak with his father's attorney. The statements consisted of such personal facts as Hinkley's name, date of birth, place of birth, as well as his activities over the
past year, but did not touch upon his activities in Washington or his
alleged criminal act. The prosecution sought to use the interview in rebuttal to Hinkley's insanity defense, but both the District and Circuit
Courts suppressed all evidence of the interview, reasoning that Hinkley
had asked to speak with a lawyer. Arguably, much of the interview
could have been characterized as "police words or actions normally attendant to arrest and custody" which the Supreme Court has held do not
constitute interrogation under Miranda.559 Alternatively, the court could
have admitted the "background interview" by finding that it was conducted in order to discover if others were involved in a continuing conspiracy to assassinate political leaders.5 60 Yet both the trial and
appellate courts took the defendant's rights seriously, a fact recognized
even by Professor Yale Kamisar, who has so often bemoaned5 61lack of
judicial enforcement of Miranda and other interrogation rules.
Furthermore, a number of state courts, relying on independent state
grounds, have adopted interrogation rules well beyond the minimum
protection established by the United States Supreme Court in
5 62
Miranda.
In summary, the following general conclusions can be drawn with
than an incantation of four-fold warnings by the police." Comment, supra note 228, at 447.
Lenient waiver standards regarding knowledge of rights have also been accepted by the
United States Supreme Court. See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1296 (1985); Moran v.
Burbine, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986).
558. 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
559. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980); see South Dakota v. Neville, 439
U.S. 553 (1983).
560. See Hinkley, 672 F.2d at 123; cf. People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972) (possibility of danger to political leaders created "exigent circumstances"
justifying unconstitutional search).
561. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-82, at 234 (1983) (remarks of Kamisar).
562. See, e.g., People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978);
State v. Raymond, 305 Minn. 160, 232 N.W.2d 879 (1975); People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d
203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (per curiam); People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167,
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regard to American police compliance and judicial enforcement: (1) Police generally comply with the warning requirement in the sense that they
routinely advise suspects of their rights prior to custodial interrogation
and, in fact, police may tend to overcomply in advising more often than
required or outside the context of custodial interrogation; (2) police less
often properly respect a suspect's assertion of rights; (3) if the "spirit" of
Miranda is taken to mean that police should make an earnest effort to
impress upon suspects the extent of their rights and the consequences of
a waiver and, thus, to discourage suspects from giving statements, police
are not fulfilling their obligations; (4) judicial enforcement is difficult to
measure, but assuming that courts are properly enforcing the "letter" of
the rules, they are often reluctant to impose on police the full force of
Miranda's "spirit."
IV.

The Effect of Interrogation Rules on Obtaining Suspect
Statements and the Significance of Suspect Statements
in Criminal Prosecutions

A comparison of the English and American systems would not be
complete without an attempt to determine the practical results of rules
governing police questioning in terms of the frequency with which police
attempt to elicit suspects' statements, the suspects' reactions to these attempts, and the importance that the respective judicial systems place on
using the suspect as a source of testimonial evidence. The frequency of
statements is in large measure affected by the aggressiveness of the police
in seeking them. This, in turn, affects both the reactions of suspects and
the availability of statements for use in criminal prosecutions. Thus, analysis of the significance of statements begins with a consideration of the
extent to which police seek to obtain statements and how often they succeed. The role played by statements in the criminal prosecution can be
understood fully only after gaining perspective on these factors.
A. The English Prosecution
(1) Law Enforcement Reliance on Police Interrogation
In England, police consistently use the interrogation process as an
important tool in criminal investigations, particularly in serious cases. A
study based on direct observation of interrogations, while noting a difference in practice between various police stations, found that "in nearly
nine out of ten cases, suspects were interviewed at the police station and,
397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979); People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 377 N.E.2d 721,
406 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1978).
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in most of the remaining cases, some kind of significant interchange
short of a full interview took place between the suspect and the police
either before their arrival at the station or subsequently. ' 563 A sample of
four hundred Worchester Crown Court cases found that only six defendants were not formally interrogated.5 64 Other studies confirm that police
565
question nearly all suspects in serious cases.
The nature of the offense can make a difference. Police are less
likely to interrogate persons suspected of minor offenses. 5 66 A study of
prosecution cases in contested trials in magistrates' courts (which generally involve less serious offenses) found that twice as many defendants
charged with property offenses involving dishonesty had been interrogated than those charged with other minor crimes. 567 The researcher
attributed the difference to the fact that property offenses are more likely
to be based upon circumstantial evidence alone and require more proof of
intent or dishonest state of mind than other cases. The fruits of greater
interrogation efforts were easily seen. Statements were attributed to 50%
of defendants charged with offenses of dishonesty compared with 19%
of other defendants.5 68 The suggestion that police rely on interrogation
to a greater extent in property offense cases is also supported by the
Worchester Crown Court study, which revealed a difference in the length
of interrogation among types of offenses. Persons accused of burglary
tended to be questioned for longer periods than those accused of "criminal damage," and those accused of offenses involving theft generally were
questioned for longer periods than those accused of crimes of violence or
'569
"criminal damage.
(2) Suspect Reaction to Interrogation
Clear evidence is available on the reaction of suspects to police questioning. The vast majority of English suspects talk, and most make a
confession or admission. A number of different research projects confirm
that from two-thirds to three-fourths of suspects questioned make a confession or damaging statement.57 0 Recent studies of committal papers
563.

P. SOFrLEY, supra note 76, at 76, 85.

564. Mitchell, supra note 513, at 598. Nearly 86% of the defendants were questioned by
the police for less than two hours. Id. at 597.
565. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 13-14; B. IRVING, supra note
246, at 103-04.

566.

P.

SOFTLEY,

567.

J.

VENNARD,

supra note 76, at 77.
supra note 387, at 10.

568. Id. at 11.
569. Mitchell, supra note 513, at 597-98.
570. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 14-15; A. BOTTOMS & J. McCLEAN, DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (1976); B. IRVING, supra note 246, at 148-
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57 1
found a confession or admission in over 75% of Crown Court cases.
Researchers consistently noted how uncommon it was for a person to
remain silent altogether. One found that only 4% of those interviewed
refused to answer all questions of substance; 572 another found even fewer
cases in which the accused made no statement.5 7 3 A third study found
that only one out of sixty interviewed refused to answer all questions. 574
The Worchester Crown Court study found that of 394 defendants formally interrogated, only two made no statement of any sort.5 75
Results were similar with respect to assertions by suspects of their
right of access to a solicitor. One study found that only one suspect in
ten asked to consult with a solicitor while in police custody. 5 7 6 The rate
increased to one in nine when they were told of their right to contact a
solicitor.5 77 Research based on interviews with suspects yielded higher
percentages but confirmed that only a minority of those interviewed ever
requested a solicitor. 578 This undoubtedly is due in large part to the fact
that, prior to the 1984 Act, suspects were not generally made aware of
their right of access. 57 9 Suspects may also have realized that the prevailing police practice of denying requests and continuing interrogation
would have made such a request futile.58 0

(3) Significance of Suspect Statements
To gauge the significance of using the suspect as a source of testimonial evidence accurately, the role played by statements of the accused in
the criminal prosecution must be analyzed. The analysis must include
the frequency with which statements are used in the prosecution's case as
well as the importance of statements in relation to other available evidence of guilt.
50; P. SOFTLEY, supra note 76, at 5; Zander, The Investigation of Crime: A Study of Cases
Tried at the Old Bailey, [1979] CRIM. L. REv. 203, 212, 219.
571. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 14; Zander, supra note 570, at
212-13.

572.
573.

P. SOFTLEY, supra note 76, at 74.
J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 28.

574.

B. IRVING, supra note 246, at 149.

575. Mitchell, supra note 513, at 598.
576. P. SOFTLEY, supra note 76, at 68.
577. Id.
578. A 1972 study found that only 57 of 134 suspects requested a solicitor. Zander, supra
note 511, at 345. A study published in 1979 found that only one in three suspects requested a
solicitor. Baldwin & McConville, supra note 508, at 148-49.
579. See supra note 509 and accompanying text (discussing posted notices); see also P.
SOFTLEY, supra note 76, at 68; Baldwin & McConville, supra note 508, at 149; Zander, supra

note 570, at 346.
580. See supranotes 510-13 and accompanying text (discussing delay of access to counsel).
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Reviewing the English literature on this subject, one is immediately
struck by the plethora of general assertions of the great importance, or
even absolute necessity, of the use of statements derived from police
questioning. Such pronouncements as the following are commonplace:
[T]he accused's statement to the police often plays a great part in the
prosecution's case.... The least criticism of police methods of interrogation deserves to be most carefully weighed because the evidence
which such interrogation produces is often decisive; the high degree of
proof which the English law requires-proof beyond reasonable
doubt-often could not be achieved by the
5 81 prosecution without the
assistance of the accused's own statement.
Today the importance of confessions ... cannot be overemphasized ....
In many cases there would be no trial without them, for
many times
the state has no other evidence implicating the
58 2
defendant.
[I]f many suspects did not confess to crimes whilst being interrogated, many offences would not be detected
as there is often no other
5 83
evidence to show their involvement.
As noted previously, studies have found the existence of confessions
or admissions in two-thirds to three-fourths of the cases and have discovered that only a very few suspects refused to answer all questions.5 84 One
is tempted to conclude from these studies that, in England, testimonial
evidence from the defendant procured through police questioning forms
a vital part of the prosecution's case in a great majority of serious cases
and in a substantial number of less serious ones. However, a number of
researchers and scholars have recently questioned this conclusion. They
argue that even if confessions are frequently used, they usually are
merely cumulative of other evidence which alone is sufficient to establish
585
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judging the importance of defendant statements in relation to other
prosecution evidence is, of course, a much more difficult task than determining their frequency. Reliance on testimonial evidence directly from
the suspect undoubtedly makes the prosecutor's task simpler; however,
the true importance of such evidence can only be fully understood by
determining how much more difficult, if at all, the prosecutor's task
would be without it. This assessment requires a subjective evaluation of
581.

P. DEVLIN, supra note 22, at 58.

582.

SHAFER, CONFESSIONS AND STATEMENTS

(1968), cited in

J.BALDWIN & M. MC-

CONVILLE, supra note 153, at 2.
583. ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS, THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS PRECEDING CRIMINAL TRIALS (1978), quoted in J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at

2.
584.

See supra notes 563-75 and accompanying text.

585. See infra notes 588-92 and accompanying text.
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the relative significance of suspect statements. Attempts at such evaluations often amount to no more than generalized assertions. For example,
in a study involving direct observation of police interrogation procedures, the researcher simply concluded, apparently from overall impressions, that "given [that] so many admissions are obtained without
adequate alternative evidence, [reducing the effectiveness of interrogation] would reduce the detection rate unless alternative proof and sufficient additional police manpower to gather it were available. ' '58 6 When
statistical analysis is undertaken, it often takes the form of a comparison
of conviction rates between those who confess and those who do not.
For example, the Worchester Crown Court study found that 93% of defendants who had made some sort of confession were subsequently convicted, whereas the conviction rate for those who denied their guilt was
only 47%.587
Until recently, no English studies had attempted to document empirically the role that confessions play within the prosecution's evidence
as a whole. Consequently, it was difficult to measure the accuracy of
assertions of their importance against the argument that despite the frequency of confessions and the fact that suspects who have confessed are
more likely to be convicted, confessions are generally superfluous. However, it may be that defendants most often confess when the case against
them is strong and, therefore, when confessions are presented by the
prosecution, it is usually in those cases where other evidence of guilt is
overwhelming.
Fortunately, several important empirical studies recently have been
conducted in England. A study based upon observations of interrogation
at four police stations in 1979 found some cases in which the confession
was crucial, but concluded that since the evidence against most suspects
was highly incriminating, and since these suspects were more likely to
confess, confessions usually merely served to strengthen an already
strong case against the defendant.5 88 A more detailed and comprehensive study of Crown Court cases employed independent assessors to evaluate the significance of defendants' statements in relation to other
586. B. IRVING, supra note 246, at 152.
587. Mitchell, supra note 513, at 600.
588. P. SOFTLEY, supra note 76, at 86. Softley noted that if police questioning were restricted, some offenders would escape conviction, but stated,
these effects would not necessarily be dramatic in terms of rates. In only 8 percent of
cases did the officers interviewed say that they would have dropped the case if the
suspect had refused to answer questions, while in 56 percent of cases they said that
they would have relied on the evidence already available.
Id. at 94.
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prosecution evidence. Researchers found that "in almost half of all cases
•.. the accused's statement had no real bearing upon the strength of the
case as a whole. ' 589 However, they also found that in about 30% of the
cases, the confession was of "central importance" and in 20% it was considered "crucial" in the sense that without the statement there would
have been no prima facie case against the accused. 590 The study concluded that "in a majority of cases, evidence emanating from police interrogation of the defendant added nothing to the prosecutor's case or else
merely supplemented an already overwhelming body of evidence." 591
Another researcher, in studying contested summary trials, found
that the prosecution offered full confessions in only 13% of the cases and
other damaging statements in only 16%. Thus, in 71% of the cases
5 92
tried, the prosecution did not present any statement of the defendant.
From the foregoing studies one might be tempted to conclude that
while confessions or admissions are present in a great majority of cases,
at least serious ones, they generally are not of much importance and justice can usually be accomplished without resorting to the accused as a
source of testimonial evidence. Indeed, the authors of the Crown Court
study using independent assessors generalized from their own and other
studies that "confessions are numerically of slight significance to the outcome of criminal trials" and that "interrogation is in fact a relatively
unimportant part of the total law enforcement picture. ' 593 However,
these studies do not support the proposition that defendant statements
are unimportant, but only that they are not crucial in most cases. While
the authors of the Crown Court study played down the significance of
defendant statements, their own research found that such statements
were of some importance in approximately 50%, of central importance in
about 30%, and crucial in 20% of the cases studied.5 94 The researchers
also found a difference in the need for such evidence depending upon the
type of offense: "Many more burglary and robbery offences would have
been weakened by the exclusion of the accused's statements than was the
case for any other offence type.... For robbery and burglary cases, the
prosecution had less additional evidence to supplement the confession of
the defendant."5 9 5
The study of confessions and admissions in summary trials also
589.

J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 28-29.

590. Id. at 27-33.
591.

Id. at 32.
J. VENNARD, supra note 387, at 23.
593. M. MCCONVILLE & J. BALDWIN, supra note 21, at 139, 154.
594. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 28.

592.
595.

Id. at 33.
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found a significant difference in the importance of confessions depending
on the nature of the prosecutor's evidence. In cases based wholly upon
circumstantial evidence, 51.5% resulted in conviction when no confession was offered, whereas 85.7% resulted in conviction when a full confession was presented. However, in cases based wholly on direct
evidence, 76.6% of defendants were convicted without any confession
offered. The researcher observed that "these findings, and the relatively
low rate of conviction among cases brought on circumstantial evidence,
would seem to indicate that confessions were most crucial in the latter
596
type of case."
The foregoing studies indicate that although statements of the accused are not absolutely necessary in most cases, they are of significant
and often crucial importance in a substantial number of cases, particularly serious ones and those lacking direct evidence of guilt.
B. The American Prosecution
(1) Law Enforcement Reliance on Police Interrogation
Numerous studies of police interrogations have been conducted in
the United States, but most studies have concentrated on the process of
interrogation and its results rather than on the decision to interrogate in
the first place. Little is known regarding the extent of police efforts to
question suspects. However, from remarks in some studies, it is apparent
that police interrogation efforts vary widely.
Frequency of interrogation varies not only among different jurisdictions and police departments, but among different offenses. While reports
consistently find frequent interrogation in homicide cases, these reports
also show that departmental policies differ in their approach toward
other types of offenses. The New Haven study found that interrogation
was less likely in arrests for narcotics, vice, and minor offenses generally.5 97 The Pittsburgh study similarly noted that narcotics, gambling,
vice, and certain other offenses were seldom referred to the police branch
responsible for interrogation. 598 A District of Columbia study found that
the overall police interrogation rate was close to 50% but noted a striking difference among offenses: "[T]he interrogation rate varied considerably with the crime charged from a high of 75% for homicide to a low of
10% for sex offenses, and with rates higher than the 50% average for
drug offenses, auto theft, assault, larceny-theft, and housebreaking. ' ' 599
596.

J.

597.

Project, supra note 6, at 1536.

598.

Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532, at 7.

599.

Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1365 n.64. The interrogation rate was

VENNARD,

supra note 387, at 13.
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Nathan Sobel, in 1966, noted that police and prosecutors in some jurisdictions interrogate in all felony cases, while New York City police interrogate only in "big" cases, which "are astonishingly few despite opinion
' '6
to the contrary. 00
Recent studies of cities with "professional" police departments show
that generally the bulk of those arrested for serious offenses are questioned. A recent study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice of
aspects of the criminal process in Jacksonville, Florida and San Diego,
California found that of those arrested for burglary, police questioned
82% in Jacksonville and 78% in San Diego.60 1 The questioning rate
seemed to be lower in robbery and felony assault cases. 60 2 These later
studies were both based upon the interrogation practices of highly "pro60 3
fessional" police departments.
A study of interrogation of suspects arrested for murder, forcible
rape, robbery, and burglary from 1964 to 1968 by one western police
department in anonymous "Seaside City" (described as an "enclave in
the Los Angeles Metropolitan area") found that only 2% of suspects arrested prior to Miranda and 8% of suspects arrested after Miranda were
not questioned.6 0 4 The study pointed out that police were interrogating
fewer suspects after Miranda, but could offer no concrete explanations.60 5 The District of Columbia study also found that interrogations
decreased somewhat after Miranda.606 Thus, evidence suggests that Miranda has had at least some impact on the frequency of police
interrogation.
While the foregoing studies provide only limited information on the
also found to be less than 50% for robbery and weapons offenses. Id. at 1417 table E-6; see
also id. at 1364-65.
600.

N. SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSION STANDARDS 142-43 (1966).

601.
602.
603.
604.
605.

F. FEENEY, F. DILL & A. WEIR, supra note 542, at 141, 143.
Id. at 142, 146.
Id. at 53, 56; Witt, supra note 16, at 324 n.40.
Witt, supra note 16, at 325 table 3.
Id. at 325, 331. Witt noted the department's policy of securing a signed statement

whenever possible but found that this policy was not being followed. Witt pointed out possible

reasons:
From conversations with the detectives, it was obvious that since Miranda and the
court's preoccupation with procedural matters, they do not want to question suspects
in cases where they have enough evidence to convict without interrogation. The
human factor is probably involved here, too, in that unenterprising detectives can
now rationalize their indolence.
Id. at 326 n.44. This reflects an inconsistency with Sobel's position that confessions are obtained principally in those cases in which police already have enough evidence to convict. N.
SOBEL, supra note 600, at 142-43.
606. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1364-65.
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extent of police efforts to question suspects, they do support the following
general conclusions: (1) police efforts to question vary greatly depending
upon the nature of the offense and the policies of each law enforcement
agency; (2) at least "professional" police departments probably continue
to question the great majority of suspects arrested for serious offenses;
and (3) there has been some decrease in questioning since Miranda.
(2) Suspect Reaction to Interrogation
A number of American studies in the aftermath of Miranda report
the reaction of suspects to police questioning. The New Haven study
found that 20% of interrogated suspects refused to talk and that questioning was "unproductive" in 29% of the studied cases. In sum, interrogation was found "successful" in 51% and "unsuccessful" in 49% of
the cases.607 The study further found that the giving of Miranda warnings had not resulted in a decrease in successful interrogations, concluding that "the impact on law enforcement has been small." 60 8 However,
the study did note an increase after Miranda in cases in which suspects
refused to talk after being warned. 0 9
The District of Columbia study, based on interviews with suspects
after interrogation, found that of those "post-Miranda defendants" who
were given the Miranda warning, 40% gave statements while 60% gave
no statements.6 10 The Denver study, also based on suspect interviews,
concluded that the rate of confessions or other damaging statements was
well under 50% and varied significantly according to the race of the
6 11
suspect.
A 1967 Pittsburgh study of homicide, robbery, burglary, auto larceny, and forcible sex offenses disclosed that of the 173 suspects interrogated, 74 (43%) refused to talk while 99 (57%) were willing to make a
statement. Of those who talked, 46 (27% of all interrogated) confessed. 61 2 The study also scrutinized police case files for all suspects ar607. Project, supra note 6, at 1565 table 11.
608. Id. at 1613.
609. Id. at 1566 table 12.
610. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1372-73.
611. Leiken, supra note 532, at 13 (confessions taken from 21.4% of whites, 28.5% of
blacks, and 46.1% of Spanish Americans). Leiken also found, as would be expected, that the
young are more likely to make a statement and to confess, and that the more prior felony
convictions a suspect had sustained, the less likely he would be to confess. Id. at 19-20. On
the other hand, contrary to what might be assumed, Leiken found that the more educated were
more likely to make a statement. Id. In this respect, the study confirms the findings of the
Postscript to the Miranda Project, which found that students and staff of Yale University spoke
rather freely to the FBI. Griffiths & Ayers, supra note 6, passim.
612. Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532, at 13 table 3.
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rested and interrogated for similar offenses from 1964 to 1967 and found
that the overall confession rate was approximately 50% in the pre-Miranda cases and approximately 33% for the post-Mirandacases. 6 13 The
confession rate decline after Miranda was 16 to 17% and was even
6 14
greater for certain offenses.
The later "Seaside City" study found that suspects arrested for serious offenses refused to talk in 6% of pre-Miranda interrogations and in
9% of post-Miranda interrogations. Suspects gave an incriminating
statement in 69% of pre-Miranda and in 67% of post-Miranda interrogations. 6 15 After Miranda, there appeared to be somewhat fewer interrogations, more suspects who refused to talk, and fewer confessions. Yet
the author concluded that Miranda had only "an indirect effect on successful interrogation. ' 616 In contrast, the Pittsburgh study pointed directly to Miranda as the cause for the decline in confession rates. 617 The
greater incidence of successful interrogations in "Seaside" than in other
jurisdictions might be attributable to many factors, including the higher
quality of the "Seaside City" Police Department and the fact that, since
it confronts a less severe crime problem than the other cities studied, it
has more resources to devote to the interrogation process. 6 18 The difference might also be attributed to the fact that, by the time of the "Seaside
City" study, police were able to adapt their interrogation techniques to
comply with Miranda while at the same time more effectively encourage
6 19
suspects to talk.
Some information is also available on suspects' reactions to Miranda'sright to counsel component. The assumption that, after Miranda
warnings, most suspects would request a lawyer 620 has not been borne
out. The District of Columbia study found that of those given Miranda
613. The specific figures are as follows: Case confession rate: pre-Miranda,54.4%; postMiranda, 37.5%; decline, 16.9%. Suspect confession rate: pre-Miranda, 48.5%; post-Miranda, 32.3%; decline, 16.2%. These "confession rates" include admissions as well, and,
since the study only concerned suspects who were interviewed, figures are not affected by
variances in interviewing rates. Id. at 10-12.
614. Id. (homicide 27% decline; robbery 26% decline).
615. Witt, supra note 16, at 325.
616. Id. at 326.
617. Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532, at 23. The District of Columbia study also
noted fewer confessions after Miranda. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1414
table E-1.
618. See Witt, supra note 16, at 324 n.40.
619. See supra notes 544-53 and accompanying text.
620. Professor Louis B. Schwartz assumed that, "[o]rdinarily after [Miranda] warnings, a
person will request a lawyer and then no interrogation can take place until the lawyer is present." L. SCHWARTZ, LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 114 (1980).
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warnings only 7% requested counsel. 62 1 The Pittsburgh study found
that of 173 suspects arrested for serious offenses in the 1967 study period,
6 22
only 27% terminated questioning by requesting counsel.
The National Institute of Justice study did not distinguish between
refusals based on silence and those founded on requests for counsel. Of
the burglary suspects questioned in Jacksonville, only 5% refused to answer but an additional 17% denied knowledge of or participation in the
crime.623 One-half of those questioned confessed, and an additional 10%
provided an admission, rendering a total of 60% of the interrogations
successful. 624 Of those interrogated in San Diego, 22% refused to answer
and an additional 15% denied the crime, for a total of 37% either refusing or denying. Twenty-nine percent confessed and an additional 13%
gave an admission, rendering a total of 42% of the interrogations successful. 625 However, in both cities a significant number of arrestees were
not questioned. Of all persons arrested for burglary, confessions were
obtained in 41% of the cases in Jacksonville, and in only 23% of the
626
cases in San Diego.
The results of these piecemeal studies vary widely and make it difficult to offer a comprehensive assessment of suspect reaction to police
interrogation. However, it is clear that most studies found that a substantial percentage of suspects questioned refused to make a statement
and that an even greater portion refused to confess. Furthermore, a
number of the studies reveal some increase in these percentages after the
Miranda decision. Nevertheless, some studies indicate that police have
adapted to Miranda by altering their interrogation techniques to avoid
any severe loss of confession evidence from wholesale assertions of Miranda rights. While evidence points to Miranda as the source of some
increase in refusals to talk and a decrease in the confession rate, certainly
Miranda has not led police or prosecutors to abandon the suspect as a
source of testimonial evidence.
(3) Significance of Suspect Statements
In the United States, as in England, the importance of suspect interrogation has been assumed by courts and scholars as well as by the general public. Specifically, proponents of confession evidence argue that
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
scribed
626.

Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 6, at 1352, 1372 table 8, 1373 table 9.
Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532, at 13 table 3.
F. FEENEY, F. DILL & A. WEIR, supra note 542, at 143.
Id.
Id. The figures do not work out to 100% since some cases fell into categories deas "other" and "unclear."
Id.
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such statements provide cogent proof of culpability, promote judicial efficiency by inducing criminals to plead guilty, and enhance criminal justice
by increasing the conviction rate. Statements such as the following can
be found in cases and in legal literature: "[M]any offenses are of such a
character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are
those implicated in the crime. ' 627 "How else can [crimes] be solved if at
all, except by means of the interrogation of suspects or of others who
may possess information? Absent confession, the guilt of the offenders in
most of the cases could not be established. ' 628 Public acceptance of these
assertions has also been recognized:
The failure of the public to become aroused except momentarily over
the Wickersham Commission's Report on police [use of third degree
techniques during interrogation] may be attributed in part to public
acquiescence in police methods as supplying a need which our formal
procedure does not satisfy .... Perhaps the difficulty is not that the
public is not enlightened but that it is unwilling to demand629cessation of
practices believed essential to safeguard the social order.
Yet, as in England, these assumptions have been seriously challenged not
only by scholars, but at times by the Supreme Court. 630 It is important,
therefore, to look dispassionately at the available evidence on the subject.
The first measure of the importance of suspect statements can be
found in the frequency of their use as part of the prosecution's case.
Judge Sobel reviewed 2000 cases presented to the grand jury of King's
County, New York from September 1965 through February 1966 and
found that confessions constituted part of the evidence in 14% of the
cases, with higher percentages in more serious cases. 63 1 But Sobel noted
that this figure was low in comparison with those of other jurisdictions
due to the New York practice of interrogating only in "big" cases. 632 A
Chicago jury study found that confessions were offered in 19% of the
cases, but with a higher percentage in more serious prosecutions. 633 The
New Haven study also found confessions in only 19% of the prosecu63 4
tion's cases.
Most other studies have found a greater frequency of confessions.
627.
States v.
628.
629.

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972), quoted with approval in United
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1976).
Inbau, supra note 12, at 267-70.
Kauper, supra note 19, at 1244 n.89 (emphasis in original); see supra note 525 and

accompanying text.
630. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
631. N. SOBEL, supra note 600, at 141-43.
632. Id.
633.

H.

KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY

634. Project, supra note 6, at 1580 table F-3.

137 (1966).
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In a study of felony complaints issued by the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, District Attorney Evelle Younger found confessions or admissions in over 40% of the cases. 635 In 1965, New York District
Attorney Frank Hogan reported that of ninety-one pending homicide
cases in Manhattan, confessions would be offered at trial in sixty-two
(68%).636 This is consistent with a Detroit Police Department study of
similar vintage finding confessions present in approximately two-thirds of
completed prosecutions in 1961 and 1965.637 The later "Seaside City"
study found interrogations successful in 67% of the cases and noted that
a confession or admission formed part of the evidence for the prosecution
638
in 43% of the cases.
The fact that studies differ concerning the prevalence of confessions
is not surprising since results vary significantly according to the nature
and seriousness of the offense as well as the methodology, location, and
time of the study. While the King's County study found the over-all
confession rate to be 14%, the rate varied from 24% for murder to 10%
for burglary. 639 The National Institute of Justice report noted the striking difference between Jacksonville and San Diego in the number of confessions obtained:
There are fully twice as many confessions in Jacksonville in the robbery cases as in San Diego and nearly 60% in the burglary cases.
This greater number of confessions in Jacksonville appears to be
due more to the number of defendants in San Diego who refused to
answer . . . than to the difference in the number of defendants
questioned. 64o
Even more significant is the fact that results differ between studies
based on case files from an early stage in the proceedings and those
based on cases presented at trial. Since defendants who have confessed
are much more likely to plead guilty or seek other dispositions short of
trial, prosecution cases presented at trial are less likely to contain confessions. 641 The foregoing Chicago and New Haven studies reporting con635. Younger, supra note 542, at 256, 260.
636. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1965, § 1, at 1, col. 2, cited in Ellis, supra note 7, at 854 &n.137.
637. Unpublished report by Detroit Police Detective Chief Vincent Piersante (July 27,
1966) [hereinafter Piersante Report] (discussing felony prosecutions for 1961), cited and discussed In Project, supra note 6, at 1640-41 & n.5.
638. Witt, supra note 16, at 325, 329 table 8.
639. N. SOBEL, supra note 600, at 142.
640. F. FEENEY, F. DILL & A. WEIR, supra note 542, at 141.
641. The "Seaside City" study found questioning successful in 67% to 69% of the cases
although an alleged confession or admission formed part of the prosecutor's evidence in only
43% of the cases. Witt, supra note 16, at 225. The fact that the latter figure was derived from
the prosecutor's trial evidence, whereas the first was the result of studying police case files,
most likely accounts for much of the difference.
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fession rates of 19% were based on evidence presented at trial, whereas
Hogan's New York figures and the Detroit Police Department report
apparently included pre-trial dispositions.
The prevalence of suspect statements in the prosecution's case is but
one measure of their significance in the criminal prosecution. Their importance in relation to alternative forms of evidence is another, more relevant measure.
Statements of defendants are often regarded as highly reliable evidence and confessions as cogent proof of guilt: "If ... the ascertainment
of truth is perceived as the major and essential objective of [a criminal
proceeding], then it is clear that defendant's silence is at least as inimical
to the ascertainment of that objective as lack of discovery ...
"642
"Ironically, in a criminal case the likelihood is that the story told the
' ' 643
police will be more nearly accurate than that told the lawyer.
Some studies have confirmed a close connection between confessions
and the conviction rate. Most recently, the National Institute of Justice
study found:
The conviction rate in robbery and burglary cases involving confessions is 40 to 180 percent greater than in the cases not involving
confessions.
Admissions obviously have a much smaller effect on convictions
than do confessions. The conviction rate for robbery cases in which
there is an admission644is nonetheless considerably above that for the
nonconfession cases.
Such connections between the existence of a confession and the conviction rate have led some observers to conclude that confessions most
often lead to convictions and that without confessions conviction of the
64 5
guilty would be substantially impaired.
However, even the most cogent proof of guilt may be merely cumulative evidence in cases in which the totality of proof is overwhelming.
The importance of obtaining confessions is often justified by the claim
that they are a powerful inducement to guilty pleas. 64 6 This argument
implies that police do not generally possess other strong proof of guilt
642. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 451 n.28 (3d ed. 1980).
643. Fletcher, PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 306
(1960); see also W. SCHAEFER, supra note 20, at 60; Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Casefor Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REv. 671, 679-81 (1968) (discussing the scope of the fifth amendment privilege).
644. F. FEENEY, F. DILL & A. WEIR, supra note 542, at 141; see also Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532, at 20.
645. See W. SCHAEFER, supra note 20, at 8, 32; Traynor, supra note 12, at 660-68.
646. See W. SCHAEFER, supra note 20, at 8; Traynor, supra note 12, at 664.
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sufficient to impel a guilty plea. Yet some commentators dispute the apparent effect of confessions on the conviction rate, contending that defendants generally confess only when there is overwhelming evidence of
guilt, and that in the great bulk of confession cases the defendant would
have been convicted without the confession. As pointed out by La Fave
and Israel, statistics showing that confessions are frequently relied upon
in criminal prosecutions do not prove that they were required or even
important: "The fact a confession was obtained in a particular case and
was tendered by the prosecution at trial does not standing alone establish
there existed a need in that instance to resort to interrogation. '647 In
Judge Sobel's study of 2000 indictments in New York, he found only 275
confessions. 64 8 Because 90% of those who confessed pled guilty without
contesting admissibility, Sobel concluded:
[A] very substantial percentage of those who give confessions plead
guilty because there is other evidence in the case and not because the
confession compelled the plea. To put the horse before the cart, where
it belongs, this establishes that a substantial percentage of confessions
are obtained when they are least needed. 649
As a general proposition, Sobel's conclusion rests on shaky foundations because, as noted previously, King's County police and prosecutors,
unlike most other law enforcement agencies, interrogated only in "big"
cases, and these may be the very ones in which there is sufficient "other
evidence" of guilt. More importantly, attempting to ascertain defendants' motives from raw statistics is a questionable enterprise, and Sobel
provides no reason for the conclusion that defendants who confess plead
guilty because of other evidence against them and not merely because
they have confessed. In fact, the opposite appears more reasonable, except in cases of clearly inadmissible confessions, and few of the confessions in Sobel's study fell within this category. 650 Finally, the importance
of confessions in relation to other evidence in the case is difficult to judge
by the decision of the defendant to plead guilty. Numerous other factors,
such as the case load and plea bargaining practice of the particular jurisdiction, have a significant influence on the guilty plea decision. 65 1
Sobel's conclusion has nevertheless received considerable support,
647. W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 99, § 6.1(2).
648. N. SOBEL, supra note 600, at 144.
649. Id.
650. In an earlier paper, Sobel had contended that "almost all the 'confessions' were inadmissible for failure to give the fourfold warnings." Sobel, supra note 10, at 15. No basis for
this view was presented, and the statistics on the percentage of successful suppression motions
do not support it.
651.

For other criticisms, see M. MCCONVILLE & J. BALDWIN, supra note 21, at 129;

Project, supra note 6, at 1642.
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most of it based on personal experience or the facts of particular cases; 652
however, as in England, a more reliable analysis of the relative importance of confessions has been achieved through evaluative and comparative case studies. The first studies of this type were conducted by law
enforcement agencies. A study by the Detective Chief of the Detroit Police Department, based upon evaluations by investigating officers of the
department, compared the importance of confessions in felony prosecutions in Detroit in 1961 with prosecutions completed in 1965. The study
found confessions present in 64.7% and "essential" in 23.6% of the 1961
cases and found confessions present in 65.6% and "essential" in 18.8%
of the 1965 cases. 653 In 1965, New York District Attorney Frank Hogan
reported that confessions would be offered in 68% of the 91 pending
homicide cases and that indictments would not have been obtained without confessions in 28% of these pending cases. 6 54 Los Angeles County
District Attorney Evelle Younger conducted two surveys of felony cases
in order to determine the impact of Miranda and People v. Dorado,655 a
California "Escobedo" case preceding Miranda. The Dorado survey was
conducted in 1965 and the Miranda survey in 1966. Confessions or admissions accompanied police requests for felony complaints in 40% of
the cases in the Dorado survey and in half of those in the Miranda survey. When felony complaints were issued, confessions or admissions
were present in 46% of the cases in the Doradosurvey and in 57% of the
cases in the Miranda survey. The prosecutors surveyed concluded that a
confession or admission was essential in 40% of the cases in which defendants were convicted after trial; however, when defendants convicted
on a plea of guilty were factored in, the figure declined to 10%.656
The well-known New Haven study appears to be the first comprehensive "academic," non-law enforcement effort to rate the relative importance of confessions. Through station house observation,
examination of police files, and conversations with detectives, the study
found that interrogations were "essential" in only 3% and "important"
in 10% of the cases observed. 65 7 The evaluations were based on information known at the time of the interrogation. As cases developed, how652. See authorities cited supra note 10.
653. Piersante Report, supra note 637. Slightly lower figures for the 1965 study were cited
in B. GEORGE, A NEW LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDO-THE SECOND ROUND 160, 161
(1967), cited in Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532, at 26.
654. See Ellis, supra note 7, at 854.
655. 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
656. Younger, supra note 544, at 262. Further figures from unpublished portions of the
report also point to lesser importance of confessions. See Project, supra note 6, at 1641 & n.12.
657. Project, supra note 6, at 1585.
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ever, it became apparent that interrogations were even less necessary
than had been supposed. The authors echoed Sobel in concluding that
"interrogation usually just cemented a cold case or served to identify
65 8
accomplices."
On the other hand, the Pittsburgh study, based on the authors' evaluation of police case files in homicide, robbery, burglary, auto larceny,
and forcible sex cases which contained confessions, found such confessions necessary in 24.7% of pre-Miranda cases and in 32.8% of postMiranda cases. 659 If cases without confessions were included, the proportion of cases in which confessions were necessary dropped to
20.2%.660 The study noted that defendants who confessed were convicted 78.7% of the time while defendants who had not confessed were
661
convicted 54.5% of the time.
The "Seaside City" study published in 1973 is the latest American
academic evaluation of the relative importance of confessions. The author evaluated 478 police case files involving persons arrested and incarcerated for murder, forcible rape, robbery, and burglary in anonymous
"Seaside City." Interrogation was found "essential or important" in
24%, "not important" in 8%, and "unnecessary" in 68% of the cases.
Despite the fact that the vast bulk of the suspects were questioned and
that interrogation, when attempted, was successful more than two-thirds
of the time, the author concluded that "in most cases interrogation was
not needed to solve the immediate crimes for which the suspects were
accused. ' 662 However, since interrogation was found to be necessary in
approximately one-fourth of the cases and to be important in performing
many collateral functions, the author cautioned that "the results do not
'663
support the thesis that police interrogation is unnecessary.
The importance of confession evidence in criminal cases is best measured by taking into account both the prevalence of confessions and their
relation to other available evidence of guilt. As with police efforts to
interrogate, the frequency of confessions varies according to the nature of
the offense and the practices in the particular jurisdiction. Yet confession rates vary even more widely (from 14% to 68%) than interrogation
rates since much depends on when the confession rates are evaluatedprincipally, whether before or after plea bargaining takes place.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.

Id. at 1588.
Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 532, at 16 table 5.
Id. at 15 table 4.
Id. at 20.
Witt, supra note 16, at 324.
Id. at 332.
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Even when confessions are present, they are not necessarily important. Certainly there is a close connection between the presence of confessions and the conviction rate, and it is reasonable to assume that those
who confess are more likely to plead and be found guilty. However, suspects facing overwhelming evidence of guilt may well plead guilty for
reasons other than having confessed. Thus, the most reliable studies of
the importance of confessions evaluate confessions in light of other prosecution evidence. Even the results of these studies diverge widely, but
such studies generally conclude that confessions are necessary in less
than half the cases in which they are found. Nevertheless, the studies do
demonstrate that confessions play an important and often essential role
in a substantial minority of criminal cases in the United States.
C. Comparison
Both the English and the American law enforcement systems place
significant reliance on police interrogation. This is particularly true in
serious cases and in those cases requiring proof of a state of mind not
readily inferable from objective facts. Although differences between the
systems do emerge, the substantial variety of practices in the various
American jurisdictions makes comparison difficult. With respect to the
frequency of interrogation, it appears that, in serious cases in England,
virtually all suspects are questioned in some fashion. In the United
States, interrogation in serious cases varies from over 90% in "Seaside
City" to 50% in the District of Columbia and only a few "big cases" in
New York according to the Sobel report. The more recent National Institute of Justice study found use of interrogation in about 80% of burglary cases but fewer robbery and assault cases. While generalizations
are difficult, it seems fair to say that even though some United States law
enforcement systems interrogate as much as the English, many, and
probably most, do not. By and large, in serious cases the English authorities tend to rely on interrogation to a greater extent than do police
departments in the United States. Some American studies have found a
reduction in interrogation since Miranda, but this alone does not appear
to account for the significant difference in interrogation rates. Still, in
America as in England, recent studies have shown that at least "professional" police departments question the great majority of suspects ar664
rested for serious crimes.
Although comparison is hampered here as well by significant varia664. The lack of sufficient data precludes comparison of interrogation practices with respect to minor offenses.
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tions in the American studies, clearer differences emerge between the two
countries with respect to the reaction of suspects to police interrogation.
The English studies consistently found that from two-thirds to threefourths of suspects questioned by police made damaging statements, i.e.,
either confessed or made some admission of guilt. In contrast, successful
interrogation rates cited by the American studies varied from one-fourth
to two-thirds. Most American studies found that half or fewer of those
interrogated made damaging statements. Exceptions were the "Seaside
City" study and the National Institute of Justice study of burglary interrogations in Jacksonville, but even these rates did not match the 75%
figure recently cited by the British reports of Crown Court cases. Also,
while the percentage of suspects refusing to make any statement at all
varied a good deal among the American studies, the numbers of such
suspects were generally significantly higher than comparable statistics in
665
the English studies.
Because English police place somewhat greater emphasis on interrogation, and English suspects tend to make damaging statements at a
greater rate than their American counterparts, one would suspect that in
England, suspect statements assume greater importance in criminal prosecutions. English studies have, in fact, consistently found damaging
statements in two-thirds to three-fourths of Crown Court cases, with recent studies of committal papers finding admissions or confessions in
over 75% of the cases. 666 In contrast, results of American studies vary
widely from a low of 14% to a high of 68%, with most studies finding
667
suspect statements in less than half the cases.
Many more American than English studies have considered the significance of suspect statements in light of other evidence of guilt-a more
meaningful measure of their importance in criminal prosecution than
mere frequency of occurrence. Figures are generally based on all serious
prosecutions studied, not merely those containing confessions. As with
frequency figures, results of American studies of the relative importance
of suspect statements vary considerably. The proportion of cases in
which a statement was evaluated as necessary for conviction varied from
a low of 3% in the New Haven study to a high of 28% in Hogan's New
York homicide study. Recent scholarly studies have come to somewhat
less divergent conclusions, finding statements necessary for conviction in
665. Comparing request for counsel rates would not be productive in view of the very few
studies considering the question, but it does appear that in both England and the United States
suspects rarely request counsel prior to making a statement.
666. See supra note 571.
667. See supra notes 631-38 and accompanying text.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

about 20% of the cases. 668 Though comparison with the English system
is difficult because of the existence of only one authoritative study, the
objective and meticulous methodology of that study entitles it to significant weight. This study concluded that suspect statements were necessary for conviction in 20% of Crown Court cases. They were of central
importance in another 10% and of some importance in an additional
20%. In the remaining cases they were regarded as of no
669
consequence.
While firm conclusions are particularly hazardous in this area due to
the likelihood of somewhat different evaluative criteria, it is apparent
that most American studies have found statements necessary for conviction in fewer cases than in England. The Detroit, New York, and Pittsburgh studies cite results comparable with the English, but others cite
lower figures, particularly Younger (10%) and New Haven (3%). Also,
under the broader category of statements either necessary or important,
the New Haven study cited 13% and the "Seaside City" study 24%. In
significant contrast, the English study reported that statements were necessary or important in about half the cases.
In summary, the criminal justice systems of both countries rely on
police questioning of suspects to a significant degree, with police usually
questioning the majority of suspects in serious cases. Interrogation rates
in America vary substantially, but are generally lower than in England,
and evidence points to slightly reduced police reliance on suspect questioning as a source of proof since Miranda. Clearer differences appear in
suspect reaction to police questioning. While results of American studies
vary widely, it can generally be said that a substantially greater percentage of English than American suspects subjected to questioning make
damaging statements. American suspects are more likely to refuse to
make any statement. Furthermore, American studies conducted after
Miranda became common knowledge detected some increase in refusals
and some decline in confession rates. Differences in the significance of
suspect statements in criminal prosecutions are consistent with the
higher English confession rates. Confessions are thus more prevalent
and more important in English prosecutions.
These generalizations obviously cannot accurately be applied to all
the numerous and diverse criminal justice systems in the United States.
However, while some may parallel if not exceed the English in their reli668. See supra notes 659-63 and accompanying text. The Pittsburgh Study found statements necessary for conviction in 20% of the cases. The "Seaside City" study found them
necessary in 16% of the cases and "important" in an additional 8%.
669. See supra notes 588-95 and accompanying text.
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ance on suspect statements, studies suggest that most do not. Nevertheless, American studies should be viewed with caution since most are less
recent than the English, and law enforcement policies and practices may
have changed appreciably.
Finally, a caveat: The significance of suspect statements has been
examined only with respect to its role in the prosecution's case. As one
English author noted, "it would be imprudent to accept without qualification the crude assumption that, even if confession evidence is rarely
crucial to the prosecution's case, police interrogation is itself of little consequence in the criminal process. ' 6 70 Police questioning of suspects has a
number of other functions and uses. It often results in discovery of stolen property or in apprehension and conviction of other suspects. It may
avoid the possibility that police will release a guilty suspect and eventually prosecute an innocent one for the crime under investigation. On the
other hand, it may result in a determination that the suspect is innocent
and aid in the apprehension of the guilty.6 7 1 Confessions of criminal activity (including uncleared crimes for which the suspect may not be
under investigation) free police resources for investigating other criminal
activity and free courts and prosecutorial resources for other cases. In
addition, use of confession evidence may reinforce public confidence in
the system of criminal justice by affirming that "the right man" has been
convicted.672 These collateral justifications for police questioning, while
highly significant, are extremely diverse and their relative importance
673
would be difficult to measure.
V.

Summary and Analysis

English and American interrogation rules are quite similar in a
number of fundamental respects. Both countries afford suspects a right
to silence as well as a qualified right to legal assistance and require that
the police notify suspects of these rights. The laws of both countries es670. 3. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 7.
671. A number of studies illustrate how questioning before and after arrest may allay suspicion and lead to release of suspects without prosecution. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT
1981, supra note 12, 2.17, and studies cited therein.
672. "A confession is sought to be on the safe side, even where there is other sufficient
evidence." Id. 2.16.
673. Through examining committal papers in Crown Court cases, McConville and Baldwin sought to discover whether the interrogation of defendants produced material other than
confessions which assisted police investigations. They concluded that "many of the collateral
benefits assumed to be gained from interviewing suspects while in police custody are in important respects illusory." M. MCCONVILLE & J. BALDWIN, supra note 21, at 153. However,
their study concerned only interrogations resulting in committals and failed to consider a
number of important collateral objectives.
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tablish an investigatory period during which police are relatively free to
question the suspect and an accusatory period during which questioning
is restricted in some manner. Finally, both countries prohibit the use at
trial of "involuntary" confessions regardless of their reliability.
These similarities reveal shared values. While we recognize the benefits of suspect statements, we want to guard against pressures that would
produce unreliable confessions or would amount to compulsion rendering the process cruel or unfair or incompatible with an adversary system
of justice. We neither wish to take advantage of a suspect's ignorance of
his rights, nor aim to frustrate his desire to seek legal assistance. Nevertheless, we recognize that suspects who receive legal advice are often less
likely to give a full and truthful account of events, and we hesitate to
impose rules which would significantly impair the questioning process.
Although the United States and England entertain similar values,
the approaches we take toward satisfying those values in many respects
diverge considerably. Some disparities can be traced to significant differences in the structure of our respective governments. Lacking a written
constitution and judicial power to override legislative acts, England gives
its judicial system fewer tools with which to protect individual rights
when confronted with the popular will. The intent of the majority, as
embodied in an act of Parliament, is the last word in England, 674 while in
the United States some of the most intractable national conflicts, particularly in the criminal justice area, are ultimately resolved by the judiciary
acting as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Another relevant
difference is the fact that England's system of law enforcement is much
smaller and more unified than ours, which makes a comprehensive rational approach to problems much easier.6 75 In our system, where primary responsibility for law enforcement rests with each of the fifty states,
it would be most difficult to devise a national scheme for the treatment of
suspects of the type recently adopted in England. Studies and recommendations, even of such respected groups as the American Bar Association,
ultimately have only a limited effect on the actual process of criminal
676
justice when compared with a unified scheme enforced by rules of law.
While these differences in governmental structure explain the lack of
674. Reliance on the European Convention on Human Rights is now possible but is of
little value in the bulk of criminal cases since pleas based on the Convention cannot be directed
to English courts but only to the World Court in Strasbourg. See Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1985, at
1, col. 1.
675. See D. KARLEN, supra note 161, at 1-12, 103-04.
676. In Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986), the Supreme Court accepted police
interference with counsel access to the client which was "at odds with" the American Bar
Association Standards of Criminal Justice.
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a comprehensive national scheme for the treatment of suspects, they do
not explain why neither any individual state nor the federal government
has established comprehensive rules of its own. By and large, the treatment and questioning of suspects are governed in the United States by a
patchwork of constitutional mandates, state and municipal law, and executive and agency regulations. The reluctance of our state and federal
governments to impose comprehensive rules on the subject must be explained by more than structural impediments.
The distinct approaches of the English and American systems reflect
fundamentally different perceptions regarding the relative importance of
the various competing values involved. A reasonable argument can be
made that the English place greater emphasis on the protection of individual rights. England's long history of abuses of authority has led to an
enduring concern with fairness toward the accused during pre-trial confrontations with the police-a concern which, until recently at least, has
not been matched in this country.677 This concern underlies the development of the English caution rules that began at the turn of this century as
an inspiration of the judiciary. 678 In the United States, similar warnings
were not legally required until Mirandawas decided in 1966.679 Furthermore, the Judges' Rules and associated directives long ago recognized
other protective principles dealing with the treatment of persons in custody, the preservation of statements, and the right of access to a solicitor. 680 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Code of
Practice strengthened these principles in many respects. Cautions are
now required to be given earlier and more often than under either the old
Judges' Rules or Miranda.6 81 There is now in place a detailed, comprehensive scheme governing the treatment and questioning of persons in
custody. 682 An independent custody officer is responsible for the conditions and length of detention as well as advice of rights and extent of
permissible questioning. 6 83 England's present commitment to memorialize in a reliable manner suspect statements at police stations is also significant. Written statements were formerly rare, but the new Code states a
preference for contemporaneous recording of interviews at police stations. 684 Additionally, in view of the mandate in the 1984 Act for tape
677.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

678.

See supra note 154 and accompanying text.

679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.

See supra notes 189-93
See supra notes 163-65
See supra notes 173-85
See supra section II.C.
See supra notes 178-82
See supra notes 375-80

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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recording of interviews and of the preliminary results of the field trials, a
national system of tape recording of interviews with suspects at police
stations is likely to be in place soon. 68 5 Finally, the 1984 Act provides a
right not to be held incommunicado and a right of access to a solicitor.
This access right has been strengthened and made meaningful by written
notice and waiver rules, duty solicitor schemes, restrictions on further
interview of one who has requested legal advice, and narrowing the exceptional situations in which access can be delayed. Neither Miranda
nor associated constitutional or statutory rules offer our citizens the same
comprehensive protections.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that, when compared
with our system, the English rules are more protective of the accused.
With respect to the law governing interrogation, the "rights" provided by
the Judges' Rules were largely illusory and prior to the 1984 Act a
number of English scholars had concluded that:
The situation [with respect to police interrogation] is . . . more
favorable to the accused in the United States where the courts have
striven in recent years to give meaning to his rights. In the absence of
corresponding efforts on the part of English courts. . . ,in England
more than in the United States, the unverifiable product of police inter'68 6
views has.. . "a decisively malign impact on the criminal process.
Certainly, the enhanced protections offered by the 1984 Act and
Code of Practice reflect the English concern that police act fairly toward
an accused, but they are also meant to serve more immediate and pragmatic purposes. Traditionally, the English law enforcement system has
enjoyed considerable public confidence. During the past two decades,
however, that confidence has declined considerably. 687 Deteriorating relations between the public and the police are most evident in poor and
minority communities. 688 To a great extent, the new protections are in685. See supra notes 390-415 and accompanying text.
686. M. MCCONVILLE & J. BALDWIN, supra note 21, at 5-6; see M. GRAHAM, supra note
19; Hughes, supra note 19; see also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 105-12; cf Packer, Two
Models of the CriminalProcess, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
687. The decline in public confidence and esteem of the police has been recognized by
English commentators. See M.D.A. FREEMAN, supra note 280, at viii ("The reputation of the
police is not what it was even a decade ago."); Munro, supra note 172, at 588 ("There has been
a distancing of the police from the public and its representatives in the last 20 years, and there
is a price to be paid in deteriorating relations with both."); The Times (London), Mar. 12,
1986, at 5, col. 1 ("The police are no longer as popular as they once were, and there are signs
that the halcyon days may have gone for good.") (comment of P. Evans on an article in the
March 1986 Police Federation magazine). A brighter view of the British police was expressed
in 1967 by D. KARLEN, supra note 161, at 98-100.
688. The recent Tottenham riots provided a graphic example of the consequences of poor
police-minority relations. See The Price of Hate, The Sunday Times (London), Oct. 13, 1985,
at 15, col. 1.
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tended to restore public confidence in law enforcement and lead to better
police-community relations.6 89 The 1984 Act also gives police greater
powers, particularly in the area of search, arrest, and detention, and the
new protections are meant to afford some balance between suspects'
rights and these new powers.6 90 In many respects the new laws either
approve existing practices or give the police even greater powers to obtain statements, 69 1 but the independent custody officer, the tape recording of statements, and the access to a solicitor all serve to open the
questioning process to outside scrutiny, enhance confidence in the outcome, and afford an accused greater protections against unfair police
practices as a balance to the greater police powers under the Act. Thus,
far from crippling police interrogation, the new rules endow the questioning process with renewed respect and legitimacy.
The willingness of the English to accept police interrogation as an
integral and important part of their criminal justice system stems from a
number of factors. First, the English concern with open and fair treatment of suspects is tempered by the realization that the crime problem is
steadily and rapidly worsening and that the police must be allowed the
means and the latitude to deal with it effectively.6 92 Second, the English
traditionally place a high value on the need for an efficient process for
discovering the truth and punishing the guilty. This attitude is reflected
in the importance given to the reliability principle in dealing with the
fruit of an involuntary confession and in the almost wholesale rejection of
the exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing the principles governing the
693
arrest, search, and treatment of suspects.
This same pragmatic view also accounts for a fundamental difference between English and American attitudes toward the necessity and
legitimacy of police questioning. While agreement is not unanimous, the
689. This purpose was evident from the Parliamentary debates on the Codes and was exemplified by Lord Glenarthur's statement in the House of Lords:
In conclusion, let me say that the Act and the Codes of Practice represent a major
step forward in police public relations .... [T]he essential point is that we have a real
chance of breaking through the innuendo and suspicion which has so often bedeviled
the treatment of suspects by the police. The whole area is a fruitful field for the types
of fears and allegations which have dogged policing for such a long time especially in
sensitive areas-for example areas concerning young people, ethnic minorities and so
on-where most damage can be done.
House of Lords, Dec. 9, 1985, col. 38.
690, See M.D.A. FREEMAN, supra note 280, at viii; T.C. WALTERS & M.A. O'CONNELL,
supra note 150, at xv.
691. For example, the limited right to silence remains unchanged and the voluntariness
rules have been weakened. See supra notes 50-51, 85-97 and accompanying text.
692. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text,
693. See supra notes 481-87 and accompanying text.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

English generally more readily accept police questioning as an integral
and indispensable part of their criminal justice system. After extensive
study, the 1981 Royal Commission clearly recognized both the propriety
and necessity of suspect interrogation, 694 and recently both the Houses of
Parliament reaffirmed its legitimacy as one of the primary purposes of
detention or arrest. 695 In this country, on the other hand, there is no
national consensus on the importance of suspect interrogation. 696 For
example, in their noted treatise on criminal procedure, La Fave and
Israel merely cite a few inconclusive studies and conflicting assertions
before pointing out that statistics as well as arguments on both sides are
inconclusive. 697 Unlike the English, we have not succeeded in arriving at
a consensus through a coordinated national effort involving public debate
and commission study. 698 Even the Supreme Court has demonstrated a
schizophrenic attitude toward police interrogation, at times cautioning us
not to "overstate[ ] ... the 'need' for confessions," 699 and asserting that
"the very fact of custodial questioning exacts a heavy toll on individual
liberty," 70 0 but more recently stressing that admissions of guilt are not
only desirable, but "essential to society's compelling interest in finding,
convicting and punishing those who violate the law." 70 1 Yet, the
Supreme Court presumes that custodial questioning is "inherently coercive," and therefore illegitimate, unless measures are taken "'to insure
694. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT 1981, supra note 12, 4.1, at 70. Most likely, the
Commission's recognition of the need for interrogation merely reflected the existing position of
the courts and the government. Lidstone & Early, supra note 20, at 489, 505.
695. Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke, [1984] 1 All E.R. 1054 (H.L.); Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984; see supra notes 439-46 and accompanying text.
696. See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text.
697. 1 W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 99, § 6.1(2); see also Ellis, supra note 7, at
855; Weisberg, supra note 6, at 46.
698. The significance of the comprehensive, coordinated approach taken by the 1981
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure toward balancing the rights of the accused and the
needs of society cannot be underestimated. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 19, at 232.
699. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 488-89 (1964).
700. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
701. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986)
On occasion, the attitudes of individual justices toward interrogation seem ambiguous and
indecisive. Compare the language of Justice Frankfurter in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54
(1949) ("Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system.... [S]ociety carries
the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out of his own mouth ... but by
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.") with his statements in
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961) ("[O]ffenses frequently occur [when] ...
nothing remains-if police investigation is not to be balked before it has fairly begun-but to
seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them questions .... [S]uch questioning is often
indispensable to crime detection.").
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that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.' ",702
The consequences of a greater general acceptance of the necessity
and propriety of police questioning in England can be seen in a number
of contexts. First, England has been more reluctant than the United
States to impose absolute rules which could significantly impede the interrogation process. For example, English law does not give a suspect a
firm right to cut off questioning by asserting a desire to remain silent;
English police do not have to take "no" for an answer and may continue
to attempt to persuade the suspect to give a statement. 70 3 Similar differences arise when the suspect asks for a lawyer. Miranda established a
rigid rule prohibiting further interrogation unless the suspect himself initiates conversation and then waives his right to counsel. The Judges'
Rules contained no such prohibition, and while the Code of Practice now
proscribes further questioning once a suspect has asked for legal advice,
the new restriction is not absolute. Police may seek the suspect's agreement "in writing or on tape" to begin the interview without a solicitor
present.7° Even if the suspect fails to agree, police may take advantage of
numerous exceptions to the restriction, such as finding that postponing
the interview will "cause unreasonable delay to the process of
'70 5
investigation.
Second, English law allows police a freer rein to take advantage of
the pressures associated with custodial questioning. While we have focused attention on reducing these pressures, and therefore reducing the
danger of compulsion, the English more readily accept the pressures associated with normal police inquiry. England's new relaxed "voluntariness" rules provide one example. The traditional two-part English
voluntariness test asked whether the confession was obtained (1) by fear
of prejudice or hope of advantage or (2) by oppression. 70 6 Older English
cases applied these rules separately and strictly, holding that statements
produced by threats or promises were involuntary even though the suspect's will was not sapped such that the statement was deemed to have
been obtained by oppression. 70 7 Recent cases have moved away from the
strict inducement test toward the more flexible oppression test, which
focuses on free will, and thus more closely resembles the American stan702. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 444 (1974)).
703. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
704. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
705. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.

706. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
707. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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dard. 70 8 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 continued the
movement away from the traditional strict voluntariness standard. Now,
confessions will be considered "involuntary" only if obtained by oppression or by conduct likely to render a confession unreliable. 70 9 Although
the new oppression standard embodies the concept of free will, the restrictive list of police conduct that would qualify as oppression suggests
that only rather extreme inducements will be viewed by the courts as
falling under the automatic exclusionary rule. Also, the new reliability
principle shifts the focus from whether the threat or inducement caused
the confession to whether the threat or inducement was likely to cause
the suspect to confess falsely. This objective reliability standard suggests
that only in the most unusual case will a court find that a truthful confession must be excluded on the ground that the attendant police pressures
were likely to produce a false one. It should be pointed out that this new
test is nearly identical to the standard advocated by Inbau and Reid in
their controversial treatise CriminalInterrogationand Confessions, which
7 10
has been the subject of considerable criticism in this country.
Though the new Act retains the traditional stiff "beyond reasonable
doubt" standard, the prosecution should now more easily be able to
prove that the police conduct was not so extreme that an innocent suspect was likely to incriminate himself, particularly when the charge is
serious and the threat or inducement minor. Indeed, the Act may allow
substantial inducements such as offers of bail and explanations of adverse
7 11
consequences from failure to cooperate.
According to the United States Supreme Court, the central question,
here as in England, is one of free will-whether the inducements were
sufficient to overbear the suspect's will to resist.7 12 This focus on free
will, together with confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts, has
resulted in a greater willingness than exists under the traditional English
rules to admit confession evidence when the defendant claimed that the
police used threats or promises to induce him to speak. While it is not
altogether clear that American voluntariness rules continue to provide
greater protection to suspects, the trend in England, both in statutory
708. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
709. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
710. F. IN3AU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS at vii, 157
(1962); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-58 (1966); Kamisar, What's an Involuntary
Confession?, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1983).
711. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
712. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960);
see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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and case law, appears to be toward allowing inducements which would
not be acceptable in this country.
English detention rules also permit greater pressures to be brought
to bear during questioning of suspects at police stations. English law
clearly authorizes police to arrest with evidence affording reasonable suspicion but insufficient to support a charge, and then to use the pressures
of arrest and custody to extract admissions of guilt to support the
charge. 7 13 Although the 1984 Act sets time limits on detention prior to
charge, police retain significant powers to detain and question suspects.7 14 Furthermore, the 1984 Act gives clear authority to detain with7 15 It is significant
out charge for the purpose of obtaining a confession.
that the period during which police, without magistrate oversight, may
authorize detention without charge for questioning corresponds with
the thirty-six hour limit on denial of access to a solicitor. Unless courts
limit these authorizations, the process may amount to an informal,
preaccusatory "Star Chamber" conducted by police and supervised by
magistrates.
In the United States police interrogation of suspects is generally regarded as an incidental consequence rather than as a primary purpose of
detention following arrest. Police are expected to arrest for the purpose
of commencing a criminal prosecution and are not authorized to detain a
suspect without charge for the purpose of questioning. However, this is
not to say that police do not engage in such practices, and questioning
during unavoidable delays has always been proper.
Limitations on the English right to silence also allow greater pressures to be brought against suspects. While the legal principles of both
countries prohibit the trier of fact from using silence after advice of rights
as evidence against the accused, the actual consequence of such silence is
quite different. In the United States, the trier of fact never hears of the
accused's failure to make a statement or his claim to silence or request
for counsel. 7 16 English courts, on the other hand, admit such evidence
and instruct the jury that no adverse inferences should be drawn from it.
It is widely recognized, however, that often the trier of fact will nevertheless draw adverse inferences from unjustified refusals to answer questions. Furthermore, in England, evidence of silence in the face of caution
and accusation comes before the jury whether or not the accused takes
713. See supra notes 437-38 and accompanying text.
714.

V. BEVAN & K. LIDSTONE, supra note 158, §§ 7.53-.54, .80-.82; G. POWELL & C.

McGRATH, supra note 97, at 120; M. ZANDER, supra note 53, §§ 58-59, at 74.
715. See supra notes 445-46 and accompanying text.
716. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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the stand. 717 As a result, in practice, while not in theory, the English
suspect's assertion of his right is more apt to hurt him. Since silence can
thus be costly, the pressures to speak to police during the interrogation
process are far greater than in the United States where the suspect is
assured that the jury will never hear of his refusal to talk.
Both countries impose restrictions on police questioning of suspects
once they have been charged with an offense, but, in some respects, English rules give police a freer rein to question charged persons. English
rules prohibit questioning with respect to the offense charged, while our
sixth amendment forbids the elicitation of statements from charged persons absent a knowing waiver of their right to counsel; however, the English restriction is subject to broad exceptions which authorize the
questioning of charged persons regardless of whether they waive their
rights or agree to be interrogated. 718 Furthermore, the English rules do
not cover elicitation of statements by an informant or secret agent
outside the ordinary context of police questioning, as the sixth amend719
ment does.
English rules give the defendant fewer tools as well as fewer incentives to challenge confession evidence. First, the automatic exclusionary
rule applies only to those statements found "involuntary. ' 720 While
courts may retain some discretion to exclude voluntary statements on
other grounds, this residual discretion is extremely limited and rarely
exercised, falling far short of the automatic Miranda or the per se Edwards exclusionary rules. 72 1 Furthermore, when a confession is suppressed as involuntary, the English reliability principle prevents the
exclusionary rule from reaching physical evidence obtained as a result of
the confession. 722 In the United States, suppressing a confession as involuntary or as violating the fifth or sixth amendments may require excluding highly reliable evidence discovered through it, such as stolen
property in the suspect's home or the murder victim's body in a location
known only to the perpetrator. 7 23 Similarly, in England, a confession
will not be suppressed on the ground that it was obtained as a result of an
improper arrest or after unreasonable detention, whereas United States
courts must suppress a confession if it is found to be the "fruit" or prod717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.

See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 306-12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 353-70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 517 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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7 24

uct of such illegality.
Finally, English impeachment rules significantly deter suspects with
criminal records from challenging the admissibility of their confessions,
since such an attack may allow the prosecutor to bring to the jury's attention the prior criminal convictions. As a consequence, defendants
with criminal records are placed at a particular disadvantage when faced
with overbearing police pressures. If they refuse to make a statement
when cautioned and questioned, the jury will know of this refusal. On
the other hand, if they succumb to extreme pressures and make a statement, they will be threatened with impeachment by their prior convic725
tions if they attempt to prove coercion.
The new protections afforded by the 1984 Act and Code will probably not change matters appreciably. Supervision of the detention and
interrogation process by the "independent" custody officer and tape recording of interviews at police stations may deter, and on occasion reveal, oppressive police conduct, but might also simply convince police to
offer inducements prior to interrogation. 72 6 In any event, suspects may
feel even more pressure to make statements with the awareness that a
refusal to deny or explain an accusation will be tape recorded and made
available to the judge and jury.
Nor is it likely that the new solicitor access rules will measurably
reduce the pressures to make statements. Suspects often are not advised
of their right of access until they arrive at the station house. Whether or
not a solicitor is present, police are not required to terminate questioning
following a suspect's assertion of his right to silence, but may continue to
try to persuade the suspect to make a statement. 727 The new restrictions
on questioning those who do request legal advice may reduce somewhat
the incidence of confessions, but exceptions to these restrictions are
broad, and police may convince suspects that they do not need legal advice or that they should make statements prior to the arrival of their
solicitor. Even if solicitors are called and made available more often, the
traditional rules and attitudes of the English criminal justice system
make it unlikely that a solicitor's presence will eliminate the pressures to
speak or reduce the incidence of confessions.
In contrast to the United States, where it is likely that "any lawyer
worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no state724.
725.
726.
727.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 132-41
supra notes 150-52
supra note 412 and
supra notes 306-12

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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lawyers in England, aware

that silence during interrogation may become known to the trier of fact
and be taken into account despite the judge's instructions to the contrary,
may well advise suspects who assert their innocence to make statements
at this point. Further incentives are provided by the new "voluntariness"

rules, which may allow police to grant pre-trial release or similar favors
in exchange for a statement. As all lawyers well know, early assertions of
innocence often conflict with proven facts and are used at trial with devastating effects on the defendant's case. Nevertheless, a lawyer faced with
a suspect who asserts his innocence is less apt to advise him to remain

silent when the lawyer knows such action may lead to considerable harm
at trial.
Differences between the roles adopted by English and American defense lawyers are also important in this context. Lawyers in this country
generally consider themselves aggressive advocates whose first duty is to
obtain an acquittal, and often regard discovery of the truth as incidental
or even irrelevant to this pursuit.729 They have more direct contact with
'730
their clients and are more likely to subscribe to their clients' "causes.
Observers generally agree that English lawyers, on the other hand, are
more restrained in their approach and more detached from their clients
and from the fray of trial combat.7 3 ' Certainly, the defendant's barrister
also desires an acquittal, but generally the English lawyer is more willing
to settle for a fair and just determination rather than to object and enforce each and every rule in the hope of frustrating the prosecution.
These differences are matters of style and degree but nevertheless are sig728. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). Judges
continue to assume that lawyers will try to persuade suspects to make no statement to the
police. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 753 F.2d 178, 185 (1st Cir. 1985) rev'd, 106 S.Ct. 1135
(1986). Some English lawyers have expressed similar views. See, e.g., Williams, Questioning
by Police, supra note 12, at 340.
729. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1967) (White, J., concurring and
dissenting.); M. FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 43-49. Some lawyers put it quite simply:
As a prosecutor, I always had my own opinion as my guide. I could dismiss a case, if
I felt a defendant was innocent. As a defense attorney, I have tried many cases and
never even formed a personal opinion as to the guilt or innocence of my client. That
is not my job; that is not my function; that is irrelevant to my responsibility.
Enright, The Much Maligned Criminal Lawyer, 46 CAL. ST. B.J. 720 (Nov.-Dec. 1971); see
also S. WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1981).

730. See Steinberg, A Comparative Examinationof the Role of the CriminalLawyer in Our
Present-Day Society, 15 CASE W. RES. 479, 485-86 (1964); see also P. COLLIER & D.
HOROWITZ, REQUIEM FOR A RADICAL 64 (1981) (discussing the life and work of Fay
Stender).
731. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 19, at 235-40; M. FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 105-12.
Historical explanations for the "calmer" advocacy of barristers can be found in 1 J.

supra note 8,at 451-53.

STEPHEN,
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nificant in rendering the entire criminal process somewhat less aggressive
and less confrontational. This moderation makes it less likely that a solicitor representing a suspect under interrogation will frustrate the questioning process by inserting distracting objections or by advising his
client to refuse to cooperate. Indeed, preliminary results of the new duty
solicitor schemes and access rules indicate that, although solicitors are
likely to be present at more interviews and sometimes will advise against
making a statement, they often act to "help the interview along" rather
than to impede or prevent it.732 Certainly, this would not be the normal
approach of an American lawyer representing a suspect during police
7 33
interrogation.
In sum, given the realities of the situation and the more moderate
and less confrontational nature of the English lawyer, the solicitor is less
likely than an American lawyer to advise his client to stand on his privilege and remain silent in the face of accusatory questioning.7 3 4 One can
see that, in comparison with American law, the English system allows
considerably more pressure to be brought on suspects to make statements
and provides fewer incentives to challenge their admissibility at trial.
These differences demonstrate the greater respect the English accord to
reliable fact-finding as well as the greater reluctance of English courts to

accept the role of disciplining police through manipulating the rules of
evidence. The differences also reflect the English view that the exclusionary rule has limited usefulness and should be applied with a gentle rather
'than a rigid and aggressive hand. The stronger pressures on English suspects to talk to police may account for the fact that a greater proportion
of English than American suspects make statements and confess. Other

reasons for the difference might include greater reliance by English law
732. Author's Interview with Alan Harding, Home Office, Feb. 1986. One study found
that solicitors tended to take a more aggressive role, challenging questions and placing restraints on interrogators. Nevertheless, the interviews proceeded with solicitors taking notes of
questions and answers. B. IRVING, supra note 246, at 126-27.
733. See Stephens, Flanders & Cannan, Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police
Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REV 407, 428 (1972) ("Most of the
detectives insisted that the presence of a lawyer during questioning usually prevented completion of the interrogation process.").
734. Another influence on solicitors has been the fact that until this year English police
acted both as investigators and as prosecutors. The police, rather than the prosecuting solicitor, determined the charge and controlled the plea bargaining process. In this environment a
defense decision not to cooperate by making a statement might have more direct adverse consequences on the severity of the charge and the eventual sentence than it would in the United
States. Under the 1984 Act, use of the Crown Prosecution Service will result in removal of
most prosecution duties from the police, but it remains to be seen what lingering effects the
old system will have on suspects' new right of access to a solicitor. See Lee, Crown Prosecution
Service, The Times (London), Mar. 31, 1986; The Times (London), May 11, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
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enforcement officials on interrogation as a source of proof, as well as the

possibility that character differences between English and American suspects are such that the English are more likely to cooperate with authorities and to acknowledge responsibility for their misdeeds. 735 Whatever
the causes, the fact that the confession rate is somewhat greater in England and that confessions play a more important role in English prosecutions is not widely recognized in this country. Rather, our courts and
7 36
scholars generally have assumed that the contrary is true.
What can we learn from the English approach to our common

problems? First, we should recognize that such labels as "right to silence,.... right to counsel," and "adversary system of justice" often are
useless platitudes unless defined by application to specific factual contexts. 737 Each is part of the English and American systems of justice but

significant differences appear in their practical applications.
Second, we should realize that emotional or absolutist approaches
toward confession problems are both unrealistic and unproductive. Extreme positions are less common in England where, as demonstrated by
the acceptance of a comprehensive scheme for the treatment and questioning of suspects, people more readily accept the need to compromise
between liberty and the demands of law enforcement:
[English] writers do not reflexively oppose every proposal to increase police powers, nor do their opponents treat every criticism of
the police as evidence of treason. Both sides are prepared to consider
735. See supra section IV.C. Because of a more homogeneous society and less concern
with law enforcement abuses, the English may be more likely to cooperate with the police,
such as by consenting to searches and volunteering to come to the station for questioning. See
P. DEVLIN, supra note 22, at 15; D. KARLEN, supra note 161, at 98, 118, 130. The American
approach may stem from our skeptical attitude toward authority in general. Political commentator Anthony Lewis recently observed:
[Tihere is something special in the American climate. Other countries are free.
Here, freedom has an intense, almost aggressive quality. Our literature does not celebrate social order. We have no reverence for history; we act as if we were liberated
from its strictures. What we revere is law: law not as the repressive arm of authority
that it is in so many countries, but as the guardian of liberty.
San Francisco Chron., July 7, 1986, at 47, col. 4. But times are changing for the English, see
supra notes 687-89 and accompanying text, and explanations based on differences between the
character of English and American suspects may no longer be as valid as they once were.
736. See authorities cited supra notes 19-20. This assumption is not accepted by scholars
who have seriously studied the English criminal justice process. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, supra
note 19, at 228 ("[English] police interrogation is extremely effective.").
English researchers reviewing English studies on confession rates have noted that they
suggest higher proportions of defendants making admissions than have been reported by
American researchers. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 153, at 3-4.
737. See Lidstone & Early, supra note 20, at 488-89 (arguing that the English and Continental systems tend to converge at the pre-trial stage, and that the labels "accusatorial" and
"inquisitorial" have little meaning in this context).
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the prosecution and defense as each having advantages and disadvantages of an incommensurable sort, and to seek a fair balance between
them.
While this kind of middle position is also common in the United
States among large but inarticulate segments of the public, it tends
73 8 to
be under-represented in legal literature and in judicial decision.
Taking a more objective as well as a more balanced analysis of both
the importance and legitimacy of police questioning, we should recognize
the limited part played by confessions in most prosecutions. Both English and American studies demonstrate that the majority of criminal
cases can succeed without them. However, these same studies caution
that we should be fully aware of the importance of suspect statements to
a very significant number of prosecutions. Accordingly, we should disabuse ourselves of the thought that our system of justice can get along just
as well without questioning and obtaining answers from those who are
suspected of crime and who, therefore, are likely to be in the best position
to know the relevant facts. Though confessions appear to be less frequent and less important in this country than in England, still, a good
portion of our criminal cases depend on suspect statements. 739 In absolute terms these cases are substantial in number. For example, 35,353
criminal convictions resulting in incarceration occurred in Los Angeles
in 1980. 740 If only ten percent had been unsuccessful because of the lack
of confessions, 3535 otherwise successful prosecutions would have resulted in dismissals or acquittals. Similarly, 38,530 defendants were convicted in the United States District Courts during the twelve month
period ending June 30, 1985.741 A ten percent loss would have resulted
in erroneous dismissals or acquittals in 3853 cases. With such significant
numbers of criminal cases dependent on suspect statements, there appears to be little support for the assertion of some English researchers
that in both England and the United States confessions are only of slight
significance and the role of interrogation of little overall importance. 742
Furthermore, the importance of suspect statements apart from their role
in the prosecution's case, although not subject to accurate measurement,
is not insignificant.
One may argue that curtailing interrogations and reducing confes738. D. KARLEN, supra note 161, at 100.
739. See supra section IV.B(3).
740. Excluded from this figure are juvenile and traffic offenses as well as those resulting in
fine or probation only. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS, 1980, at 29 (1985).
741. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1985, at 180 table 42 (1985).
742. See M. MCCONVILLE & J. BALDWIN, supra note 21, at 139, 147.
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sions would lead to greater use of alternative means of crime detection,

but the fact is no one really knows whether alternatives of equivalent
reliability would be available or whether law enforcement resources
would be sufficient to take advantage of them. 743 In some cases, alternative sources of evidence would be less trustworthy than a confession. In

others, such evidence could not be found at all. The extent of the harm
to law enforcement that would be encountered by reduced confessions
remains "both unanswered and perhaps unanswerable. ' ' 744 It would be

folly to dismiss the importance of confessions when our system of justice
relies on them to such a significant degree without firm assurance that
other equally reliable sources of proof could take their place.745
Looking at the fair yet effective English rules governing police interrogation and recognizing our own significant reliance on suspects' statements, we might more readily accept the fact that the pressures inherent
in custodial questioning often are necessary to obtain those statements.

In particular, we might consider whether these pressures should continue
to be regarded as constitutionally suspect.

Perpetrators of crime generally do not walk into police stations and
confess. Some initiative by police, such as arrest and questioning, is usually necessary to obtain an admission. The traditional view was that police questioning per se did not involve compulsion in violation of the fifth

746
amendment since the police have no legal power to compel answers.
Miranda dispensed with the requirement that compulsion be of a legal

743. As put by Judge Friendly, "[D]oes anyone truly know... about such things as the
possibilities of 'skillful investigation' of crimes without witnesses, about the increases in the
police force necessary if interrogation were curtailed, and about the risk that this curtailment
might lead to increased dependence on unreliable identifications?" Friendly, The Bill of Rights
as a Code of CriminalProcedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 955 n.138 (1965).
744. Developments, supra note 20, at 944-45.
745. Comparative scholars have recognized in America
an exaggerated notion of the feasibility of police detection by means other than interrogation. There are some crimes in which there is no extrinsic evidence on which a
case can be built. The best the police can do, if they can do anything, is to use their
knowledge of likely culprits based on patterns in method or tips of informers, and try
to obtain a confession. The alternative is to leave such crimes unsolved. The English
generally regard this alternative as undesirable, as do most Americans. But there is a
strong minority view in the United States to the effect that failing to solve crime is
preferable to solving them through the use of confessions.
D. KARLEN, supra note 161, at 129.
746. "It is a settled principle that while the police have the right to request citizens to
answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to
answer.'" Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 n.9 (1983) (quoting Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969)). Since only a court or other legal entity has the authority to
compel testimony, police interrogation was viewed as beyond the protection of the self-incrimination privilege. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 125 (E. Clary ed. 1984).
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nature in order to violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It also broadened the notion of compulsion by finding it
present in the normal custodial interrogation process and required that it
be dispelled by the safeguards of warning and waiver. The Supreme
Court continues to follow Miranda'ssuggestion that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and that, absent procedural safeguards, responses arepresumed to be compelled and coerced except in the narrow
public safety context. 747 The Court distinguishes this presumption of
compulsion from actual compulsion which violates due process, but nevertheless holds the presumption conclusive for purposes of the prosecu74 8
tion's case-in-chief and requires automatic suppression.
One may readily understand Miranda's application of the fifth
amendment privilege to nonlegal forms of compulsion, 74 9 but what justifies a conclusive presumption, in essence an automatic and irrebuttable
rule of law, that the ordinary process of custodial questioning absent the
"safeguards" of warnings and waiver invariably entails compulsion?
Certainly, the process is likely to be stressful and to bring about a degree
of pressure, but why should the natural pressures associated with arrest
be regarded as coercive as a matter of law? Some pressures to confess are
not imposed from without but owe their source to the natural "compulsion to confess" within the human character. 750 Wigmore made the
point with a dramatic flair:
The nervous pressure of guilt is enormous; the load of the deed done is
heavy; the fear of detection fills the consciousness; and when detection
comes, the pressure is relieved; and the deep sense of relief makes confession a satisfaction. At that moment, he will tell all, and tell it truly.
To forbid soliciting him,
to seek to prevent this relief, is to fly in the
75 1
face of human nature.
Other pressures are natural consequences of custodial police questioning,
whether friendly or accusatory. But the normal encouragement of suspects to make statements can hardly be regarded as the equivalent of
747. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
748. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
749. As noted by former California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, "[i]t is casuistic to pretend that because the police have no legal authority to compel statements of any kind, there is
nothing to counteract and hence no need of a privilege against self-incrimination during police
interrogation." Traynor, supra note 12, at 674. Furthermore, custodial interrogation has
been regarded as involving "implicit legal compulsion" on the ground that police "act pursuant to implicit judicial authority." Saltzburg, Foreword, The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional
CriminalProcedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 202-03 (1980).
750. F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC 94-95
(1956); K. MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF 203 (1938); T. REIK,THE COMPULSION TO

267 (1959).
751. J. WIGMORE,

CONFESS

WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,

§ 851 (Chadbourn 3d ed. 1970).
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compulsion. Professor Kamisar strains the term when he argues that
"[i]f the police conduct is designed and likely to pressure or persuade, or
even 'to exert a tug on,' a suspect to incriminate himself ... then that
conduct is 'compulsion' as Miranda defines the self-incrimination
clause. ' 752 To persuade, to push, or to tug may encourage but does not
753
compel, whether physically or psychologically.
Former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Traynor emphasized the importance of allowing the normal interrogation process to
operate free of compulsion, but free as well of artificial restraints on police efforts to obtain confessions:
Only overwhelming social policies can justify the exclusion of such vital evidence. In the case of coerced confessions, the evidence may be
unreliable; even if reliable, a free society cannot condone police methods that outrage the rights and dignity of a person whether they include physical brutality or psychological coercion. . . . [W]hen a
confession is voluntary, however, courts are reluctant to exclude it.
"Interrogation per se is not, while violence per se is, an outlaw ......
So long as the methods used comply with due process standards, it is
to encourage confessions and adin the public interest for the police
754
missions during interrogation.
Furthermore, even if the pressures involved in custodial police questioning can properly be characterized as "compulsion" in some circumstances, they cannot necessarily be so characterized in every case. As
Judge Friendly pointed out with respect to Miranda's list of interrogation horrors, "[n]ot every person in custody is 'swept from familiar surroundings, surrounded by antagonistic forces and subjected' to unfair
techniques of persuasion; if all these factors are essential ingredients to
the presumption of compulsion, the presumption should be so
755
limited."
The English experience reinforces the argument against regarding
products of ordinary custodial questioning as presumptively compelled.
Despite their concern with the fair treatment of those accused of crime,
752.

Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
160 (1980), first published as Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams and Miranda: What is
"Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978).
753. This point was made by Chief Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
1968: "[Ihe Fifth Amendment does not say that a man shall not be permitted to incriminate
himself, or that he shall not be persuaded to do so. It says no more than that a man shall not
be 'compelled' to give evidence against himself." State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 52-53, 243
A.2d 240, 250 (1968); see also L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 374-75 (1968)
("[N]ever in history has the existence of the right placed the state under an obligation to
prevent a person from incriminating himself.").
754. People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 163, 367 P.2d 680, 697, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 57 (1961)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (quoting Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944)).
755. H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 272 (1967).
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the English have not accepted the proposition that suspect statements
will still be available as a source of evidence when the pressures on suspects to make them have been significantly reduced. Far from curtailing
the process of interrogation, England has embraced it with enthusiasm
and endowed it with the ability to exert greater pressures on suspects
than would be tolerated under our laws.
In our system, the absence of important countervailing protections
found in England such as the independent custody officer's monitoring of
suspect statements should caution us against a wholesale adoption of this
English approach toward encouragement of confessions. However, the
English experience demonstrates that an accusatory system of justice
which is sensitive to the rights of the accused is not incompatible with a
system which places considerable reliance on the natural inclination of
suspects to admit wrongdoing and accepts the normal pressures inherent
in custodial questioning. Long before the new protections of the 1984
Act, Lord Devlin noted that "while the English system undoubtedly does
give the accused man the right to be silent, it does nothing to urge him to
take advantage of his right or even to make the course invariably the
attractive one." Defending the pressure to speak generated by a suspect's
fear of jury awareness of his failure to respond, Lord Devlin remarked,
"this dilemma in which the law puts the suspect ...seems to be a per'756
fectly fair one."
Other examples of British moderation and pragmatism might also
assist us in more clearly evaluating our own rules. In particular, the
English reluctance to impose rigid interrogation rules which stand as
barriers to questioning suspects contrasts sharply with our per se Edwards rule prohibiting further questioning once a suspect has asked for a
lawyer and our strict Massiah-sixth amendment rule prohibiting the
"elicitation" by police informants of wholly voluntary statements from
those who have been formally charged in the absence of counsel. 757 The
English equivalent to our Edwards rule is subject to numerous exceptions
which allow police to question suspects before the arrival of their solicitors.758 The English restriction on questioning charged persons does not
apply beyond traditional station house questioning and is also limited by
exceptions unknown to our system. 759 In short, comparable English
rules are less absolute and less restrictive of police interrogation efforts.
Differences in the way the English enforce their rules also provide us
756. P. DEVLIN, supra note 22, at 59, 61.
757. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
758. See supra notes 292-93, 306-12 and accompanying text.
759. See supra notes 351-70 and accompanying text.
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with another helpful perspective. In their efforts to make effective the
rules governing the treatment and questioning of suspects, the English
clearly prefer the use of police discipline over the exclusionary sanction.
In part, this choice stems from the tradition of respect accorded the police and the assumption that disciplinary rules will be of some consequence. A unified law enforcement system enables the English to impose
a comprehensive nationwide disciplinary scheme which recently has been
760
revised for enhanced objectivity and effectiveness.
Nevertheless, confidence in police discipline cannot alone account
for the English reluctance to use the exclusionary sanction. The greater
respect the English accord reliable evidence and the greater importance
they place on trustworthy verdicts also play a role. This is suggested by
the manner in which the exclusionary sanction is used in the context of
"involuntary" confessions.
First, the new Act has narrowed the category of "involuntary"
statements subject to automatic exclusion, defining such statements in
terms of their likelihood of unreliability.76 1 Second, even when a confes-

sion must be excluded as involuntary, all physical evidence discovered as
a result of the statement is still admitted. 762 Thus, even when the English
find the exclusionary sanction appropriate, it is kept within narrow limits. In balancing the need for trustworthy verdicts against the competing
values which support the exclusionary sanction, the English system appears to give more weight to the former than does our own.
We might benefit by considering whether our unbending exclusionary rules are always appropriate when applied to highly reliable and probative "fruit" of confessions. As the pragmatism and moderation of the
English approach demonstrate, and as some American scholars point
out, fairness to the accused can be maintained while interrogation rules,
often complex and technical, are "enforced with a sense of
proportion. '763
Perhaps most important, from the English perspective we can readily see the narrow focus of our own rules. Our rules are principally concerned with reducing the pressures associated with custodial questioning
760. See supra notes 491-94 and accompanying text.
761. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
762. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
763. See Johnson, The Return of the "ChristianBurialSpeech" Case, 32 EMORY L.J. 349,
381 (1983). The Supreme Court has taken a step in this direction by holding that the "fruit"
rule does not apply to products of confessions resulting from failure to give Miranda warnings. But the Court suggested it would still apply to products of fifth amendment and due
process violations as well as to more serious breaches of the Miranda rules. Oregon v. Elstad,
105 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 n.3 (1985).

November 1986]

INTERROGATIONS AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

by requiring that police warn suspects of their rights and that they respect a suspect's assertion of those rights. The English, on the other
hand, while placing limits on pressures that can be used to obtain statements, are not as concerned with totally eliminating those pressures, but
recognize other means of assuring fairness to the accused. Imposing specific rules governing the treatment of suspects and entrusting their enforcement to an independent custody officer are two examples. Others
include detailed record-keeping rules and the new tape recording
requirements.
We might also consider whether our one-dimensional approach is
adequate to deal with the complexities of interrogation. Custodial questioning of a suspect is essentially a secret, inquisitorial process, the result
of which often determines the outcome of the case by affecting both plea
bargaining and trial. This inquisitorial process is sometimes viewed as
alien to our accusatorial system of justice.76 4 Some have proposed abolishing it altogether, 765 while others have suggested various forms of judicial supervision. 766 However, because of the significance we place on
confession evidence as well as the reluctance of judges to take on an investigative or quasi-prosecutorial role, the current structure of the interrogation process is likely to be with us in the same form for some time. It
is most important, then, to correct those most glaring deficiencies that
now exist.
Two of the most serious objections to the interrogation process are,
first, that it is conducted in secret solely by the investigating police officers and, second, that the results, often crucial to the outcome of the
case, may not be subject to independent verification. Opening the process to outside scrutiny and supervision and requiring a reliable means of
verifying what occurred would go far toward enhancing overall fairness.
The English have taken solid steps in this direction by requiring that an
independent custody officer be responsible for the conditions of detention
and questioning, and that the police maintain detailed records and eventually tape record all station house interrogations.
Shifting the focus of our concern away from the natural pressures
inherent in police questioning and toward reducing the secrecy which
surrounds it would benefit both the prosecution and the defense in a
number of respects. It would enhance public confidence in our system of
764. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
765. See Ellis,supra note 7; Rogge, Confessions andSelf-Incrimination, in THE RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED IN LAW AND ACTION 61 (S. Nagel ed. 1972).
766. See W. SCHAEFER, supra note 20, at 76-81; Friendly, supra note 643, at 671, 713;
Kauper, supra note 19, at 1235.
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justice and, ultimately, bolster respect for law enforcement. Opening suspect interrogation to outside scrutiny would provide more reliable evidence, reduce court contests over what occurred during the questioning
process, and reduce the need for jury trials. Finally, it would tend to
ensure greater fairness by encouraging police to follow prescribed rules
and deterring them from bringing excessive pressures on suspects.
This is not to say that we should adopt the identical approach of the
English. Objective monitoring of interrogations may be better accomplished by an individual independent of the police or by videotape rather
than by audio tape. Also, our own system presents more formidable barriers to monitoring interrogation because of the presence of defense counsel. Without substantial alteration of our rules regarding the
consequences of silence and our understanding of the role of the defense
attorney, counsel's presence would ensure, not that questioning would
take place fairly, but that it would not take place at all. Furthermore, we
would do well to maintain many of our existing rules. For example, Miranda'swarning requirements enhance the overall fairness of the process
and do not significantly reduce the frequency of confessions. The
Supreme Court recently assumed that Miranda warnings tend to deter
suspects from responding to police questioning, but it cited no evidence
in support of this view. 767 Most studies conducted in the aftermath of
Miranda found some increase in refusals to make statements as well as a
lowering of confession rates, but generally the amount of change was not
substantial. The experience of Justice O'Connor as a trial judge, recounted by her during her Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation
hearing, is probably typical:
My experience on a trial court is that application of Miranda has not
resulted in an inability of police to still be reasonably successful in their
efforts to gain information and obtain statements. It has, no doubt,
precluded some, but on a broad general basis I cannot say that I think
police have been unable to cope with it .... People continued to make
statements despite the fact768that they had been warned of the consequences, in large measure.
Furthermore, Miranda warnings may significantly benefit the prosecution. Prior to Miranda the prosecutor was required to establish that a
confession was voluntary without any guidelines as to what specific facts
767. See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (1985). In New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984), the assumption was used as a basis for concluding that Miranda warnings
need not be given in situations posing a threat to the public safety. In Moran v. Burbine, 106
S. Ct. 1135 (1986), the assumption was stated as a basis for holding that Miranda does not
require that police inform a suspect of his attorney's efforts to contact him.
768. Nomination of SandraDay O'Connor: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1981).
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would satisfy this burden. Now, compliance with Miranda's dictates
often assists the prosecution in meeting its burden of proving the statement voluntary and, thus, admissible. The Supreme Court recently
stated:
We do not suggest that compliance with Miranda conclusively establishes the voluntariness of a subsequent confession. But cases in which
a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating
statement was "compelled" despite the fact that the law769enforcement
authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.
In conclusion, although Miranda's warning requirements should
not be abandoned, they should be placed in their proper perspective in
relation to other means of promoting a fair and reliable interrogation
process. Seeking to dispel all pressures associated with interrogation
may not be the best means of attaining this goal. Focusing on opening
the process to independent monitoring and verification would go farther
in promoting reliability and efficiency as well as fairness. Furthermore,
the establishment of such protections would lay a foundation for reconsidering some of Miranda's harsh and inflexible rules, such as the requirement of automatic exclusion regardless of the extent of the
impropriety or the seriousness of the case and importance of the
statement.
The Miranda Court disclaimed any intent to create a "constitutional
straitjacket" and invited suggestions of "potential alternatives for protecting the [fifth amendment] privilege. ' 770 However, we have adapted
to our "nonconstitutional" straitjacket and now feel comfortable in it,
often not realizing the extent of our confinement. The English example
should awaken us to new approaches which would not only protect the
769. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,433 (1984); see also Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.Ct.
1135, 1142 (1986). A study of the reaction of Denver, Colorado trial courts to Miranda found
that Miranda aided the prosecution in meeting its burden of proving confessions admissible.
See Leiken, supra note 532. Even strong critics of Miranda have recognized that a warning
that the suspect is not required to make a statement "will serve to facilitate the confession's
admissibility." F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 710, at 167.
770. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control
Act purported to modify Mirandaby providing that confessions shall be admissible in evidence
if voluntarily given. The guidelines to be applied in determining voluntariness included
whether the suspect was advised of the right of silence and the right to the assistance of
counsel. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1983). Appellate courts have been reluctant to apply the Act in
light of Miranda's admonition that "the issues presented are of Constitutional dimensions."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
With the Court later characterizing Miranda rules as "procedural safeguards" rather than
rights protected by the Constitution, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974), a foundation has been established for returning to a more flexible standard of admissibility. This path
has evoked strong support, but that support is often unaccompanied by suggested alternatives
for protecting the privilege. See, e.g., Inbau, supra note 534, at 798-800.
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privilege, but offer a fairer, more flexible, and more efficient process for
the questioning of suspects.

